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
LOS ANGELES

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CHINA and Her People

Being the Observations, Reminiscences, and
Conclusions of an American Diplomat

By
THE HON. CHARLES DENBY, LL. D.
Thirteen Years United States Minister to China

In Two Volumes
VOLUME II.

PROFUSELY ILLUSTRATED WITH REPRODUCTIONS
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China and Her People

CHAPTER I.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

IT would be useless for me to describe in detail the administration of government in China. Anybody who wants to read such an account will find it *in extenso* in Williams's "Middle Kingdom." I freely admit that the system of provincial government was admirably devised to govern a people who were isolated from the rest of the world, whose idea of government was that of family rule, and whose head was the mouthpiece of heaven. What I shall endeavour to enforce, after a few general observations on the form of government, is that China now imperatively needs

a consolidated government, and that the foreigners, if they are wise, will, in their own interest, pursue a directly opposite course from that which they have pursued since 1897. Instead of robbing China of her territory, and holding the emperor in leading-strings, they should build up a strong central government. It may perhaps be surprised that this is exactly what the great European powers do not wish to do, because they cannot help looking forward to the day when the country will be partitioned among them. Every riot or murder tends to advance this proposition farther along toward its consummation, and the weaker the government the more riots,—but I am writing first in the interest of my own country and next in that of China. I will recur to this subject hereafter.

All the world knows that China presents to-day, as it did thousands of years ago, the only perfect specimen of a theocratic government that is now extant. The emperor is the high priest of his people. He worships Heaven, and he declares its will. His is the “Celestial Empire.” He is a despot, but a patriarchal, or parental, despot. The people

are his children, and the family relation is the basis of his authority. As the children owe absolute obedience to their fathers, so the people owe the same obedience to the emperor. Despotic as the emperor's rule theoretically may be, practically he governs little. He is encompassed by forms and ceremonies. Every act he does is recorded. He is the slave of precedent. Once, when a censor proposed to record an act which the emperor contemplated doing, the emperor ordered him not to record it, but the censor said that he must then record the imperial prohibition to make the record, whereupon the emperor abandoned his purpose to do the act. China is divided first into districts — hsien, which are ruled over by a district magistrate, or chi-hsien. The next grand division is into provinces. In China proper there are eighteen provinces. Manchuria, Mongolia, and other outlying countries are not counted with these provinces. We hear it said now that the Chinese care nothing for Manchuria, because it is an appanage of the throne, and not a constituent part of the original China. As far as the imperial government is concerned, the chief function of these prov-

inces is to remit to Peking the proportionate share of each toward bearing the expenses of the government. These provinces are ruled over by governors, but in some cases the important ones, either alone or in conjunction with others, are governed by officials whom the Chinese call Chih-tai, and the foreigners viceroys. Thus Li Hung Chang was for more than twenty years Viceroy of Chihli, and Chang Chi Tung has been Viceroy of Hunan and Hupei.

These viceroys and governors may be said to have all power, extending in the case of viceroys to life and death. The viceroys have armies of their own, their own navies, in some cases their own mints. While the Throne appoints all the important officers, it leaves to the viceroys and governors the absolute control of the provinces. There is no legislative body whatever, and the edicts of the viceroys constitute the laws of the land. It thus happens that there are many riots and disturbances in the provinces which are directed against the provincial authorities, and not against the Throne at all. The condition of China in the actual administration of its government may



LIN KUN-I, LATE VICEROY OF NANKING

be likened to our own condition before the adoption of the constitution of 1787. What our far-seeing forefathers did for us in 1787 must be done for China now. They supplanted a weak, disjointed, inoperative confederacy by a strong, united federal government. She needs a consolidated government, an imperial army and navy, a government mint, an imperial system of banking and currency which will create national money, the consolidation in the Empire of the powers of the viceroys and governors, a central board to control mines and railroads. Her government now is a rope of sand. There is no check on the viceroys except, perhaps, the criticism of the censorates.

While the emperor is clothed with autocratic power, he can rarely exercise it. He rules, but he does not govern. In the Japanese war and the riots of 1900 the provincial viceroys stood aloof. In Central and Southern China it was scarcely known that any trouble existed. China had, in 1900, declared war against all the world, but the central and southern viceroys wisely refrained from doing anything whatever except to repress disorder. When the empress deposed the emperor, scarcely a

ripple of excitement went over the country. Clearly such conditions must be changed, and some scheme of government must be devised by which the central authority shall be supreme, not merely in conception but in actual administration.

With the establishment of a strong central government should come reform not only in the fiscal system, but in the immoral and disgraceful practices of the office-holder. China pays wretchedly small wages to its employés, from the highest to the lowest, and each and all are expected to "squeeze" from the people all the subsidies that can be procured without direct robbery. The whole people is demoralized by the tolerance extended to "squeezing," and private integrity does not exist except among the Chinese merchants and bankers. Peculation is the order of the day, and it cannot be avoided. Foreigners have tried to remedy this annoying evil, but they have found it impossible to do so, and now submit, just as we in this country submit to a universal system of tips.

While China is as autocratic as Russia, nevertheless many principles of democracy

enter into her system of government. The emperor is a despot, but he is a patriarchal despot. The head man in every village rules it, but his rule is parental. It is very kindly and gentle, and it dispenses with the costly and troublesome formulas of courts of law. There are no lawyers and no juries in China. Equity governs the judgments of the courts. An example of this was furnished when, in a certain case, there was a finding for the plaintiff, and damages were awarded him, but, because his conduct had been in some particulars blameworthy, the amount assessed in his favour was ordered to be paid to a charitable institution. Uprisings against magistrates and their decisions are quite common in China. The populace sometimes drags the magistrate from his official seat, and — acme of insult — pulls off his official boots. On the other hand, popular magistrates are presented with many pairs of boots. If a magistrate complains to the Throne of the conduct of the people, he is simply told that if he cannot get along with the people he had better retire. And he does retire. Even the gods are subject to popular displeasure. In times of drought they are put

out in the sun that they may see for themselves how hot it is, and, when the rain lasts too long, they are scourged with whips in order to secure a cessation of the deluge.

China is said to have more books than any other country. I am not able to say whether this statement is true or not, but certainly the Chinese have a voluminous literature. In Peking there are several blocks of streets in the Chinese city which are devoted to books. The Hanlin Library contained many thousand volumes. Among them there was one work comprising 23,633 volumes. The Boxers conceived the idea that the burning of this priceless collection would create so much smoke that the foreigners would be driven out of the British Legation. They accordingly set the library afire, but the wind changed and no harm accrued to the beleaguered foreigners.

CHAPTER II.


THE TRADE OF CHINA

THE trade of China, as it exists in this opening of the twentieth century, differs somewhat in character from the trade which occupied the attention of our ancestors in the early days of the nineteenth century. Then, not only China was not opened, but many developments in the commercial life of the West were undreamed of. Not only has the East changed in the methods of its business, but the West has changed also. The articles of commerce are more numerous, the means of transportation are facilitated, and the financial methods are enormously improved. Old trade channels have been abandoned, old methods have fallen into disuse, a greater uniformity in the commercial practices of China and the West has superseded the variety of cus-

toms and methods once distinguishing the "China trade" from that of the rest of the world. Above all, the agents of trade have changed, and foreign merchants inhabit the commercial centres of China as they do those of other countries of the world.

Before China entered into treaty relations with the countries of the West, there were two main routes to her market; one was by land through Central Asia, one by sea around the Cape of Good Hope, or through the Persian Gulf. The Good Hope route has been almost entirely abandoned. The Suez Canal brings steamers from Europe and the Eastern States of America more quickly and more cheaply; the overland route was in the days of caravans never very important except for the tea trade of Russia. The great trade routes to China to-day are by sea from Europe *via* Suez, and by sea from Western America; the only rival to them is the railway across Siberia and Manchuria, and, until railway transportation enormously increases in cheapness and efficiency, the sea will continue to be the road for the Western nations of the world to the ports of the East. Soon we shall have the Panama

CARAVAN ENTERING PEKING



Canal, which seems destined to revolutionize the commerce of the world and to transfer maritime supremacy from Europe to America. None can foresee the ultimate effect of such an innovation.

Though routes have changed, the objects of the China trade have not varied much during the recent century, especially as regards exports. It was the tea and the silk which brought the mediæval traders to Cathay, and these articles are to-day the staples of trade. Foreign relations with China began with Canton and extended up the coast. For this reason our school-day ideas of China are confined to the south, and we associate the name with fans, quaint boxes, paper parasols, ginger, and tea. When the north was opened by the French and English wars of '58 and '60, and access to Tientsin was established, new exports were added; the wool and hides, the beans, beancake, and straw braid of Tientsin, Chefoo, and Newchwang were given an outlet to the markets of the West.

The variety and extent of imports into China have constantly increased. The country has afforded an enormous market for the


cottons of the United States and England. The old hand-looms of the interior have not been able to compete with the factories of our country, and more and more the smooth and well-made piece goods from abroad have replaced the coarse but durable homespuns, until the greatest item of the import trade is now the products of Manchester and New England and the flourishing mills of our Southern States.

Foreigners were early attracted to the possibility of cotton manufacturing in China. They naturally reasoned that, if foreign goods could be imported and sold in competition with the hand-made article, by availing of the cotton produced throughout the Empire and the cheap silver-paid labour to be had, a great profit must await the manufacture on the spot of the completed article. Disappointment met these efforts. The Chinese were able to so manipulate the cost of cotton, and the cost and efficiency of labour, that the splendid weaving plants of Shanghai, Hankow, and elsewhere have not only made no money, but have been run at a loss or stopped altogether. It would seem, however, that this

cannot long be the case, and that the cotton-spinning business should eventually be so reformed and organized that it would prove a most profitable enterprise.

Iron and steel, and articles made of these metals, are a large and increasing item of China's import trade. China made iron for centuries, but never in such quantities nor of such quality as to supply her demands. The smiths of Shansi were early famous in the history of the country, and to this day the manufacture of iron pans by hand in that province is almost a monopoly. In Shansi we find the coal and iron lying side by side within easy reach, and the smelters' art there goes back beyond the records of man. After the foreigner came, however, the Chinese artisan was not slow in discovering the superiority of the foreign article, and the import of iron assumed great proportions. In particular the good temper of the iron which is made into foreign horseshoes was early noticed, and cast-off horseshoes are imported by tons into the Empire. All through the interior one may find the itinerant smith with tools, bellows, and anvil, beating out, at the doors of his

customers, knives and other implements from the worn-out shoes which once protected the hoofs of the horse of Western cities. Some of these shoes are of much greater size than would fit the hoof of any Chinese horse, and they excite the astonishment of the rustics, who regard them as some invention of the "foreign devil" to fit some diabolic artificial horse, which he himself has constructed. It is an auspicious sign for China that one of the large articles of import is railway material, rails, bridges, and locomotives. These articles come almost exclusively from the United States and from England, though now some French and Belgian supplies are finding a market under the protection of capital of those nationalities. As between England and America the contest remains undecided as to which can equip the Chinese railroads more cheaply. Usually, when times are dull in America, our manufacturers quote the lowest prices; if our factories, on the contrary, are busy, England underbids us. This is one of the most unsatisfactory features of foreign trade in American manufactured goods; we do not



BIG GUN IN FORTIFICATIONS AT SHAN HAI KWAN

maintain prices abroad, and always prefer the home market.

The trade in arms is also a large factor in the import trade. China has bought from Europe and America millions of dollars' worth of rifles, big guns, swords, pistols, and ammunition, which she has used to keep order amongst the turbulent portions of her Empire, or of which she has made ineffectual use in her various foreign wars. Her arsenals remain to this day museums of arms of all patterns and dates, and all apparently equally ineffectual in the hands of her armies. When the allies captured Tientsin in 1900, the American troops found in the arsenal there thousands of Winchesters, Mausers, Lee Metfords, Mannlichers, and other rifles, and many hundred thousand cartridges. Great warehouses were filled with swords, pistols, shells, and other implements and materials of war. The Chinese, in the Boxer madness, fired millions of rounds of ammunition and distributed to the mobs rifles in great variety and profusion, but they might have indefinitely augmented their forces, as far as arms were

concerned, without exhausting the enormous supplies at their disposition.

When the representatives of the foreign powers, at Peking, inserted a paragraph in the peace conditions to the effect that the importation of arms should be suspended, competent observers felt that the step was superfluous, because China had already within her borders enough war material for any force she might care to put in the field. It was not lack of guns which led to their defeat in 1900, but it was a lack of something in the man behind the gun.

If China listened to the advice of her most disinterested friends to-day, she would give up all idea of arming and maintaining a strong military force, and she would, even more, abandon all aspirations for a powerful navy. The Chinese navy has been almost entirely bought and equipped from abroad. Many million dollars have been spent on Krupp and Armstrong cruisers and on guns and equipment. Somehow it has happened that, when called on for the defence of the country, these fleets have proved an ineffectual reliance, and they have, on two notable occasions, been com-

elled to surrender to the French and Japanese. China, on land, with the immense forces at her disposal, if the cause excited the popular approval, would be a very difficult country to conquer. Admiral Seymour, on his expedition to Peking, found his progress impossible in the face of the crude and unorganized opposition which he encountered. A hostile force marching through the interior and opposed by an organized resistance would find the obstacles too great for hopes of ultimate success. The weakness of the Chinese defence, however, is that it is not difficult to detach the people from their allegiance to their flag and to employ them in expeditions against their own government. China, in fact, cannot be regarded as a nation in the same sense as are the nations of the West. Great antipathy exists between people from different parts of the Empire, and it was even found in the Boxer uprising that the Cantonese in Tientsin and Peking were quite as much an object of hostility as were the foreigners themselves, and they were in even greater fear.

The cotton goods, the iron and steel and the implements — warlike or otherwise — made

thereof, do not exhaust the list of China's imports. The oil from Pennsylvania and Ohio lights millions of homes in China, and we have literally denuded our mountains on the Pacific Coast to supply Eastern Asia with wood for building material. Our canned goods — the salmon of Washington and Alaska, the fruits of California, the meats of Chicago and Kansas City — all have contributed to swell the total of America's trade.

Japan and Austria have taken a foremost place in the supply of matches, Belgium in glass, France in wines and bric-à-brac, Germany in a vast variety of miscellaneous articles, including a large importation of chemical dyes and electrical material, watches and clocks, soaps and perfumes.

One subject which has been very much discussed recently is the attitude of the Chinese people toward the commercial invasion of their territory, and by ill-informed persons it has been claimed that commerce, in some ways, was as much responsible for the ill-will of 1900 as were the acts of foreign governments or missionary activity. This seems to be an erroneous view. The people as a whole are


devoted to trade. The foreign trader, as a trader, is welcome everywhere, and foreign wares are offered for sale in Chinese shops throughout the Empire. The Chinese are not slow to appreciate the advantages of trade, and they appreciate also the improved means of communication which make accessible the remoter parts of the Empire. It may safely be said that it is only when the foreigner comes with some attack upon the religious feeling of the Chinese, or in pursuit of some political design, that he is met with suspicion and hostility.

The railway is doing much to bring the different parts of the country into communication, and will do much to unify and consolidate the Empire. At present the means of communication throughout China may be roughly divided in character between the north and south. In the south nearly all transportation is by water or by coolies, and it is possible to travel for many hundreds of miles without encountering a pack-animal. This is partly due to the absence of roads, partly due to imperfect means of crossing the watercourses which intersect the country, and largely due

to the fact that the roads are in many places mountainous and impassable even for mules. In the north all this is different, — there are great, open plains, stretching for many hundreds of miles, and traversed by dusty highways leading in all directions. Here, throughout the winter, is carried on an immense traffic by means of carts drawn by mules, oxen, and donkeys. As the transport varies in the two sections of the Empire, agriculture is also widely different in character. In the south, due to the abundance of water, the principal crop is rice; in the north, over the alluvial plains, immense crops of corn, kaoliang, sweet potatoes, and various kinds of millet are raised. In the summer the northern plains are covered with a dense green growth. In the winter they are bare, — robbed even of the roots by the people in search of fuel.

One striking and recent innovation in the crops of the north is opium. In Manchuria, and even within the Great Wall between Tien-tsin and Shan Hai Kwan, the poppy is grown over enormous areas. Opium is an easy and profitable crop, it is easily grown, the soil is perfectly suited to it, the finished product is

THE GREAT WALL NEAR SHAN HAI KWAN



easily transported and is sure of a market,—so poppy replaces wheat and corn and millet over hundreds of thousands of acres. The only thing that can be said for it is that China-grown opium will eventually cut off the Indian trade, and at least enable the people to spend in their own country the money which they devote to their own perdition; but the opium trade as a whole is a curse to the country, whether the article be Chinese or foreign, and the greatest blessing that could befall the Chinese people would be to have a government with the moral and physical force to stamp it out. The whole opium trade is unfortunately intimately associated with foreigners; the very name of the poison is “foreign dirt”; and the connection with opium is the blackest stain on the whole history of foreign relations with this people.

One interesting feature of Chinese trade, which we can easily believe had no counterpart in the earlier days of Western commercial relations, is the question of exchange. China being a silver country, and silver being the measure of value there, whereas the foreign countries are as a rule doing business on the

basis of gold, the profits of each transaction depend on the ratio of value between the two metals. This, in a sense, makes business almost gambling. For instance, if a merchant can buy in Tientsin a thousand bales of wool for a certain sum in silver taels, whether he will make a profit or a loss on the transaction depends on how much gold he will be able to receive in exchange for his silver. If a tael is worth sixty gold cents at the time that he buys his wool, and then falls to fifty gold cents at the time that he wishes to sell it, his profit will disappear in the difference in exchange. Similarly, if he has bought for silver, and silver rises in value, he stands to make a large profit on his transaction. It is customary for merchants to insure themselves against these fluctuations by arranging with the banks to fix the rate of exchange for some months in advance. For instance, a merchant who has bought when a tael was worth sixty gold cents, and expects to receive payment from his American consignee three months later, can arrange with the bank that the rate of exchange for this particular transaction shall be sixty cents at the expiration of the three months. But this



OPIUM SMOKING

device is not in all cases effectual, because, if exchange has fluctuated much in the meantime, and silver has become cheaper, a rival may take advantage of the more favourable ratio and undersell his competitor. It is the uncertainty arising from this condition which makes the mercantile communities throughout the East so anxious to secure a fixed ratio between gold and silver by some international coöperation. This has been done with such success in India that China merchants feel that there would be no difficulty in adopting a similar measure in this country. Appeals have been made to the United States government for its assistance in this connection, and there is every reason to believe that, if the steps of the United States meet the approval of the other great commercial powers, the uncertainty of exchange in China may cease to have such a disastrous effect upon its trade and industries.

One of the great problems in China to-day is what shall the future of the country be in a commercial sense. This is naturally largely dependent upon the political future of the Empire. If this should be dismemberment, its

effect upon trade would naturally depend upon the policy of the powers which acquired the divided territory. As a rule, the capital engaged in great enterprises in China is subscribed by people who wish to make a profit from the conduct of those enterprises, and orders, as a rule, go to the nationality of the people who furnish the capital. If a Belgian syndicate builds railways in China, the Belgian capitalists who furnish the money are almost certain to insist that the material shall be bought in Belgium from their friends. Naturally enough, if a country like Germany spends money and sacrifices the lives of her soldiers and sailors in obtaining a foothold in Shantung, it is to be expected that the profits to be made from the development of enterprises in Shantung shall go to German manufacturers. It has been the actual experience of an American locomotive manufacturer to have his locomotives refused by the German railways in Shantung, although cheaper than German, and the explanation given to him was that, though cheaper than German, German capital was invested in the province, and one of the conditions of this investment was that

railway material should be bought in Germany. An open door is a farce under such conditions.

The capitalists of the United States cannot hope, on the mere ground of cheapness, to meet foreign competition. It will also be necessary for them to invest their money in those countries whose trade they wish to exploit, and above all, to have their resident representatives there. It is not only by manufacturing goods in America and shipping them abroad that foreign trade can be created, but also by the industry and activity of American citizens who devote their time and their money to the development of enterprises in foreign lands. In this sense trade follows the flag.

CHAPTER III.

PROGRESS OF FOREIGN TRADE IN CHINA

IT has been a long and hard struggle for the foreigner to get a foothold in China. The first treaty was made in 1842. Before that the foreigners were confined on a strip of land near Canton, and were represented in all their dealings by nine Chinese firms which were called the Cohong. The East India Company, which had the monopoly of the English trade with China for two hundred years, had its Eastern headquarters at Canton. It paid its superintendent \$100,000, and it allowed \$500,-000 for expenses. The Portuguese went to China in 1525. They finally occupied the port of Macao, which they still hold. Macao has gone to ruin and decay. During the time when coolies were exported to South America, Macao, being the port of shipping, did a thriv-

ing business, but now the harbour is nearly silted up, and the only thing for which Macao is notorious is that it is the headquarters of the game of fantan. The fantan dealer formerly paid \$400,000, Mexican, per annum for the privilege of playing the game, but he now pays only \$40,000, and the revenues of the colony are greatly reduced.

The Dutch went to China in 1632. They had at one time a thriving establishment at Formosa, but they were either driven out or murdered. The first English vessel anchored off Macao in July, 1635, and a long struggle by England to create and build up trade began. Through the opium war and the arrow war the contest went on, until to-day the foreigner has thirty concessions where he may live and own land and carry on business. By paying from fifteen to twenty per cent. ad valorem, the foreign merchant may bring in goods from abroad, and send them anywhere in the interior. By a recent treaty the likin tax has been abolished. In addition he must pay a coast-wise duty from treaty port to treaty port amounting to $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. He may export goods by paying 5 per cent., and he may

bring goods down from the interior without paying any duty. The English arranged in their treaty with China that the individual may bring in liquors, cigars, books, clothes, and many other things for his own use without paying any duty, but under the Peace Protocol these articles now pay a tariff duty. The foreigner has also secured the right of extraterritoriality, and cannot be tried or sued in any of the Chinese courts. His own consuls have exclusive jurisdiction over him. Thus the condition of foreigners in China as compared with other countries is exceptionally good.

Naturally it would have been supposed that foreign trade would have reached great proportions, but this expectation has not been justified. Foreign trade has never exceeded 334,000,000 of dollars in any one year and our own share has never been more than about 34,000,000 of dollars. Some writers and lecturers on this subject portray a future in which this trade will reach billions, but I am not inclined to indulge in their roseate dreams. For centuries the internal trade of China sufficed to supply the wants of the people. These

vast masses of humanity traded with one another, and while other nations in the East crumbled and fell, China stood erect, and her people in the main were prosperous and happy. Her soil supplied every want, and the interchange of products between the north and the south, the east and the west, took the place of foreign trade. Undoubtedly, however, if peace prevails in China, foreign trade will increase largely. The railroad has come to furnish easy and quick transportation. The people are being educated day by day by the foreign press, the diplomatic and consular body, the Imperial Maritime Customs and the missionaries, and new wants are springing up. When China fairly embraces foreign conditions she will move with an impetus that will astonish the world. She may emulate or surpass Japan, which, in less than fifty years, has gotten rid of her old customs, and has leaped fully equipped into the arena of modern nations.

That our own trade with China is increasing may be seen on all sides. Oregon sends lumber and railroad ties; Denver sends mining plants; South Carolina and Alabama send cotton.

The mills in those States run full time in order to fill their contracts with China. Piece goods and kerosene oil are leading articles of export to China. Iron, flour, drugs, are also articles of export, and the Baldwins have sold about forty locomotives to Chinese roads. A few years ago they sold 150 to Japan. The depreciation of silver has greatly helped the export trade from China. When, after the passage of the Sherman Bill in 1891, silver went up to nearly par with gold, a temporary trouble was produced in trade. The man who had bought goods on a silver basis, and who, when he discounted his bill of lading on London got only a half or a third as many silver dollars as he expected to get, ceased for a time to discount bills, but silver soon commenced to fall again and finally reached forty-seven cents, that is to say a silver dollar was only worth forty-seven cents of our money. Recently it has fallen as low as thirty-three cents. It was plain to everybody that the export trade from China would greatly increase, as it did. When a man can buy for forty-seven cents, and sell for a dollar, he is apt to buy all that he can. Quantities of tea, silk,

satin, straw braid, wool, hides, were bought and exported. The question was, what would become of the import trade where a man buys for one dollar and must sell for forty-seven cents? But curiously enough the import trade, though it did not increase in the same ratio as the export trade, fairly held its own. The manufacturer in the United States was protected in his own country, so he could afford to lower the prices on goods sold abroad, and although the merchants in China were compelled to raise their prices somewhat, they did not do it exorbitantly.

In considering the effects of the disturbances of 1900 on trade, it must be remembered that they were confined to the three northern provinces, Chihli and Shantung and Shansi, and parts of Manchuria, and that the other sixteen provinces were untouched. The middle and southern provinces are the rich commercial parts of China. In these the foreigner has all the appliances of civilization, and so far he has been unmolested. The Boxers did not constitute a great part of the people. The stores, the banks, the factories, the steamships, are all in full blast as heretofore. Foreign

trade in the two provinces and in Manchuria has long ago resumed its course. The foreign trade of China approximated \$333,000,000 in 1899, an advance of \$44,000,000 on the total of 1898 and double that in 1900. Sixty-three per cent. of trade is British, eleven Japanese, ten American, five Russian, and the balance is with France and Germany and other countries. Sixty-one per cent. of the tonnage is nominally British. This statement, which is compiled from the reports of the Imperial Maritime Customs, is, however, misleading. Hongkong is the entrepôt of foreign trade. It is a free port and no statistics are ever kept. Goods from Canton go to Hongkong for shipment abroad, and are credited to Hongkong. Goods from the United States destined to China go to Hongkong for trans-shipment, and are credited to Hongkong. Necessarily such must be the official returns, but in reality the exports went from the United States and not from Hongkong. Millions of dollars' worth of goods go from Hongkong to London destined for the United States, but in the official returns they appear as shipped from London. I have never doubted that our trade

with China was next to that of Great Britain. It exceeds that of the whole continent of Europe, leaving out Russia.

The Imperial Maritime Customs issues every year "Returns of Trade and Trade Reports" for China, and an elaborate report thereon is made by the statistical secretary. From the report for the year 1902 I have culled the following facts and figures:¹ "Three noteworthy events connected with commerce took place during the year, the negotiation of a new British treaty, the revision of the import tariff, and a heavy fall in exchange. This collapse in exchange, which will call for higher currency prices for new cargo with the uncertainty of its future movements, naturally disturbs the import trade, while by augmenting the amount which the government has to find to pay its gold obligations, it has led to heavier internal taxation, which has a tendency to counteract any temporary advantage to exports."

The statistical writer proceeds to denounce pessimistic views regarding the commercial

¹ The more recent figures are not materially different from these. — THE EDITOR.

solvency of the country, shows that the foreign debt is trifling, and predicts an expansion of trade, provided that taxation is taken off goods in transit, and local industries are relieved of excise taxes.

He deprecates the imposition of a consumption tax on native goods, and the hindrance of the introduction of foreign capital by levying excise on machine-made products.

China cannot absorb more imports unless she has something to give in exchange. Cheaper transit and the removal of burdens on domestic trade will improve the situation. The trade of the Great Powers with China in 1902 was as follows, estimated in Haikwan taels — sixty-three cents to the gold dollar: Great Britain, 67,968,985; Hongkong, 216,-181,544; United States of America, 55,078,-865; Europe, Russia excepted, 58,213,315; Russia via Odessa and Batoum, 4,682,921; Russia and Siberia via Kiakta, 4,267,090; Russian Manchuria, 3,196,129; Japan and Formosa, 64,070,577; British America, 3,-198,123; the Philippine Islands, 1,006,093.

The foreign population of the treaty ports is reported for the chief powers as follows:

Great Britain, 5,482; Japan, 5,020; the United States, 2,461; Germany, 1,359; France, 1,263; Portugal, 1,220. The Chinese population in the chief cities at the ports is reported as follows: Canton, 880,000; Hankow, 850,000; Tientsin, 750,000; Hangchow, 700,000; Foochow, 624,000; Shanghai, 620,000; Nanking, 270,000.

CHAPTER IV.

AMERICA'S TRADE WITH CHINA

Americans are supposed to be the most adventurous people in the world, but in trade and commerce with foreign countries they do not justify this reputation. Above all things our merchants and manufacturers should study the details of the Chinese trade more than they do. They should send commercial agents to the country to find out for themselves the conditions and the needs of trade. What can be more ridiculous than the inquiries which often reached me touching the trade in fine buggies in China? I often got letters asking for the names of dealers in buggies in Peking, and enclosing circulars, in English, of course, to be distributed. There isn't a decent road in North China, and in the south there are nothing but paths. The ordinary vehicle in the north is a heavy cart, or

wagon. Rich people ride in chairs, the middle class in carts or litters, and the poor go afoot. There wasn't a single buggy in Peking, and very few vehicles of any kind except carts.

The Chinese does not want knives and forks, he uses chop-sticks. Above all he wants cheap things; but when he takes a fancy to an article he will buy it at all hazards, until he commences to counterfeit it, which he soon does. I had some trouble with the counterfeiting of the brand of "Indian Head" cotton cloth, which was very popular, and "Eagle Brand" condensed milk. I procured from the Yamen an order that the counterfeiters of American brands should be severely punished, and, under my directions, Mr. Reid, the able consul at Tientsin, broke up by energetic prosecution before the Tautai an establishment which had put immense quantities of counterfeited goods on the market.

Kerosene oil has won its way to universal consumption by its cheapness. It has practically superseded bean oil, which was made in every village. It has run the gauntlet of all kinds of persecution, and has been charged with the perpetration, in one form and another,

of all the crimes in the calendar. Proclamations have been issued against it, setting forth the dangers attending its use, religious views have been invoked, but still it wins its way everywhere. Why does not one of our inventors make a cheap lamp, something that will not break? The Germans have one of which they have sold large quantities, and we could do much better.

Wealthy Chinamen buy immense quantities of ornaments and knick-knacks, but our staple articles cost too much to be bought by the general public. If one were asked why the most adventurous nation in the world — as Americans are — becomes the least so in its dealings with other nations, the answer would probably be that our system of protection provides our manufacturers with a highly paid home market, and they do not feel the necessity of cultivating foreign markets. When the time comes, as no doubt it will, when the home market is overstocked, then our people will look abroad for consumption. Then we shall see the same keen competition in China for a market that we see at home. As the condition of the Chinese improves, his wants will

increase. Fancy what would happen to the cotton trade if every Chinese wore a shirt! Well, the missionaries are teaching them to wear shirts. How the hat trade would boom, if every Chinese wore a hat! The Japanese have taken to wearing hats — why not the Chinese? In Japan you may see any minute a native clad completely in his own costume, except that he proudly wears a foreign hat. Sometimes he transfers his allegiance to shoes, and everything is native except his shoes. Changes must come to China as well as Japan, but it is idle to imagine that they will come without work, more serious work than the reports of consuls or commissioners, work done by active, "hustling" agents like those we have always busy here at home, — the great, able, untiring body of that justly honoured class — the commercial travellers — familiarly known as "drummers."

We may reasonably expect the railroads now building in China to do the work of progress there as they do it here — but the conditions are different. We build lines into the wilderness, and the population comes on behind. In China the people are already there.

An immense passenger traffic may be immediately relied on. The number of travellers in this country is enormous, but, except at noted centres, it is nothing when compared with the quantities of people who travel in China and Japan. When the railroad between Peking and Tientsin was completed, it carried from the start immense numbers of passengers. It ran four passenger-trains a day each way, and room on them was wanting. There was one car for the foreigners with high-priced tickets, one for the well-to-do Chinese at a lower figure, and the open, uncovered cars for the common people at very low rates, which were always packed. In 1898, after a year's use, the line was making nearly taels 500,000 net every month. All the railroads north and south, east and west, will be jammed with people from the very beginning. I cannot speak so enthusiastically of the freight trade. Of course the railroads will bring out more goods than the caravans did, but of agricultural products there will be little to transport. After the mines are well at work, and the vast stores of coal, iron, and silver are opened, the harvest of the railroads will begin. Mean-

TRAIN ON THE SHANGHAI - WOOSUNG RAILROAD



time they will carry rice and millet and other food products to a people whom starvation year by year stares in the face. They will do other good things. They are great civilizers. They will familiarize the people with the foreigners, and they will emphasize the benefactions of intercourse with foreign peoples. They will accomplish also a great political purpose on which the future of China hangs. They will bind the distant parts of the Empire together and make it stronger. They will make rebellions and riots less frequent, because troops can be sent to quell them with rapidity and ease.

I have very often argued on these lines with the Yamen, to be answered sadly that my reasoning was right, but they were bound by the old conservative customs of the country, and were afraid of the people. The time has come when the logic of events has made it not only possible, but necessary, that a new leaf should be turned, and it is safe to say that the building of railroads will revolutionize trade, and materially influence the government as well.

Under the treaties of 1858 the tariff on imports was calculated at five per cent., but the

fall of silver reduced it to three per cent. By Article VI. of the Peace Protocol the tariff on maritime imports was raised to an effective five per cent., including all articles heretofore free, with the exception of rice, cereals, and flour, as well as gold and silver coin. By the recently made treaty the tariff has been raised to between fifteen and twenty per cent.

In the beginning of 1900 we had our greatest trade with China, but the returns for the year show how trade in the north was wiped out. At Newchang trade was completely destroyed. At Tientsin the losses were enormous, particularly in Oregon lumber. No goods could be landed during the disturbances. The total duties in China fell off two and a half millions of dollars in 1900. The losses in the cotton trade were estimated at \$3,000,000. We supply the food products of the world. Let some one invent, as has been suggested, an acceptable food article cheaper than rice, and if possible the millet, and a great trade in it will spring up.

It boots not now to say what we might have done had we not taken the Philippines. However unpremeditated was our seizure of these

islands, the event has seriously modified our treatment of China. For us China must remain simply a market. She must be an outlet for our superabundance of manufactured goods, and a field for our missionaries.

The arena of ethics in which the white race claims sovereignty over the black, the copper, and the yellow races is closed for us so far as China is concerned. The new Pacific has opened up a splendid area for commerce. Our condition at home is forcing us to commercial expansion. Day by day our mechanics are demanding shorter hours of labour and higher wages. Day by day production is exceeding home consumption. Whether protection or free trade shall solve the problem of securing the greater market for our manufactures is to be the great political question of the future.

CHAPTER V.

THE PROVINCE OF SZE - CHUEN

THE existence of natural gas wells in Sze-chuen, and the magnitude and importance of that province, make it proper to devote some consideration to a description of it.

The province of Sze-chuen, lying in Western China, on the border of Tibet, has been known for many hundred years as one of the prosperous and peaceful portions of the Empire. It has always held a high rank and was at one time the site of the capital, the emperors of the later Han dynasty having ruled at Ching-tu-fu. Its present flourishing condition, however, dates from the early part of the seventeenth century. At that time, in the disorders of state which culminated in the overthrow of the Ming dynasty, Sze-chuen was devastated and almost depopulated by the

notorious robber Chang Hsien-chung. To re-people its fertile hillsides, land was allotted to immigrants from Hu-kwang and Kiang-si, to whom, as an inducement to settle, great reductions in the land tax were made. This ancient concession has been conscientiously adhered to, so that to this day the land tax remains almost nominal.

Throughout the present dynasty its history has been uneventful. The Taiping rebellion, which devastated thirteen provinces, inflicted little or no injury here. Continued peace, fertility of soil, and freedom from taxation have enabled the inhabitants to obtain a degree of prosperity and contentment contrasting favourably with other parts of China.

Sze-chuen comprises a territory of 167,000 square miles, being almost as large as France, and has a population numbering between 35,000,000 and 45,000,000. It may be described in general terms as a plateau at the foot of the vast highlands of Tibet, exceedingly mountainous in its topography, and abounding in streams and rivers, carrying a large volume of water and flowing with great rapidity. From the four largest of these

rivers Sze-chuen (four rivers) gets its name. In the geographical features it is divided into two parts, Western and Eastern Sze-chuen. The former partakes of the character of the Central Asian table-land. It is very rugged in its conformation, sparsely populated, and almost unfit for cultivation. The eastern portion, however, called by Richthofen the Red Basin, from the abundance of its red sand-stone, is the scene of the industry, wealth, and prosperity which mark descriptions of Western China. The climate is of an almost tropical character, and the soil of great fertility, producing nearly all the cereals, as well as silk, hemp, sugar, tobacco, opium, and an unusual variety of fruits. Cotton is cultivated to some extent, but not in sufficient quantity to supply the demands of the local market.

The growth of opium has in recent years assumed great importance in Eastern Sze-chuen. The poppy is grown over vast areas, forming in many districts a regular winter crop of the bean and Indian-corn lands. This crop is very profitable to the farmer, not only for the drug produced from the sap, but for the oil pressed from the seed, the lye manu-

LIKIN (CUSTOMS) STATION



factured from the ashes of the stalks, and the leaves which furnish food for pigs. Thirty catties of seed will yield ten catties of superior oil for illuminating purposes or for food. Though it is doubtless chiefly for the opium produced that it is cultivated, it is said that the other products of the poppy would remunerate the grower. It is not difficult to raise, will mature in time to allow other crops to ripen on the same ground the same year, and the opium produced is readily converted into cash, all of which tends to make it popular with the farmer. The facility with which opium, on account of its convenient form and small bulk in comparison with its value, can be carried over the mountainous roads of Sze-chuen, enabling the bearer to evade vexatious likin stations, and to smuggle it duty free into neighbouring markets, tends also to make it an exceedingly profitable product. Some idea of the inducement to this smuggling can be formed when it is remembered that the customs duty on imported opium is 110 taels per chest. A large percentage of that produced in Sze-chuen evades all taxation whatever. The area under cultivation annually increases,

and the drug of Sze-chuen, with that of Manchuria, to which, however, it is inferior, constantly encroaches on the market of the Indian product. It is a source of great dissatisfaction to the missionary to observe the wide extent of fertile ground given up to Indian corn and poppy, the one to be converted into alcohol, the other into opium.

The mineral resources of the province have been long known to the Chinese, though, because of the primitive means at their disposal, never fully developed. Bituminous coal, copper, gold, and iron ore are abundant, but mined only in limited quantities.

Salt, which is a government monopoly, is obtained by the evaporation of the water of the brine wells which abound in certain districts of Sze-chuen. These brine wells and the manufacture of salt there constitute a most interesting industry. The wells are found about 175 miles from Chung-king, on the bank of an affluent of the Yang-tse River, near the flourishing city of Tzu-liu-tsing, or self-flowing wells. The manufacture of salt, which has been carried on here for sixteen hundred to two thousand years, is conducted somewhat

as follows: By means of a rude iron drill, holes six inches in diameter, and varying from a few score of feet to five thousand or six thousand feet in depth, are bored in the rock. The boring sometimes lasts for forty years before brine is reached, and is carried on from generation to generation. When salt water is finally found it is drawn up by bullocks in long bamboo tubes by means of a rope working over a huge drum. In the vicinity of the salt wells, natural gas wells are also found, from which gas is supplied to evaporate the brine in large iron cauldrons, leaving the pure salt as a deposit. The product of salt here is enormous. There are twenty-four gas wells and about a thousand brine wells in operation in the vicinity, producing annually two hundred thousand tons of salt, valued at \$5,000,000.

The method of boring these wells is described by Baron Von Richthofen. To make a well the Chinese use a long and elastic bamboo pole supported in the middle by a cross-piece, a rope made by coupling the ends of long (not twisted) slices of bamboo, and an iron instrument which weighs 120 catties (catty, 1 1-3 pounds). The rope is fastened

on the thin end of the pole, and the iron on the end of the rope. A slight up and down motion of the thick end of the pole makes the iron hop and bore a vertical hole with its broad, sharpened edge. The ground to be perforated consists chiefly of sandstone and clay. When a portion of this rock is mashed, clear water is poured into the hole, and a long bamboo tube with a valve in the bottom is lowered, and the turbid water raised to the top. Pipes of cypress wood are rammed in to protect the sides of the bored holes, and to prevent the water contained in the surrounding ground from getting access to the well. The pipes are attached to each other at the ends with nails, hemp, and tung oil. The inner width of the pipes is about five inches. As the work proceeds the pipes are rammed deeper, and a new one attached on the top; the rope, too, is made longer. At a depth varying from seventy to a hundred chang (seven hundred to a thousand feet) the brine is struck, and the well is fit for use. The brine is raised to the top through long bamboo tubes and bamboo ropes, as described, by means of a horse-

whim, and then carried to large pans for evaporation, or led to them through bamboo pipes.

Besides these wells there are others which are bored to the depth of from eighteen hundred to two thousand feet. At that distance below the surface petroleum is struck. Immediately on reaching it an inflammatory gas escapes with great violence. Work is now stopped and a wooden cap, perforated by several rows of round holes, fastened over the mouth of the pit. In each of them a bamboo pipe is inserted, and through these the gas is led under the evaporation pans. The pipes ramify, and on each end a tapering mouth-piece, terminating in a small aperture, is attached. The gas is then used for evaporating the brine.

The enterprising spirit which induced the Chinese to examine the ground at so great a depth is said to have its origin in the drying up of a brine pit. The proprietor was in hopes of meeting brine at a greater depth, but found instead the gas.

When the country was infested with rebels during the Taiping rebellion, they removed the cap from one of the gas pits and set fire

to it. Since that time, or at least up to the time the Baron Richthofen wrote, a long column of fire arose from that pit, and it is considered nearly impossible to stop the flame.


The gas pits and brine pits are owned separately by corporations. The owners are subjected to the control of the government. The government monopoly is in the hands of the "Taotai," who resides at the place. The salt works of Tzu-liu-tsing yield considerable revenue to the government, and have besides enriched numerous proprietors, and given occupation to a large population. The number of fire pits is twenty-four, and the salt pits are innumerable. Some of them do not enjoy the advantages of gas, and the brine is evaporated with grass and wood. There are salt pits in neighbouring localities on the Min River, but no gas pits.

Virgil C. Hart, writing in 1888, says of these wells: "No one can visit this remarkable section of Sze-chuen and see the operation of this ancient industry without feeling more respect for the people who designed and executed an undertaking on so prodigious a scale sixteen centuries ago."

It is a remarkable fact that Marco Polo, the noted Venetian traveller of the thirteenth century, who mentions the oil wells on the Caspian Sea, and whose notice nothing of importance seems to have escaped, does not speak of the kerosene or natural gas wells of Sze-chuen, though such phenomena were absolutely unknown in Europe at that time. He remained probably but a short time in Sze-chuen, and mentions only its capital city, and its mighty river which he identified with the Yang-tse, but which is the tributary river Min.

The convention concluded between China and Great Britain in 1888, opening Chung-king to British trade, attracted attention anew to that city and to the resources of the province of Sze-chuen. Chung-king is the commercial metropolis of Western China, and, under its new status as a treaty port, is destined to annually increasing importance. It is situated on the Yang-tse, at the mouth of the Kiating River, 725 miles above Hankow, and 1,506 miles from Shanghai. It is beautifully located on a sandstone promontory surrounded by mountains, and resembles, it is said, the city of Quebec.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of passing the Yang-tse gorges above Ichang with junks towed by coolies against the rapid current, the trade between Chung-king and the lower river ports is considerable. The Yang-tse and its tributary here are covered with thousands of junks, and the wharfs and river-front present the animated scene of a busy mercantile centre. The past history of Chung-king does not reach back to any great antiquity. It is said to have been built by imperial command about 230 years after Christ. Its ancient earth walls were replaced with stone in 1400, and these were destroyed at the siege which the city underwent at the beginning of this dynasty, in which most of the population was slain. Since this disastrous incident Chung-king has flourished with the prosperity of Sze-chuen. It now numbers about 120,000 people and is the second city in the province, Ching-tu-fu with one million people being the first. Chung-king was the scene of the disastrous anti-foreign riots in 1886, in which the Roman Catholic, English Inland, and the American Methodist Episcopal missions suffered the destruction of their property. The loss sustained, however,



CHINESE JUNK

was fairly compensated by the imperial government, and these three missions are again in the field. Other anti-foreign riots broke out in Ching-tu-fu in 1895, during which all the foreign property was destroyed by mobs. The government paid heavy damages and the foreign buildings were all rebuilt.

The time will come when the upper Yang-tse will be navigated by steam vessels, and the whole province of Sze-chuen will be brought within cheap and easy reach of foreign commerce. The resources of the province, the industry and prosperity of the people are such that the foreign merchant's most sanguine estimate of the future can not be considered extravagant.

CHAPTER VI.

MANCHURIA

THE attention of the world has recently been directed to Manchuria, and especially to the policy of Russia and Japan toward that country. When I went to China in 1885 it was the almost universal opinion of diplomatists that Russia intended to seize one of the Korean ports, presumably Wensan, or Port Lazaraff, as she calls it. In anticipation of such action, England in 1885 seized Port Hamilton, a Korean island. She held it two years, and evacuated it February 27, 1887, on the promise of Russia that she would not take any Korean territory. The world, still, did not believe that Russia was in earnest in this declaration. Mr. Henry Norman, writing in 1894, declares that "except for some European cataclysm which will set back all Russian schemes for a century . . . the terminus of

the Siberian railway will be in Korea." But Mr. Norman was mistaken, though when he wrote everybody concurred with him. It was plain that Russia would not build a railroad 4,713 miles long without having a terminus on the unfrozen sea. At that time it was not possible to see how such a terminus, over the opposition of England, could be secured in China — but everything comes to him who waits. The Japanese-Chinese war of 1894 altered all the plans of Russia and gave her the opportunity which she coveted, to secure a Chinese port which was open all the year. While, before that war, China was not regarded as an essentially warlike nation, still its power was respected. Li Hung Chang had built a fine navy which was regarded as invincible, the Chinese had whipped the French, and the enormous population promised soldiers in illimitable numbers. The Japanese war dissolved the bubble. It demonstrated the absolute incapacity of China to carry on any foreign war successfully. She stood before the world humiliated and powerless. It was well known that, whatever indignities were heaped upon her, she could not resent them. In fact

the Chinese have always had a silly idea that they could play off one nation against another, that they could interest one nation in their welfare so as to make it stand as a guard and protector against other nations. Naturally she had turned to Russia, whose territory was limithrope with hers for over four thousand miles, which was an Asiatic power, and which was the undying foe of England. She had the right to rely on Russia. That country had prevented Japan from taking the Liaotung peninsula, and she had made a recent treaty with China — the Cassini Convention — whereby she had agreed to protect her against all comers. When the time came to test this solemn alliance, it dissolved in the rays of self-interest, as the bubble does in water. Russia, it appeared, felt aggrieved that China had leased land to Germany, though she refused to assist China to prevent that aggression, or even to advise her to fight her own battles.

So it came about that Russia in 1897 acquired by lease Port Arthur, and Tailienwan Bay, and the strip of land back of it, and the right to run her great railroad straight through Manchuria to the open sea. Neces-

sarily the operation of this road involves the control of Manchuria. Openly, or secretly, Russia must be the supreme power in Manchuria. A great part of the commerce of the world is destined to pass over this road. It is to be the chief thoroughfare of travel. The time is not far distant when the traveller will be able to get into a railroad car at Petersburg, and get out at Canton, having traversed six or seven thousand miles in twenty days. Such a line going through the wilds of Manchuria must have a strong power to protect it. Its protection means the concentration of troops, and the control of the civil government, but does not imply the actual absorption of Manchuria. Now let us coolly and dispassionately consider our interest in this question. Such a discussion may be, probably will be startling, because it is unusual and improper for an American diplomatist to venture to hint at anything which would seem to disparage or antagonize England. It has become the fashion to talk about our blood, and our language, et cetera, and the writer who does not fall into this sentimental vein is an outcast. If, for example, England had taken Man-

churia, as she took Burmah, the Hongkong colonial possessions and Wei-hai-wei, we would be discreetly silent. We would find some excuse in the common blood and religion idea for the acquisition. There would be no outcry, but the act of expansion would be treated as the natural advancement of the Anglo-Saxon, indeed, possibly as his high and bounden duty, because on him rests the obligation to enlighten the world. Now, I have not the slightest desire to weaken our sentimental relations with England. I am content that all non-official people shall turn to her with fondness and affection. Naturally we all have some such feeling. When I saw at Dover the cliff down which King Lear was supposed to jump, I thought it was very low compared with the poet's description of it. When I saw the English people, I could not help realizing that their much boasted affection for Americans had dwindled just like the cliff did. I mean their affection for us as individuals. I do not doubt that England likes America politically.

Let it be said openly that in all international matters we are too prone to consider England's

interest therein as something important which it is our duty to consult before we take action. Now, the true rule of international action is that all nations should be treated by us alike, enemies in war, in peace friends. In considering the Eastern, as all other questions, we should look to our own self-interests—this is patriotism. Plainly it will be a severe blow to England if Russia ever gets Manchuria. Such action advances her many thousand miles toward India. Should war for the possession of India, which has time and again been imminent, ever occur, the possession of a railroad across Asia will be a most advantageous strategical condition — but how does that condition affect us? We have no interests in India. Should Russia get Manchuria it is not likely that our commercial interests will suffer. I know that one cannot rely implicitly on the most solemn declarations of nations, but in 1899 and 1900 Russia distinctly gave assurances as to impartial trade, — the “open door,” — and, as she notoriously values our friendship, she will, probably, adhere to them. Of course we know that she has on divers occasions proclaimed that she intended to respect

the autonomy of China, but she does not regard such declarations as inconsistent with the control of Manchuria, stopping short of annexation. Were it not for the universal dread that the annexation of Manchuria would be followed by the partition of China among England, France, Germany, and, perhaps, Austria and Italy, we might view the happening of the event with greater equanimity, but I am not in favour of the annexation of Manchuria to Russia. I was, and am, opposed to the whole business of seizing under forms of lease any of the territory of China by the European powers. I prefer that China shall work out her own destiny.

Nevertheless, Russia must have some latitude in managing the Manchurian question, and we should freely and frankly acknowledge the fact. The talk about an alliance on our part with England and Japan, to fight Russia and France, should be discountenanced. Let us plainly and openly recognize as a fact in international politics that Russia is, and ought to be, as dear a friend to us as England is. Let us abandon this undercurrent of opinion, which runs, like the Gulf Stream, through all

international questions, and wherever it goes fertilizes a tender feeling for England. Let us openly proclaim that we are as friendly to Russia as we are to England. We owe so much to her. She is the one European nation that stood by us when the Union was in danger. She openly, and proudly, was friendly to the North, when the South strove so strenuously to secure sovereignty for itself, and came so close to success. She opposed the recognition of the Southern Confederacy, when England and France, with her acquiescence, would have proclaimed it, and would have thereby destroyed the Union. It may be a curiosity in history how the autocrat has befriended the republican, but it stands out as an undisputed fact.

Manchuria is a country worth fighting for. It is a white man's country, and not a tropical land where life is a burden to our race. Its size deserves mention. The area of China proper is 1,534,963 square miles; of Manchuria, 363,720; of the North Atlantic division of the United States, including Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and

Pennsylvania, 162,065 square miles; while England and Wales have only 58,378.

Manchuria is one-fourth the size of China proper — the eighteen provinces — and twice the size of the States named. It is by no means a land of snow and ice. Mr. A. R. Colquhoun, who recently travelled through Manchuria, and wrote an excellent book, says:

“The climate may be described as a Canadian winter and summer, with this difference, that there is a blue sky throughout the year.”

The temperature varies between seventy and ninety degrees in summer, and in winter between fifty degrees above and ten degrees below zero. The rivers are frozen over from November to the end of March. The country is rich in minerals, gold, silver, lead, iron, coal and salt, being all found in paying quantities. Manufacturing industries are not important. Bean oil is the chief one. Distilling is carried on, and a strong spirit is produced from sorgho. Leather is tanned. Wool felt, macaroni, and starch are made. Fishing is a great occupation. There are large forests, but wood is chiefly imported from the United

States. Wild animals abound. Tigers are frequently killed. The plants are millet, bean plants, various cereals, wheat, oats, buckwheat, and maize, tobacco, indigo, the ricine plant, potatoes, and all kinds of vegetables. The poppy is largely cultivated, and its production competes greatly with the Indian drug. Ginseng, which is the most prized of Chinese roots, grows largely in the wild state. Cattle breeding is extensively carried on in parts adjoining Mongolia. Brigands are common. In travelling in Manchuria I saw many inscriptions to beware of robbers. Travelling is uniformly done in Chinese carts. Road making is unknown. A railroad is being built from Peking to Mukden. It deviated from its true line twenty-seven miles to avoid the tombs of the present dynasty, else the fung shui would have been disturbed.

The chief imports from the United States are cotton goods, kerosene oil, and lumber. Thirty per cent. of the entire imports into China of piece goods went to Manchuria from the United States in 1899, and six per cent. of the coal oil. The mills in Alabama and South Carolina are or were running exclu-

sively for this market. They manufacture a heavy cloth, which is peculiarly adapted to Manchuria. A cheap woollen cloth should be invented for this market.

Russia was severely criticized for the massacre of the Jews at Kishinef, as she ought to be by the people, but it is questionable whether our government should take up such a subject and make it the matter of international protest. I recall here a counter incident, which has never been noticed by the press, but which deserves recognition. It will be found reported at page 195, U. S. Foreign Relations of 1895. Upon the request of the American missionaries at Kalgan, China, I asked the Russian minister at Peking to give me a passport or some official paper, granting to the missionaries the right to go into Russian territory in the event that they were attacked by a Chinese mob, and forced to flee for their lives. To this application the Russian minister answered that the rules relating to the matter were very precise, and that it would be useless to telegraph to St. Petersburg on the subject. He suggested that the Americans should go to Urga, where Russia had

a consul, and that, if desired, he would give them a letter to the consul. This proposition was not accepted because to reach Urga would have necessitated the travel of hundreds of miles through Chinese territory, and protection at the end would have been doubtful. In the usual course of business this matter was reported to the State Department, which, through its ambassador at Petersburg, brought it to the attention of the imperial government. The Czar immediately granted the desired permission to take refuge in Russian territory from the attack of a Chinese mob without imposing on the Americans any previous conditions whatever.

The American missionaries at Kalgan were not molested by an anti-foreign mob in 1894 or 1895, and no use was made at that time of the permission so kindly granted, but during the riots of 1900 it became necessary for these same missionaries to escape to Russian territory, and they did so by travelling for many days across the Gobi desert, and when they reached Russian soil every kindness and courtesy was extended to them by the authorities. While I was in Peking I was twice re-

fused requests made to enable missionaries to travel through Siberia, but when it became a question of saving lives, the Czar acted distinctly and unqualifiedly in the interest of humanity.

CHAPTER VII.

CHINESE RIOTS

IN the chapter on Manchuria I have discussed some of the political questions which confront us in China, and there are few others. When one has settled to whom the precedence shall fall in China — to the Russians or the English — he has settled the Eastern question. Abstractly that question is not, or ought not to be of the least importance to us. The problem is wherein lies our interest, and not whether either of the two nations will be benefited or injured by any line of conduct that we may adopt. Being an American, and having been honoured by four administrations of different political parties to a degree far beyond my deserts, I speak and write what I believe is for the interest of my own country solely. I am glad that from the President down to this humble writer all

Americans are united on one subject — and that is, that justice should be done to China. Let us have no cant about this question. Let us in looking at it recognize and understand its real merits, and let us hold China at the bar of public opinion to a just accountability. It is certain that China has not done her full duty in protecting the foreigners in her borders, as she agreed in the treaties made with all nations that she would do. I have always been convinced that she could, if she would, make foreign life as safe in China as it is in Indiana. It is idle to point to occasional riots in this country, produced mainly by dastardly assaults by negroes on unprotected women, as an argument to show that riots cannot be prevented. Such occurrences spring from a sudden and overpowering passion for revenge that sweeps away in its current the coolest and most peaceable men. Human nature is not strong enough, in spite of law, to resist the pressure of the combined feelings of sorrow, resentment, and a craving for inflicting punishment on the criminals who perpetrate these awful crimes. Riots in China against foreigners have no such excuse. The foreigner

as an individual does no wrong to the Chinese. He brings to him alms, employment, education, and the hope of spiritual improvement. I will say it proudly for the foreign residents in China, that among them the individual cases of maltreatment of the Chinese are exceedingly rare, and that no class condemns them more than the foreigners. I remember a case in Peking when an American, unprovoked, brutally assaulted a Chinese waiter at a hotel, and I recall, also, that I made him pay heavy damages for his wrong-doing — and this was the only case of the kind that I ever heard of.

Chinese riots are not sudden. They are prepared and organized beforehand, with the full knowledge that the local authorities will make no real effort to suppress them. At Chungking in 1895 the viceroy had twenty-five thousand soldiers under his command, but the rioters marched by the doors of his Yamen, and through the ranks of these soldiers, and proceeded to sack and destroy foreign property in his view, and he did not raise a hand to prevent it. It was said that the soldiers joined in the work of destruction.

Above the demands of commerce, above the

licenses to missionaries to practise their honourable profession, above the question of paying damages for wrong done, stands the all-important proposition that foreign life should be made secure in China.

It is idle to talk of missionaries going into the interior, or of building railroads, or of opening mines, unless protection be guaranteed to the strangers. This is the foundation-stone of our intercourse with China, on which all foreign interests depend, and unless protection is assured we had better abandon the country.

If the riots of 1900 are to occur again, if the foreigners are to be periodically butchered as they were at Pauting-fu, at Kutien, at Tientsin, and many other places, the effort to do any business in the interior ought to be abandoned.

It seems to the writer that the members of the conclave of nations, which sat at Peking in 1901, did not give to this subject the consideration which it then deserved and still deserves. The Protocol of September 7, 1901, contained many excellent provisions. It provided for the erection of a monument to the

memory of Baron Ketteler; for the punishment of the leaders of the riots; for the suspension of official examinations for five years in certain guilty cities; for reparation for the assassination of a Japanese chancellor; for the erection of an expiatory monument in the desecrated foreign cemeteries; for the prohibition of the importation of arms and ammunition into China for two years; for the payment of damages to the Powers, being in gross the sum of Haikwan taels four hundred and fifty millions; for the granting of a foreign concession at Peking; for the razing of the Taku forts; for the occupation by the foreigners of certain strategic points; the posting and publishing in certain cities of certain edicts issued in the interest of foreigners; agreeing to assist in improving the Peiho and Whangpu rivers; the doing away of the Tsung-li-Yamen and the establishment in its stead of the ministry of foreign affairs called Wai-wu-Pu, which takes precedence over the six boards, and the modification of the court ceremonial to accord with Western usages.

In consideration of these agreements the foreign plenipotentiaries declared that with the

exception of the Legation Guards the international troops would evacuate Peking, September 17, 1901, and with the exception of the localities mentioned would withdraw from the province of Chihli, September 22, 1901. It is freely admitted that the articles of this protocol embody several very useful and important provisions tending to the benefit of foreigners.

What I want to do is to call particular attention to the clause which relates to the protection of foreigners. It reads as follows: "Edict of the first of February, 1901, declaring all governors-general, governors, and provincial or local officials, responsible for order in their respective districts, and that in case of new antiforeign troubles or other infractions of the treaties which shall not be immediately repressed, and the authors of which shall not have been punished, these officials shall be immediately dismissed without possibility of being given new functions, or new honours." This is all that the protocol contains on the subject of the protection of foreigners. It simply provides that the edict of February 1, 1901, shall be published and posted during

two years in all district cities. So far as they go the provisions of the edict are good. The deprivation of office is no doubt a severe punishment for an official, but this penalty is not sufficient. It is right that the officials should be held responsible for preserving order, and that if the riots occur they shall suffer if they do not repress them and punish the offenders, but a more strenuous course had always been urged on the Chinese government. By the instruction of my government I demanded that punishment of officials in such cases should be commensurate with the crimes committed. If, for instance, murder occurred, the negligent official should be punished with the penalties of murder, and so with arson and other crimes. The first head demanded by a foreign power after a riot should be, not that of an obscure rioter, but of the highest official in the locality. If the Chinese government would apply the rules governing the transactions of its own people to those affecting foreigners, ample justice would be secured. The responsibility of officials in China is practised and enforced in all cases affecting the government and individuals. If government

money, for example, is stolen in any province, the viceroy or governor is held responsible. He must recover it or pay it.

In civil matters all the members of the family are responsible for the payment of each other's debts. The Chinese code goes further in criminal matters than any other code. It provides that if any person knows of the intention of another person to commit a crime, and does not communicate this knowledge to the authorities, he shall be punished as a principal. The plenipotentiaries at Peking might very easily have set this matter at rest, and in a few words have prevented the recurrence of riots, and why they passed the subject over with a simple reference to a decree previously issued remains a mystery. This subject has been discussed by every American Minister. It has been the subject of many despatches sent by the State Department to its representatives. I have, time and again, brought it to the attention of the Yamen. During the last administration of President Cleveland it was, owing to the occurrence of riots in Sze-chuen in 1895, minutely and particularly discussed by Secretary Olney. As a result of his instruc-

tions I sent to the Yamen a paper, which is reproduced here because it emphatically supports the views hereinbefore expressed. It is scarcely necessary to state that whatever merit it possesses is due to the distinguished gentleman who was then Secretary of State. It will be seen that this despatch demands the condign punishment of negligent or culpable officials, and I cannot forbear expressing my regret that it was not considered by the framers of the protocol before they made their demands on China.

“Your Highnesses and Your Excellencies:—

“On the twenty-first day of September, 1896, I had the honour, by direction of my government, to address to you a communication to the effect that my government was carefully considering the subject of anti-foreign riots in China, with the view to present to you thereafter another communication embodying its views on the measures it desired to see adopted, in order to prevent the occurrence of these lamentable outrages on foreign residents in China.

“I have now the honour, by order of my

government, to lay before you the following observations:

"It is unnecessary to dwell upon the necessity that rests upon China to secure the safety and security of foreigners residing in her borders. Such persons dwell in China by virtue of the treaties and conventions which recognize their right to remain in her territory. This right and the consequent duty of protection by the government have been recognized in many imperial edicts and in many papers emanating from the Tsung-li-Yamen. In spite, however, of the most solemn assurances, given from time to time by the imperial government, that foreigners in China would be protected, in spite of the issuance of passports, which on their face engage the government to afford protection, there occur year after year, almost month after month, riots and massacres which startle and shock the civilized world.

"It is desirable that the subject of riots should be treated as a whole, for, while the incentive motives are not the same in all cases, the graver question of official responsibility, which underlies most antiforeign outbreaks in

China, is the principal subject of the concern of my government.

"The earnest desire of the United States government, and it is confidently expected a like desire animates that of China, is to render the recurrence of outrages of this nature impossible, by the adoption of such measures as experience has now shown best suited to that end.

"The punishment of those who have actually participated in antiforeign riots has rarely been as prompt or as severe as it ought to have been; furthermore the erroneous idea is entertained in China by many of the officials, and the people generally, that money payments for injuries suffered constitute a complete indemnity. Such, however, is not the case, for, in addition to the reimbursement of the sufferers for losses actually sustained, there remains that vindication of the law by the state, which is the only deterrent of crime. Nor does the punishment of a few ringleaders satisfy justice. The official who deliberately stands by and fails to intervene to protect innocent people, when he has at his disposition sufficient

means to enable him to do so, is at least as guilty as the actual leader of a mob.

"The commission sent by my government to investigate the antiforeign riots in Sze-chuen has stated its belief that: "The simplest and most efficacious policy is to insist that the local officials shall be held responsible and punished, without further investigation than is necessary to establish the fact that such riots have occurred; for we are firmly convinced that, except in the case of open rebellion, no such riots of any extent can take place if the local officials are energetic in the use of their influence and the means they have at their disposal."

"Commander Newell in his report of the Ku-tien riots says that but for the inertness, inefficiency, and culpable negligence of certain provincial and other authorities, whom he mentions by name, the massacre of Hua-shan could have been prevented. While these statements may not be applicable to every locality in China in which riots have occurred, they certainly do apply to every city and town of considerable importance. In such places there are soldiers and policemen, sufficient and able to prevent rioting if they are commanded to

do so. Uprisings against the authorities, occurring anywhere in China, are put down by the strong hand, and secret societies are held firmly in check, and the members thereof are often tried and executed. Incipient conspiracies are unearthed and instantly suppressed. In any offence against the government the utmost vigilance, forethought, and strength are shown in dealing with the offenders. Anti-foreign riots are not sudden local uprisings of ignorant and malicious persons, as has sometimes been claimed, but all the proof shows that antiforeign rioting, pillage, and massacre are often arranged beforehand, without much, if any, effort at concealment, and it is difficult to avoid the belief that the local officials are cognizant of and at least tacitly approve of the felonious designs which are concocted within their immediate jurisdiction. It is perfectly evident, for instance, that there was last year a concerted action between the capital and the outlying towns in Sze-chuen, and that a general plan was organized to drive foreigners from that province, and that the officials had knowledge thereof.

"From the foregoing remarks it is necessa-

rily to be inferred that the main remedy for existing evils, and the surest preventive of riots, will be the holding of local officials to a personal accounting for every outrage against foreigners that may occur in their jurisdiction. Such a line of conduct is in strict conformity with the established usage in China with regard to all crimes and misdemeanours, other than such as concern foreigners.

" My government concludes that the best means to prevent the recurrence of antiforeign riots in China, as far as Americans are concerned, for whom alone it speaks, would be to adopt the following measures :

" 1. Recognition by the issuance of a formal declaration in an imperial decree that the American missionaries have the right to reside in the interior of China.

" 2. The declaration in such decree that American missionaries have the right to buy land in the interior of China ; that they have all the privileges of the Berthemy Convention, as amended in 1895, and that deeds taken by them shall be in the name of the missionary



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society or church which buys the land, as that convention provides.

" 3. The determination of and formal declaration by China by imperial decree to hold responsible, and promptly punish, not only all individuals and minor officials directly or remotely involved, upon the occurrence of any riot, whereby peaceable American citizens have been affected in person or property or injured in their established rights, but also the viceroy or governor of the province in which it has occurred, who is directly responsible to the Throne for the acts or omissions of every one of his subordinates, although his only fault may be ignorance.

" 4. That the punishment of officials found guilty of negligence in case of a riot, or of connivance with rioters, shall not be simply degradation from or deprivation of office, but that they shall be in addition rendered for ever incapable of holding office, and shall, also, be punished by death, imprisonment, confiscation of property, banishment, or in some manner under the laws of China in proportion to the enormity of their offence.

" 5. That the imperial decrees embodying the

above provisions shall be prominently put up and displayed in every Yamen in China.

"In presenting the foregoing suggestion it will naturally occur to you that my government has not undertaken to go into detail regarding everything it thinks should be done after a riot has occurred, such, for example, as compensation to be paid for injuries, the right of American citizens to return to the scene of the riot and abide there, the ceremonies to be observed by the local officials in reinstating sufferers in their rights, and other matters which can be better discussed as occasion may require. But my government has simply endeavoured to outline the measures that it considers should be taken by China to prevent the riots. This is the great object that it has in view in addressing this communication to your Highnesses and your Excellencies, and, having no doubt that the government of China shares to the full its desire to prevent the recurrence of antiforeign riots, it indulges the hope that early action will be taken by China on the lines indicated, so that the good relations existing between the two countries may be confirmed and strengthened."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE TREATMENT OF CHINA BY THE FOREIGN POWERS

HAVING in the preceding chapter exposed the chief evil from which foreign residents in China suffer, that is to say the insecurity of life and property, let us look at the treatment of Chinese by foreigners, and the treatment of the Chinese government by the foreign powers.

There is no caste in China as there is in India. There are no classes, superior to other classes, looking down upon their fellow men with abhorrence. There is among the Chinese no social exclusion on account of colour. In the United States there is an almost universal sentiment among white people of repulsion to association socially with coloured people. In the East such a feeling has no existence whatever, as applicable to the Chinese, the

Japanese, the Filipino, the Korean, or the Siamese. The white man mixes with the individuals of these races without the slightest feeling of antipathy or disdain. He sits next the ladies or gentlemen of these races at dinner as complacent and self-respectful as if they belonged to his own race. At Manila I attended balls and entertainments, given by Filipinos, at which very few white persons were present. The ladies wore dresses made by Worth, and displayed sparkling diamonds. The gentlemen were clad in the usual evening suits. At the buffet champagne and *pâté de foies gras* abounded. The music was as good as you will hear in any Western capital, and the guest never for a moment thought that he was demeaning himself. In China and Japan, in social circles, there is not the least thought, or imagination, that the colour of the natives betokens any inferiority.

Let the idea be dismissed that the racial sentiment of white superiority has any influence among white people, except as against the black race. It is sufficient for my purpose to state facts relating to this matter, without either applauding or denouncing such a senti-

ment. It is not, therefore, because the individual foreigner looks down upon the individual Chinese by reason of the colour of his skin that the foreigner interferes in governmental matters, exacts favourable treaties, and makes war if the Chinese polity does not suit him.

From time immemorial the Chinese were exclusionists. During all their history, until one-third of the last century had elapsed, their country was sealed to foreign intercourse. The trade with foreigners was for many years confined to one locality in China. The advent of steam and the telegraph, and an appeal to force, wiped out this isolation. It was gravely argued that no nation had the right to exclude itself against intercourse with other nations, that the ports which nature provided could not be closed to the world, and that international law authorized and sanctioned that every country should be open to foreign trade. So well recognized was this principle, that when during our civil war we sank vessels laden with stone in the harbour of Charleston, Great Britain remonstrated with us, and desisted only when she was assured that the ob-

structions would be removed when the war was over.

I have myself repeatedly insisted that China was in duty bound to remove the obstructions placed in the West River below Canton. As the foreign powers have since 1842 dictated a tariff to China, and compelled it to make commercial treaties, whereby intercourse with the Western countries is regulated, it is needless to argue whether they had the right to do these things. It is certain that they will not for many a year to come surrender the privileges which they now possess. Certainly the diplomatist will never advise their surrender until conditions in China greatly change. His class is practical. It does not engage in humanitarian discussions. It looks at things as they are, and not through religious or sentimental spectacles. It recognizes the truth of the old adage that "when two men ride a horse one must ride behind," and it prefers that the representative of its race, or races, shall ride in front. In this adage may be found the secret of foreign treatment of China. It may seem brutal to adopt this theory which rests on force, and not an inter-

national law, as the fundamental rule of control in our treatment of China, nevertheless, its existence rests on the supreme necessity of self-defence.

I do not doubt that the Chinese, except the Christian converts, would hail with joy the departure *en masse* of the foreigners from China. I do not doubt that they hate us almost universally. They are a proud people. They prefer their own ways, habits, and customs to ours. They look down upon us vastly more than we look down upon them. Still, we are in China by their consent expressed in several treaties, and they must be made to abide by their agreements. These treaties are to international intercourse what the constitution is to domestic intercourse, and China can do no act which contravenes them. It is the business of the diplomatists, backed by the armies and navies of the world, to hold her to her written contracts. To do so we must do the things which the treaties and the protocol of 1901 declare we may do, and we must force her to do what she promised to do. There is no hardship in compelling a nation to execute the provisions of existing treaties. In order

to do so we must dictate the internal policy of China so far as foreigners are concerned. So far we justly may go, and no farther. The foreigner has gone farther, and is going farther, day by day. He has wantonly and uselessly seized portions of the territory of the Empire, as has already appeared in these pages. He has forced the importation of opium on China, which, at last, as a fancied protection, has allowed the ancient decrees against the cultivation of the baneful drug to lapse, and it is now raised, without let or hindrance, everywhere in the Empire. He has levied unjust and useless wars against the Chinese for purely selfish purposes. He has, time and again, made exactions for indemnities which had no just foundations. Witness one recently made by France. A Frenchman and his wife were carried off from Tonquin by bandits who took refuge in China. The Chinese government was asked to rescue these prisoners and restore them to liberty. China sent a brigade of troops, who pursued the bandits to their den and recovered the prisoners. The French government thanked the Chinese government for its assistance, and be-

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stowed the decoration of the Legion of Honour on the brigade commander, and then shortly afterward demanded the payment of an enormous indemnity for the outrage, on the ground that China had delayed to effect the rescue.

The Chinese were aghast, but they paid the money. Other instances, hardly less atrocious, have been cited by recent writers: Lord Charles Beresford, Mr. Archibald R. Colquhoun, Mr. Harold E. Gorst, and Mr. Chester Holcombe. These writers agree in the proposition that European diplomatists have on many occasions treated the Chinese authorities arbitrarily, violently, and threateningly. In the case of antiforeign riots an appeal to violence may be condoned. If China can not, or will not, protect our citizens, an appeal to the "gunboat" policy may be justified. A city in which a serious antiforeign riot occurs may be battered down. Once at Hankow a British naval officer notified the viceroy, who resided at Wuchang across the river, that if an anti-foreign riot broke out in Hankow, he would train his guns on the viceroyal palace, and batter down the city of Wuchang. The threat

was efficacious, the threatened riot did not come off, and all the world applauded the wisdom and courage of the commander of the British man-of-war. There is a vast difference, however, between the just punishment of mobs, and the wringing from a defenceless people of exactions of money or land.

It is a pity that the framers of the Protocol of 1901 did not embody in it that, if China kept the peace, and complied with the treaties, her international rights would be respected.

It would have been a splendid thing to do to guarantee that there should be no partition of her territory. It is too much to expect that the five nations which have seized her land should give it back to her. No man of affairs expects that the restitution will be made. Where the German eagle has once fastened his claws, says the German Emperor, there he will remain.

Conceding that the *status quo* must be preserved — what of the future? Of all the countries of the world China is least adapted to partition. No race is more homogeneous, or compact, or bound together by more ancient ties and attractions, than the Chinese. Wher-

ever the Chinese goes he retains his national habits, customs, and solidarity. He has invaded in great numbers Hongkong, Singapore, Columbo, the Philippines, Borneo, Australia, and California, but he remains everywhere segregated in a mass secluded from the residents of the lands whose employments he has conquered. A division of China among the European powers might mean subjugation of the various portions by arms, but it would never mean absorption. The Chinese have absorbed the Mongolians, and the Manchus, and they would absorb their conquerors. Partition would bring with it incessant insurrections. Russia, perhaps, would meet the conditions by wholesale massacres, but the other powers would hesitate to adopt such bloody measures. Finally, the conquerors would quarrel among themselves. They would covet each other's territory, and a general war would break out, which would mean disaster to the beaten party.

In this day and generation it should be a sufficient answer to a proposal of partition to say that it would be wrong and unjust. No nation can afford to perpetrate a naked wrong,

which the public opinion of mankind denounces. The man who soils his conscience leads a felon's life, and the nation which oppresses its weak and defenceless neighbour will inevitably pay the penalty of its wrong-doing. If China, taught by a terrible experience, executes the treaties in their letter and spirit, she should be left free to work out her own destiny. The freer she is, the more prosperous she becomes, the better will it be for the Western nations. She will become a great market for manufactured goods, and a large exporter of silks, teas, straw braid, and many other prime articles of commerce.¹¹ The policy of America is to make her great, rich, and prosperous, and it is certain that the present administration apprehends to the full the expediency of this policy.¹² We have recently acquired the Philippines. The chief argument in favour of this acquisition is the advantage that their location gives us to increase our trade with China. Situated 640 miles from Hongkong, Manila should become the entrepôt for our trade with the countless millions of Asia. If China is to be disrupted, if hostile camps of Europeans are

to confront us on her rivers and shores, little advantage will accrue to us from the possession of the Philippines. We may expect to see every kind of restriction thrown about trade, and every species of taxation put in force against our goods.

We will suffer, also, in our humane and religious works. Scant toleration will be allowed missionaries in a territory held by Russia or France. Why cannot the world treat China as it treated Japan? The nations of the world combined to assist Japan in her brave efforts to attain Western civilization. They have allowed her to make her own tariff, and to strike down extraterritoriality.

An increased commerce with her people has rewarded the business of the world. No one supposes that the Chinese are less intelligent than the Japanese. I do not deprecate the latter when I repeat that the universal opinion of persons who know both races is that the Chinese are more dignified, more serious, more steadfast, than their insular rivals. What Japan has done in the way of advancement China will do if left to herself. If she is partitioned chaos will come again.¹⁾ You can-

not make Englishmen, Russians, Austrians, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, out of the Chinese. They are Orientals, and will so remain always.¹¹ There is not much of good augury to be drawn from the domination of Eastern peoples by Western nations. No real assimilation ever takes place between the conquerors and the conquered. India to-day is held by force of arms. Tonquin, Annam, Cochin China, are held by the sword.

Let us hope that we are writing a new page of history in the Philippines, but it is too early to formulate an opinion as to our success in introducing free institutions into the Archipelago.

It may be conceded, I suppose, that if we find that the Filipinos will always prove unfit to become American citizens, we will grant them their independence. Our retention of the islands cannot, therefore, be cited as an excuse, or argument, for the partition of China among the European powers.

CHAPTER IX.

THE EXCLUSION OF THE CHINESE LABOURER

THE Supreme Court has many times determined that a treaty has no more validity than an act of Congress, and that it may be abrogated by a law. Congress has several times enacted laws which violated and annulled treaties. Such legislation cannot be commended. That such a thing may be done is the naked, brutal law, but that does not make it right. It may be true that a nation, like an individual, has the absolute legal right to violate its solemn contracts, holding itself responsible for any damages that may accrue to the opposite party, but no moral right to do so exists. If a nation makes a treaty with another, justice and morality require that it should be abided by until it is set aside by mutual consent, or by war. If this statement is not true, why make treaties at all? It is

the misfortune of our country that we have set the world the bad example of annulling treaties by legislation. The treaties with China have been utterly disregarded and repudiated by Congress. Let us briefly review the treaties and the acts of Congress.

The treaty of 1868, which was negotiated by the Hon. Anson Burlingame, led off with a broad definition of policy. The fifth article of this treaty contains the following words: "The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognize the inherent and the inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and, also, the mutual advantage of free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects, respectively, from the one country to the other for the purpose of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents." Following this piece of buncombe, come, in the sixth article, these words: "And reciprocally, Chinese subjects visiting, or residing in the United States, shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or residence, as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favoured nation."

Naturalization, however, was excepted from the privileges granted. The United States, between the dates of 1868 and 1880, saw the fatal error of the concessions made to the Chinese, and to some extent corrected them by the treaty of November 17, 1880. By that treaty it was provided in Article I. that: "Whenever, in the opinion of the government of the United States, the coming of Chinese labourers to the United States or their residence therein affects, or threatens to affect, the interests of that country, or to endanger the good of any locality within the territory thereof, the government of China agrees that the government of the United States may regulate, limit, or suspend such coming or residence, but may not absolutely prohibit it." This was a great step forward.

In 1888 a treaty was negotiated by Secretary Bayard, under President Cleveland's administration, which suspended the immigration of Chinese labourers during twenty years. This treaty was not ratified by China, because she feared that other nations, particularly Australia, would demand similar restrictions.

I notified the Chinese government that the

refusal to ratify this treaty might result in stringent legislation by Congress, and my prediction proved true. After the treaty was rejected, Congress, in 1888, passed what is called the Scott law, which was very severe in its provisions. Again, in 1892, Congress passed the Geary law, which went a bow-shot farther than any previous treaty or legislative act. Both of these violate the treaties, but they were sustained by the Supreme Court on the ground above stated.

That all countries have the inherent right to exclude all foreigners from their borders, either as temporary or permanent residents, admits of no kind of doubt.

It was a very great mistake for us ever to agree by treaty to suspend or abrogate the exercise of this right, but having done so, all that remained to do was to negotiate another treaty, which should put the matter at complete rest. Other powers were creating in the minds of the Chinese prejudice against us. I rarely went to the Yamen, or to see Li Hung Chang, that I was not told that we had violated our treaties. I answered this accusation the best



LI HUNG CHANG; HIS BROTHER LI HAN CHANG; AND THEIR SONS

I could, but I continually advised my government to negotiate a new treaty.

Accordingly, another treaty between China and the United States was negotiated, and ratifications were exchanged December 7, 1894, which completely put an end to any semblance of treaty violation by whatever legislation we might enact, at least for ten years. Article I. of this treaty reads as follows: "The high contracting parties agree that for a period of ten years, beginning with the date of the ratification of this convention, the coming, except under conditions hereinafter specified, of Chinese labourers to the United States shall be absolutely prohibited."¹⁴ At last we had arrived at the ultimatum of prohibition instead of suspension. It is not necessary to quote the provisions which comprise the exceptions to this sweeping clause. In general they relate to the return of Chinese who have near relatives in this country, or who are worth one thousand dollars. The treaty was intended to cover the exclusion act passed by Congress, and this it does. The Chinese government specifically agreed to the enforcement of the Act of May 5, 1892, as amended

and approved November 3, 1893, so far as it relates to the necessity of registration by its subjects.

One of the most vexed of all controversies under this treaty is as to the classes allowed to come to the United States. The third clause of the treaty of December 7, 1894, reads as follows: "The provisions of the convention shall not affect the right at present enjoyed of Chinese subjects, being officials, teachers, students, merchants, or travellers for curiosity or pleasure, but not labourers, of coming to the United States."

From this clause the Treasury officials argue that nobody except members of the classes named can come to this country. They assert that every person who does not belong to one of the above named exempt classes is, according to the treaty, a labourer. One attorney-general has interpreted the treaties to mean that all Chinese are to be held to be labourers except officials, teachers, students, merchants, and travellers. Although this construction was greatly criticized, it seems to be correct. Immediately following the clause

above cited, being a part of the same paragraph, there follow these words:

"To entitle such Chinese subjects as are above described to admission in the United States they may produce a certificate either from their government, or from the government where they last resided, viséed by the diplomatic or consular representatives of the United States in the country or port whence they depart."

It thus appears that, under the terms of the treaty, only certain classes such as "are above described," were required to have certificates, while all the other classes were left free to come to this country without having any certificate whatever, unless it were agreed that the designated classes were the only classes which could enter the United States. It cannot be possible that the framers of the treaty meant that officials, teachers, students, merchants, and travellers only should be required to have certificates, and that all the rest of the enormous population might come into the United States unchallenged. It, therefore, follows that the interpretation of our officials is the correct one, and that the treaty of 1894

does mean that labourers and all other classes are excluded, except officials, teachers, students, merchants, and travellers.

This construction is supported also by the legal maxim, "*expressio unius est exclusio alterius.*" It is stated that some courts have held to this opinion. There is nothing unreasonable in China's agreeing that all her population except certain defined classes should be excluded from a foreign country. Her form of government, and the customs of her people, all look toward exclusion from the rest of the world.

[The author at this point enters into a keen and sarcastic review of a bill before Congress at the time of his writing this chapter, which was framed to revise the exclusion law very radically and to legalize many practices of the Treasury Department in interpretation of the law. This bill failed to pass. Indeed, no legislation was enacted at all except a measure at the 1904 session of Congress, merely continuing for ten years the law of 1894. An attempt is now, August, 1905, being made to negotiate a treaty to settle the question more definitely and put a stop to the Chinese

boycott which has followed some unwise actions on the part of United States Treasury officials in the spring of 1905 in detaining several parties of wealthy and educated Chinese entering the United States through Canada. It is just such foolish acts that the author condemns. He continues from this point:—*The Editor.*]

The Treasury officials are, no doubt, perfectly honest in their interpretation of the laws and the treaties. They are confronted with the great problem of excluding labourers; and these people assume all sorts of disguises and practise all kinds of fraud for the sake of gaining entrance into our country.

The present law requires that all Chinese desiring to enter the United States shall procure a certificate from their own government, which shall be viséed by a consul, stating in detail the occupation and biography of the applicant. This system, however, is not satisfactory. It throws too much work on the consuls. These officials are stationed along the seacoast, or on the Yang-tse. Behind them is the vast country containing four hundred millions of people. A man comes from the interior, thou-

sands of miles away from a port, bearing a certificate signed by a Chinese superintendent of customs, which, in the most minute manner, purports to detail the man's former life, his birthplace, his occupation, the value of his business if he is a merchant, his family, individual, and tribal name, and many other particulars. Now, how can the consul verify these statements? He would have to take proof a great distance away in the interior. If he relied on the declarations of those persons who claimed to know the man in the port, nine times out of ten he might be deceived by false testimony. It is impossible that the work of the consul in connection with viséing these certificates should be judicial, or anything more than perfunctory. In fact the consul is forced to take the certificate of the superintendent of customs as true. The matter, therefore, of the admission of non-labourers passes entirely out of our hands, and is lodged in those of the Chinese officials. It is not necessary to indulge in denunciation of the want of integrity of those officials. In no country would it be right to undertake to carry out a system of exclusion by putting all the

machinery of its execution in the hands of foreign officials, whose interest might be directly opposed to the purpose in view. It must be conceded that the whole system is defective, leading on the one side to the perversion of plain language, and on the other to perjury and lawbreaking.

Taught by experience, it may be safely predicted that the American people will no longer content themselves with statutes under which it can be claimed that no Chinese subjects except labourers are excluded. They will not open the door wide to Boxers, traders, beggars,—all classes, in fact,—that do no manual labour. The fight is a racial one, rather than a warfare against a class. It certainly will not do to throw this country, or its dependencies, wide open to all classes except labourers. Few men in this country, except those whose interests are antagonized by seclusion, believe that this immigration is desirable. It is generally conceded that it is a permanent menace to our civilization. Let us briefly look at some of the reasons for the exclusion of the Chinese coolie.

This question confronts us in the Philip-

pines and Hawaii as sternly as it does here at home. There are about forty thousand Chinese in the Philippine Archipelago, of whom about twenty-three thousand live at Manila. During the Spanish régime between ten and twelve thousand came to Manila every year, and seven or eight thousand returned to China. The same objections to Chinese immigration have been made in the Philippines that are made here. The Chinese are excessively stubborn in persisting in maintaining their own peculiar customs and manner of life. They resist everything which pertains to good government, public hygiene, police rules and regulations.

They live segregated by themselves, and never assimilate with any other people wherever they are. In emigrating to a foreign country they have no purpose whatever except to gain a livelihood. Colonization to them means simply herding together and creating a new China, wherein the worst vices of their old home are perpetuated. They do not enter in the least degree in the commercial ventures of their new home. They have very few necessities, and their only aim and object is to

supply them and save enough money to enable them to return to China. They hoard instinctively, and their capital is either hidden, or taken, or sent away from the country. Thus they do not in the least assist public progress, or undertake in any wise to advance public interests. They are industrious, but their industries have a narrow scope. They are laundrymen or gardeners, and are not engaged in agriculture or in productive work. They possess a solidarity which no other people has attained, and form a vast commercial society in which all help one another, and defy all competition from merchants who work separately. They greatly venerate their ancestors, from whose bones they do not wish to be separated, and they provide that their bodies shall be returned to their ancestral homes after death.

Unquestionably they have good traits. They are industrious, good-natured, and as honest as other people are. Undoubtedly we owe a debt of gratitude to the Chinese converts who assisted in defending the beleaguered foreigners at Peking. If their splendid conduct could be appropriately recognized, all the

world would applaud the gracious act, but we cannot judge a race by the conduct of a body of Christians, who preferred to suffer martyrdom rather than prove recreant to their faith.

We cannot safely amalgamate into our political system people in great numbers who cannot in a generation be made to understand the principles on which our government is based. We are having a sufficiently difficult task in managing the black race, and in elevating the Filipinos, to cause us to pause in undertaking to make citizens of the people who belong to the yellow race.

The enormous number of the Chinese must, also, be considered. There is scarcely any limit to the number that might be brought to our shores. China has five times as many people as we have, about 400,000,000. To bring a Chinaman from Macao or Hong-kong would cost less than five dollars, but the steamship companies would charge, as they used to, fifty-five dollars. There would be a clear profit of fifty dollars per head, and at that rate they could bring to this country every year at least a half-million immigrants. The Pacific slope would be submerged, and its

civilization would be wrecked. The "yellow peril" would attack our institutions, our customs, and habits, and overwhelm them. If we made the Chinese citizens, their votes would control the elections, and if we did not make them citizens, we would have to deal with a Helot race, which would demoralize all our youth. It may be laid down as a fundamental proposition that no immigrant should be permitted to land on our shores who has not the making in him of an American citizen. In a republic, based on the equality of all men, it would be highly dangerous to have as residents a large class of people who are ostracized, and deprived of all political power. This consideration alone is sufficient to exclude the Chinese.¹¹

Besides, there remains the labour question. To introduce into our system a million or two of stalwart labourers, who would compete in every trade and occupation with our own workmen, would be the height of unreason. The subject is not worthy of discussion. To do this thing would stamp us as a nation of sentimentalists. Good people like the missionaries who favour an open door for the

Chinese labourer are not practical. They think that their standing before the Chinese in China would be improved by an indulgent line of conduct on our part toward them, and that the spiritual results obtained would compensate for temporal evils. All this is illusory. No number of conversions could compensate for the ill which would follow in the train of a vast Chinese immigration to this country. Our labouring classes, our workmen, of whom we are justly proud because they have made us the greatest nation in the world, would lose their well-earned wages, and sink to a level with the cheapest labour. Think of bringing into competition with our mechanics people who have been accustomed to working for fifteen or twenty silver cents a day — and who often cannot get so much! Once when I was at Soochow, when many Chinese were collected there who had been driven from their homes, the missionaries supported these people and allowed them for subsistence one Mexican dollar a month, and it was sufficient to enable them to live. What American labourer could compete with a man who can live on three and a third silver cents a day?

In the argument touching the exclusion of the Chinese, those persons who oppose it always compare them favourably with the other Oriental peoples. They profess to be unable to understand why the African, the Malay, and the Japanese are allowed to come freely to the United States, while a better race of people, as they claim, is excluded. Comparisons are invidious. I have no desire to set forth the merits or demerits of other Oriental races, and it is not necessary to do so in order to determine the precise question which is herein presented. We are a nation. We have all the rights and powers of other nations. We can exclude whom we please, and because we do not exclude others besides the Chinese does not in the least affect the question of the propriety and expediency of excluding them. Whenever it shall become necessary to exclude other races, no doubt it will be done. Our government is not an eleemosynary institution. We are beginning to look at public questions in an economic light, and to raise them up above the controlling influence of mere party considerations. Even now the Chinese have in some respects more rights in our country

than we have in theirs. They have no extra-territorial system here, as we have in all non-Christian countries except Japan, but they have the right as aliens to take their cases into the United States courts, of which they freely avail themselves. Once within our borders, they can go where they please in forty-five States, and all the Territories, while the foreigner in China, except the missionary, can reside nowhere save in the treaty ports. Their lives, too, are safe here, except on rare occasions. Riots against them are rare. No class is arrayed against them except the labouring class. In China antiforeign riots are the order of the day. There have been as many as twenty-two in one year. The bloody riots at Tientsin, in 1870, and those of 1900 in North China will never be forgotten. It is doubtful whether we have any friends in China except among the Christian converts. Nevertheless, we must see to it that our legislation concerning China conforms with propriety, morality, justice. What we put into the new treaty should be the result of calm and complete consideration. What we do we should do openly and honourably, and not under cover

of a strained interpretation of words. We should define, so that there can be no quibble over our meaning, what class of people may come to our country. Above all, we should adhere to our policy of exclusion of the labouring classes, in spite of all the influence that may be brought to do away with it.

The spread of the Chinese into the dependencies of European powers in the Far East is interesting as illustrating the vitality, perseverance, and colonizing qualities of their race. From late sources I have prepared the following statement of the Chinese population in the more important Eastern localities.

The total population of the colony of Hong-kong, according to the census taken in January, 1901, was 283,975. The resident civil population was composed as follows: Europeans and Americans other than Portuguese, 3,860; Portuguese, 1,956; Indians, 1,453; Eurasians, 267; other races, 903; Chinese, 274,543. The Chinese floating population numbered 40,100. According to the returns made in 1896, the population of Macao was 78,627, of which the Chinese numbered 74,568.

In Nagasaki, Japan, there are 606 foreign-

ers, exclusive of Chinese, and about 750 Chinese.

At Yokohama, Japan, the Chinese, in a total population of 192,566, numbered 2,015.

The Chinese in the Philippines probably number 70,000.

In Saigon, Cochin China, the Chinese number one-third of the population, which is about 19,000.

The population of Haiphong, the capital of Tonquin, is about 18,500, of whom 900 are Europeans and 5,500 Chinese, the balance being mostly Annamites.

In Borneo the Chinese conduct all the trading operations, but I am unable to give their number. In Labuan, the smallest British colony in Asia, with a population of 6,000, the Chinese number over a thousand. They are the chief traders, and most of the industries of the island are in their hands.

The number of Chinese in Siam is estimated at 1,300,000.

The census of the Straits Settlements taken in 1901 gave the population of Singapore as 228,535, of whom about 90,000 are Chinese.

In Malacca, with a population of 95,487, there are about 20,000 Chinese.

In Selangor, with a population of 81,592 persons, 50,844 are Chinese.

The Chinese are a large part of the population of Perak, being estimated at 47,000, while the Malays number about 53,000.

In Penang, out of a total population of 248,207, the Chinese number nearly 70,000.

It will be seen from this cursory exhibit that the Chinese are over-running contiguous commercial points in the East. They are fast absorbing business, and ousting other nations and foreign traders. In China proper they are dangerous rivals to foreign merchants. They make no display, do not leave their business to compradors, and, owing to a widespread system of mutual responsibility, they are generally honest and meet all their obligations. Already, in Australia, Japan, and all over the Far East, the same objections to their presence are heard as in the United States, but wherever they go they become the masters of trade. The mutterings against them are loud in every locality, but their compact conservatism, their industry, and their economical

habits enable them to win their way over all opposition short of absolute exclusion. "We cannot flatter ourselves that we can assimilate or lift up these people economically. The only remedy in their case is absolute exclusion."

As I have said before, we have always aimed to treat the Chinese fairly. Only once, except in the recent disturbances, did Americans fire a hostile gun in China. In November, 1856, the Chinese holding the Barrier forts below Canton, while the complications with the English were going on, not knowing an American from an Englishman, fired on one of the boats of our fleet twice, killing one man. The American fleet consisted of the *San Jacinto*, *Portsmouth*, and *Levant*, then lying at Whampoa. It was commanded by Commodore J. Armstrong. Aboard our fleet was an American who was destined to achieve immortality in another hemisphere, — Captain A. H. Foote, commanding the *Portsmouth*. He was ordered to destroy the forts, and he led a storming party, dismantled them, and spiked the guns. Seven Americans and three hundred Chinese were killed. When the matter was reported to the Chinese viceroy, he simply said:

"There is no matter of strife between our respective nations. Henceforth let the fashion of the flag which the American ships employ be clearly defined, and inform me what it is beforehand. This will be the verification of the friendly relations which exist between the two countries." There were no apologies nor guarantees. The matter was dropped.

This episode deserves attention as illustrating the difference between the treatment of China by America and England. Let it be said in addition that we have never coveted the land of China.

CHAPTER X.

THE JAPANESE - CHINESE WAR

THE war between Japan and China occurred in the summer of 1894. It illustrates the well-known fact that nations do not deliberately determine to go to war, but they insensibly drift into it. A notable exception to this condition is furnished by the war of 1866 between Austria and Prussia. As early as 1852 Bismarck had said that the quarrel inaugurated between Frederick and Maria Theresa, for the domination of Germany, had to be fought out with sword and fire—*ferro et igni*. Through all the devious windings of diplomacy he pursued unrelentingly this purpose, until, finally, the formidable duel took place. In spite of this example to the contrary, it may be said that wars arise after various small difficulties have occurred between the people of the two discordant nations. By

degrees the two peoples become suspicious and irritated. Small disturbances are seized upon by the press to create dissension. A general national dislike is created, and a spark suffices to light the fires of war. In our own country we are, without any real cause whatever, becoming estranged from Germany. Let me digress a moment to deplore that feeling. Nothing can be worse for the public peace than slurring remarks made by some Americans about the Germans. European nations do not understand why such latitude of expression is allowed unless the government approves of the censures so openly published. Surely there should be a strict rule that the military and naval officers shall not criticize the political conduct of foreign governments. By the press, and by these officials, the public is being educated into a dislike of a great nation. Should a chance difficulty occur in some foreign port between the sailors of Germany and of the United States, the consequences may be far-reaching for evil. Among all the nations of Europe there is none with which we should more strenuously cultivate good relations than Germany. Between us and that country there

is not the shadow of real cause for trouble. Unpleasant little incidents have occurred, particularly between Admiral Dewey and German officers, but they had little real significance.

A war between us and Germany would almost be fratricidal. We have millions of Germans in this country. They are among our very best citizens. They are supremely loyal to our flag. They have on all battle-fields illustrated their devotion to our country. They are princes in commerce, and model citizens in their every-day lives. Away, then, with this senseless contention, and down with the agitators, who, for the sake of creating a sensation, are sowing seeds of strife.

The war between Japan and China did not come about by reason of any fixed determination on the part of Japan to begin hostilities. Of course, on the part of China, war was never dreamt of. She sat shrouded in self-conceit. She did not dream that the "wojuns" (dwarfs), as she called the Japanese, would ever have the audacity to attack her. She had a population of four hundred millions against forty millions. Her country was vast. Japan was small. They were both Eastern nations,

and there seemed to exist no reason for war. Nevertheless, there were riots and difficulties, here and there, between the representatives of the two peoples. A notable one occurred at Nagasaki, where Chinese and Japanese sailors engaged in riot, in which seven lives were lost. Bad feeling between the Chinese and Japanese kept growing, fed by small incidents. The idea of engaging in a foreign war finally commended itself to the Emperor of Japan, because a war would consolidate his people, who were restive and discontented. The Diet had three times overruled the government. A patriotic feeling must be evoked to save the situation.

The Korean situation was favourable for experiment. Japan and China had agreed that neither country would send troops to Korea without giving due notice to the other. Japan got around this difficulty by announcing that she would send troops to Korea for the purpose of protecting her legation, which was in danger from mob violence.

Accordingly she sent a regiment to Seoul. The King of Korea requested the Chinese to send troops to aid him in putting down a rebellion against him, but June 8, 1894, the

outbreak was officially declared to be suppressed. Nevertheless, June 10, 1894, the Chinese landed two thousand troops near Asan, forty miles south of Chemulpo, ostensibly to aid in suppressing the rebellion.

It may be well to understand the condition of Korea geographically and politically. Korea is a promontory lying between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. With regard to China her geographical position is almost exactly that of Florida to the United States. A curious relation existed between her and China. Korea was permitted by China to make treaties with the foreign powers as if she were an independent country, but still she was a vassal of China. When the Chinese Minister reached Seoul, the king came outside the city gates to meet him. He alone of all the foreign ministers had the right to ride in his sedan-chair into the royal presence. He did not meet and consult with the other representatives — he was on a higher plane than they. Nevertheless, China intermeddled very little in Korean affairs. When Korea got into a difficulty with the foreign powers, China left her alone to get out of it the best she could, but she insisted on

formal suzerainty. For instance, when Korea sent an envoy to Washington, China declared that he must be introduced to the President by her own minister, and that he must go into the audience behind her representative. Of course, this could not be permitted. Representatives from independent countries only could be received, so the Korean Minister was received as the representative of a sovereign state.


The position of Korea *vis à vis* China directly confronted Japan. If Korea was an independent state, Japan could interfere in her affairs as much as she pleased, and China would have no right to take offence. If, however, she was only a vassal of China, that country must be consulted in the dealing of Japan with her. Japan had a vague idea that she might play the same part in opening up Korea as we had played in opening Japan. Our success had been phenomenal, and we had made a great and strong government for Japan. The idea of one Eastern power doing the same work for another appealed romantically to Japan. The whole problem hinged on the question whether Korea was, or not, trib-

utary to China. The king was in a quandary. If he answered negatively he would offend China, while an affirmative answer would irritate Japan. The answer of the king was the citation of a clause from a treaty made with Japan in 1876, wherein Korea was stated to be an independent state, and one also from a letter to the President of the United States. When Commodore R. W. Shufeldt made in 1882 a treaty with Korea, the same question arose. The king then wrote a letter to the President, which will be found in Commodore Shufeldt's despatches of May 29, 1882. It contains the following clauses: "The Chao-hsien country (Korea) is a dependency of China, but the management of her governmental affairs has always been vested in the sovereign. In the matter of Korea being a dependency of China any question that may arise between them in consequence of such dependency, the United States is in no way to interfere." Naturally this diplomatic answer satisfied Japan, and she proceeded to disregard any right over Korea that China might choose to assert. I can only briefly allude to the incidents of the war which ensued. Five hundred Japanese troops en-

tered Seoul, as a legation guard, June 10, 1894, and eight hundred more Japanese troops arrived June 13th, while others were at Chemulpo, and on the road to Seoul. June 16th, three thousand Japanese soldiers entered Seoul, and July 26th the Japanese sank the *Kowshing*, carrying fifteen hundred Chinese troops,—the best foreign drilled troops of Li Hung Chang, under the command of the German General Von Haniken. July 28 and 29, 1894, the battle of Asan was fought, in which the Japanese lost seventy men and the Chinese eight hundred, and all their stores and artillery. Then followed, August 1, 1894, the great battle of Pingyang, in which the Chinese were routed, and in the battle of Yalu, September 17, 1894, in which four Chinese men-of-war were destroyed, while the Japanese lost none. Port Arthur fell November 22, 1894, at the taking of which much horrible cruelty was displayed by the Japanese.

The Japanese then invaded Manchuria, and were supposed to be marching on Tientsin and Peking. Our condition at Peking was dangerous. We knew that if a battle occurred on the road between Tientsin and Peking, and

the Chinese were routed, as they probably would be, the débris of their army would rally on Peking, and our lives would not be worth a moment's purchase. Before that time my colleagues had ordered up some marines to protect the legations, but I had not demanded any, because neither in a military nor a civil point of view could I see any reason to apprehend that Japan would take Peking. Besides the State Department was rather averse to sending troops to the interior, though it left the decision of the question to me. My German colleague took the same view that I did of the situation, but the English, Russians, French, Spanish, and Italians sent marines to the capital. Precautions, however, were taken. The ladies of the various legations and the Imperial Maritime Customs, with one exception,—Lady O'Conor, wife of her Majesty's minister,—left the city. My family was in the United States, so I was in no wise embarrassed. The Department had notified me that, if necessary for my protection, I could go to Tientsin, where we had a man-of-war, the old *Monocacy*, but I never dreamed of leaving my post. As I stayed, our own mis-



OFFICERS' QUARTERS, AMERICAN LEGATION GUARD, PEKING

sionaries, men and women, stayed, also, and we arranged that in the event of trouble all the Americans were to move into the legation. I appealed to the prefect, who commanded the Banner corps, — which acted as the city police, — to know whether, in any event, he could protect the foreigners, and he assured me he could. He, therefore, sent a company of soldiers to camp at the gate of every legation. They were a sorry lot, armed with spears and long swords, and they would not have stood a minute before a Mauser gun, but we let them remain at the gates, lest, if we sent them away, China would cease to hold herself responsible for our protection.

Our condition was decidedly interesting, and involved much discussion. Some of the ministers were in favour of an evacuation of Peking, but the majority voted the other way. I distinctly refused to advise the missionaries what to do. I said if they left their business, and went to Tientsin — which was the only place of refuge — and no trouble ensued at Peking, I should be blamed; whereas, if they stayed, and we all lost our lives, I should be greatly blamed for not advising them to leave.

As they knew as much about the situation as I did, they must come to any conclusion they pleased. As it turned out, they wisely determined to stay as long as I did, and they calmly and safely continued to carry on their philanthropic work. Two days before the fall of Port Arthur, November 20, 1894, I received at Peking the following despatch:

“DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
November 19, 1894.

“Our minister at Tokyo is advised that any direct overtures for peace made by China to Japan through the American Minister at Peking will be considered.

“GRESHAM.”

On this hint diplomacy — blessed diplomacy — intervened.

Prior to that date the Tsung-li-Yamen had convened the Ministers of America, England, Germany, France, Russia, Spain, and Italy together, and had feelingly besought us to procure our respective governments to intervene in favour of peace. When the proceedings of this interview were reported to the Presi-

dent, he declined to entertain any proposition to intervene, although he stated that he would mediate alone if China and Japan both requested him to do so. The European powers all declined to interfere at that time.

The coast, therefore, was left free for me to act on the lines suggested by the above mentioned despatch, and I proceeded immediately to do so. November 22, 1894, I had an interview with the Yamen. I inquired of them whether they could maintain the conflict any longer. They said they could not; that they had no commissariat, no quartermaster's or hospital department, and no soldiers. I said, "You have twenty-five thousand soldiers at Peking doing nothing." They replied that those soldiers could not fight, that the Chinese army was not intended to fight, but simply to overawe the people. I then said that if they were satisfied they could not fight any more to any advantage, they ought to make peace. They said, of course, they wanted to make peace, but how could they do it, as they could not correspond with Japan? I answered that I would, if they authorized me, conduct the negotiations

through Mr. Dunn, our minister at Tokyo. They were delighted, and begged me to go ahead immediately. Accordingly, I wired to Japan that China desired to negotiate for peace on the basis of the independence of Korea, and the payment of a reasonable war indemnity. Japan promptly answered that she would entertain proposals for peace, but she would dictate the terms. I then asked for an armistice during the negotiations, but the proposition was refused. It was not until Li Hung Chang was shot at and wounded a few months later by a fanatic at Shimonoseki, that an armistice was granted, as some compensation to China for this atrocious crime. Negotiations were kept up between China and Japan by the American Ministers until late in January, 1895. It would serve no good purpose to recount them here. The two nations mistrusted each other, and China was always trying to ascertain in advance what the demands of Japan would be, in order that she might procure the intervention of England or Russia. Finally, however, the two plenipotentiaries, Chang Yin Huan and Shao Yu Lien, were ready in the middle of January, 1895, to go to Hierio-

shima, Japan. Arriving there, they met Count Ito and Viscount Mutsu, the Japanese plenipotentiaries. When plenipotentiaries meet the first thing to be done is to produce their "full powers" for mutual inspection. The Chinese envoys produced a paper, which is worthy of reproduction here, as it is the most remarkable specimen of "full powers" that was ever prepared. This unique document reads as follows:

"By decree we do appoint Chang Yin Huan, minister of the Tsung-li-Yamen and junior Vice-President of the Board of Revenue, and Shao Yu Lien, an officer of the button of the first rank and acting governor of Hunan, as our plenipotentiaries to meet and negotiate the matter with the plenipotentiaries appointed by Japan.

"You will, however, telegraph to the Tsung-li-Yamen for the purpose of obtaining our commands, by which you will abide. The members of your mission are placed under your control. You will carry out your mission in a faithful and diligent manner, and will

fulfil the trust we have reposed in you. Respect this."

The date. Seal of Imperial Command.

It is seen at a glance that this document does not contain the indispensable words giving full powers to conclude, sign, and seal a treaty. The Japanese had heard that the Chinese government had on other occasions repudiated the acts of its envoys, and they concluded that it was trifling with them, and simply wanted delay, and possibly a truce. As I had charge of the negotiations which had for their object to bring the two nations together, I was somewhat criticized by kind friends for not having, as was alleged, seen to it that the envoys were provided with proper "full powers," but this criticism was undeserved. I had suggested to the Yamen that I would prepare suitable credentials, and they had agreed that I should. I accordingly sent to them a Chinese draft adapted from the best models of such documents that could be procured. The forms used were furnished by my French colleague, with whom I freely consulted, and were complete in every particular

according to modern usage. Shortly after sending in this paper I inquired of the Yamen whether the emperor had signed it, and was assured he had. When, as the consequence of not having "full powers," the Chinese envoys were ordered home, I wired to Chang Yin Huan to deliver to the Japanese the paper that I had prepared, and he wired back that the emperor had not signed it. Of course, the credentials actually sent had no semblance to those which I had prepared. Taught by this subterfuge practised by the Yamen, I always required it to send its instructions to me in writing. Even when we personally conferred together I adhered to this rule, and I have now in my possession a bone paper-cutter on which one of the ministers wrote a direction which he had communicated to me orally.

Before the envoys returned I wired to the Japanese that I had prepared "full powers," which by some mistake were not given to the negotiators, and that I would telegraph their contents, and transmit them by mail as soon as navigation opened, but this offer was declined. Japan was at that time about to take Wei-hai-wei, the second great fortress of

China, and abruptly broke off negotiations. Besides, she always dreaded foreign interference, and was anxious to finish the work she had undertaken.

After the Chinese envoys returned home, we were all at sea again, but in view of the threatened intervention of Russia, Japan was impelled to renew the peace negotiations. She, therefore, wired me that if China would send a competent and distinguished envoy, the subject of making peace would be taken up again. It was well known in China that Japan desired Li Hung Chang to be appointed envoy, chiefly because of his great influence over the government, and the respect in which he was held by the people. Unfortunately, Li was under a cloud. September 17, 1894, he had been deprived by imperial decree of his "three-eyed peacock feather" and his "yellow riding jacket," on account of the disastrous defeats suffered by China. He did not desire to go to Japan. He greatly feared that he would be assassinated. I had serious arguments with him to induce him to accept the honour tendered him. He was very sore over the loss of his peacock feather. This ornament is worn

in the hat, being inserted in a hole prepared for it on the back of the rim. The hat without it conveys the same impression as does a cock which has lost its tail. I represented to him that China could not send a disgraced man to Japan, and, therefore, his honours would be restored to him, and this inducement, connected with the much higher one that he might be of some service to his country, made him agree to undertake this dangerous duty. It was in every way dangerous, because Li well knew that he could not by any possibility make a treaty without ceding a portion of the territory of China to the Japanese, and he knew that such a cession meant for him decapitation when he returned home. Not very long before China had ordered the decapitation of an envoy who had made a treaty with Russia, which was disapproved of, and all that saved his life were the efforts of the diplomatic corps, who naturally did not like the precedent, and the personal intervention and request for mercy made by the queen.

Li sailed from Tientsin for Shimonoseki, March 15, 1895. March 24th he was shot at Shimonoseki by a fanatic, who approached

close to his chair and fired at his face. The ball lodged in the left cheek, and remained there until he died.


There was no trouble over his credentials. Those I had formerly presented were adopted. The telegraph company accomplished the remarkable feat of wiring the original text to Tokyo. As the Chinese language is ideo-graphic, its words are not susceptible of being wired. The actual transmission is done by numbers and not words. It was difficult, of course, to wire so lengthy a document, but it was done with such success that Japan answered that the document was satisfactory, except in one verbal deficiency, and she also requested that the English translation should be transmitted.

Thus the two great nations were brought together after some months of labour by Mr. Dunn and myself.

A distinguished American diplomatist and lawyer, Colonel John W. Foster, of Indiana, was to appear on the scene as the adviser of China, and our responsibilities were terminated.

It is not necessary here to detail the long,

MONUMENT OF BARON KETTELER





LI HUNG CHANG

weary consultations with the Chinese ministers, their many efforts to induce me, as the American Minister, to take an active personal part in the negotiations, their prayers for advice and commiseration. I was only an intermediary. Still, if any one thinks that this position is an easy one, let him sit up all night two or three times a week with a lot of Chinese statesmen, and he will change his mind.

It was gratifying to Americans that both the great Oriental nations instinctively turned to their representatives for such assistance during the war as international usage permits. Japan, at the time that its chargé d'affaires left Peking, turned over to us the archives and property of the legation, and requested us to take charge of its affairs in China. Our consuls thus became the consuls of Japan, and the minister represented her at Peking. Shortly afterward China in like manner transferred to the American Minister and consuls in Japan all her interests.

I cannot particularly describe what the Americans in the two countries did in pursuance of their new and trying duties. They saved some lives in both countries, and they

administered in the most scrupulous manner the business interests which came under their care. Not a breath of scandal was ever heard. When the war was over Japan proposed to decorate us all,—minister, secretaries, and consuls. The State Department declined to transmit to Congress a request to pass a resolution allowing us to accept these decorations, on the plea that we had only done our duty. Whether this plea is sustainable or not is questionable, as our duty did not involve services rendered to a foreign power, but on other grounds the decision was right. It is better, I think, that under no circumstances whatever shall a diplomatist or consular officer accept any gift, grant, reward, or decoration from a foreign power. There should be no parleying about the circumstances; the iron rule should prevail of absolute refusal of all honours, always and everywhere.

Li Hung Chang recovered from his wound, made the treaty, and returned home. The friendship of the empress and his own personal sufferings saved his life. The new treaty was urgently denounced in China. It opened

up vistas which greatly influenced the future of China. They will be discussed later on.

Before dismissing Li Hung Chang from these pages, let me say of him that an intimate acquaintance with him served only to enhance respect for him. He was a great man — probably the greatest that his country has produced since Confucius. Beyond all manner of doubt he was a patriot. He was not a Manchu, nor a Mongolian, but Chinese to the backbone. He loved his country, and wanted to see her develop on foreign lines until she became great and prosperous. During the troublous days of the Taiping rebellion he might have seized the throne, but he never dreamt of doing so. To the latest moment of his life he was devoted to the empress dowager. He respected foreigners, though he did not love them. He was always surrounded by them. He listened to their suggestions, gained knowledge from them, and applied it in public affairs. He protected missionaries, not because he liked them, but because this course ensured the public peace. He encouraged and favoured foreign missionary doctors and surgeons. During all of the twenty years of his rule over Chihli

as viceroy, no antiforeign trouble occurred in its borders. Cases reaching me involving foreign interests from other provinces than Chihli were referred for adjustment to the imperial government, those from Chihli — and they were very rare — were referred to Li directly. This course gratified him, and good results followed. He was a broad-minded man, a wise man, a learned man. He had attained the highest literary honours — he was a “Hanlin.” If I am to criticize him at all, I must say that he fell beneath supreme greatness only because he was too material in his views. He could see how railroads, steam-boats, telegraphs, would benefit his country, and he laboured to secure these benefactions. A moral hero or a demigod cannot be born without there be developed a higher aim and object than mere physical well-being. Li will be forgotten in the ages to come, during which the memory of Confucius will ever be green. Li never thought of educating his countrymen, of removing their superstitions, or of improving their spiritual condition. Therein he failed in his life’s work. His successor in greatness will be a reformer. He will brush away hoary

wrong-doing; he will uproot absurd and useless superstitions; he will teach honesty and morality, in public and private life. Possibly he may be a Christian, and if he is he will elevate China to an equality with her Western sisters.

In closing this episode of my diplomatic career it is right and just that I should testify to the ready, willing, and invaluable services rendered me by my staff. My son, Charles Denby, Jr., was secretary of legation, and Mr. F. D. Cheshire was interpreter. They both spoke Chinese perfectly, and were well versed in the knowledge of Chinese habits, customs, and history. They spared no pains or labour in the discharge of their important duties, and to them belongs the chief credit — if any credit is due to any one — for having brought to a successful termination negotiations inaugurating peace between the two great Eastern empires.

CHAPTER XI.

SEIZURES OF CHINESE TERRITORY

A TREATY of peace was concluded between China and Japan, April 17, 1895, and ratifications thereof were exchanged May 8, 1895. The negotiators on the part of Japan were Count Ito and Viscount Mutsu, and on that of China, Li Hung Chang and Li Ching Fong. Li was described as senior tutor to the Heir Apparent, Senior Grand Secretary of State, Minister Superintendent of Trade of the Northern Ports of China, Viceroy of the Province of Chihli, and Earl of the First Rank. Lord Li's appellation was ex-Minister of the Diplomatic Service of the Second Rank.

The most discussed, and the most denounced, clause of the treaty was the one which ceded to Japan a portion of the province of Fêng Tien. The line of demarcation began at the mouth of the river Yalu, ascending that



COUNT ITO

stream to the mouth of the river An-ping; it thence ran to Fêng Huang; thence to Hai-cheng; thence to Ying Kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The mid-channel of the river Liao was followed by the line from Ying Kow to the mouth of the Liao, and the cession was commonly described as that of the Liaotung peninsula. This cession included all the islands appertaining or belonging to the province of Fêng Tien, situated in the eastern portion of the bay of Liaotung, and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea. The island of Formosa, with all the islands appertaining to it, was also ceded, and the Pescadores group, that is to say, all islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of longitude east of Greenwich, and the 23d and 24th degrees of north latitude.

China agreed to pay to Japan a war indemnity of two hundred million Kuping taels. The treaty opened to Japanese trade four cities: Shashih, Chung King, Suchow, and Hang-Chow, at which places Japan should have the right to station consuls. It also provided for steam navigation between Ichang and Chung

King, on the Yang-tse, and on the Woosung River, and the canal from Shanghai to Suchow and Hang-Chow. The right of manufacturing in all open cities, towns, and ports of China and of importing machinery was secured. Japanese subjects were permitted to carry on business in the interior and to rent warehouses. There was no objection made by Russia to any clause in the treaty except the one ceding the southern part of the province of Fêng Tien. It was folly and madness for Japan to insist on the cession of any territory on the mainland. She had been gently warned that this would not be permitted. Her rulers well knew that Russia would not consent to her holding such territory. Russia was about to fulfil the dream of Peter the Great of getting to the open water. She was nearing with the great Siberian railroad the unfrozen sea. She was looking for a port which did not freeze in the winter, and she had cast her eyes on Talienwan Bay. It was a wild dream to imagine that she would suffer this young, active, ambitious nationality to interpose between her and the deep sea. The Emperor of Japan and his advisers were perfectly conversant with all these

considerations, but driven by the army and the navy, and possibly influenced by England, which wanted to cut Russia off from the route to India, they insisted on this absurd cession. As soon as the contents of the treaty were known, Russia, backed by France and Germany, notified Japan that she must cede back to China the Liaotung peninsula. Russia had twenty-three warships in Chinese waters, and they were immediately cleared for action. Without delay Japan consented to the recession in consideration that China would pay to her thirty million taels in addition to the sum named. On account of this affair Japan has borne a grudge against Russia, and is now wreaking her vengeance.

The Japanese war was the beginning of the end for China. She came out of it humiliated and disgraced. She lost her fairest island, Formosa. She was involved in debt; but, worst of all, she had lost her prestige,—what the Chinese call “face.” She had been regarded as dangerous on account of her great population, but she stood at last before the world a huge giant filled with wind. The nations of the world had learned the lesson that

she could not fight, and were prepared on the slightest pretence to seize her territory.

One came in November, 1897. In one of the riots, which are common in China, two German Catholic priests were murdered in the province of Shantung. Immediately, without saying good morning, Germany landed a battalion of marines at Kiaochau, which is a port in the province of Shantung on the gulf of Pechili, and about forty miles from Chefoo. These marines took possession of fifty miles of territory back of Kiaochau and ordered the Chinese troops to retire. Germany then demanded the lease of the territory she had seized for ninety-nine years, the right to control railroads and mines in the whole province, an indemnity for the families of the dead, and the rebuilding of the church and houses which had been destroyed by the mob. China applied to Russia for help, because Russia, as she claimed, had promised in the Cassini Convention to protect her against all comers, but Russia dilly-dallied with the subject until, finally, China was forced to make the convention which Germany demanded. Then Russia informed China that the Czar was greatly dis-

pleased at the outcome of the matter, and, in order to protect herself, she demanded the cession by lease of Port Arthur, Taliewan, and a great strip of territory back of it, being the same that she would not permit Japan to retain. Then France, under the alleged construction of the "favoured nation" clause, in all treaties, demanded and received the cession of a large strip of territory at Chouman Bay, opposite the island of Hainan, and England forced China to lease to her Wei-hai-wei in the north, and to cede four hundred miles in extent of land and water around Hongkong — including a part of the mainland. Italy, also, demanded a lease of territory, but by that time the empress dowager had seized the reins of government, and Italy's demand was refused.

Let it be noticed that Port Arthur is the greatest fortress in China. It is situated on the right as you enter the gulf of Pechili. Wei-hai-wei, the next great fortress, is situate on the left. Peking is about one hundred miles from the gulf of Pechili. The powers which control the gulf control Peking. The position was about the same as if England had seized

Fortress Monroe, Russia, Governor's Island, Germany, Charleston, and France, Galveston.

Of course these powerful nations are not without apologists for a course of conduct which, on the face of it, seems to be wrongful. Russia pleads that she was compelled to have an open port as the terminus of her great trans-Siberian railway, England sets up in defence of her conduct that self-protection demanded that she should possess Wei-hai-wei, and extend her holdings around Hongkong so as to protect that colony against hostile fleets. Germany insists that China owed her some compensation for assisting in restoring to her the Liaotung peninsula; that she never made any, so she helped herself. France sets up that she simply followed the example of her sister states.

It is doubtful whether either France or Germany got anything of value. Kiaochau has proved a sorry investment, and France has made no use whatever of her concession, and probably never will make any use of it.

The governments of the world stood by while these spoliations were committed, and made no sign. Possibly I ought not to judge these nations, or denounce them. I suppose

the inculcation, "Judge not lest ye be judged," applies to national as well as private affairs.

All these seizures were cruel and uncalled-for blows to China. They destroyed the prestige of the government. They created discontent among the people. They stopped the hands on the dial of peaceful progress. They neutralized all the fair and honest treatment which the foreigners had practised toward China, and made them in the eyes of the people vulgar robbers. Philanthropic work was believed thereafter to be only a pretence for foreign aggrandizement. The Chinese *en masse* became hostile to the foreigners. If all the writers who have discussed the "Boxer" movement of 1900 can be believed,—from Sir Robert Hart to the humblest missionary,—that uprising had for its direct cause the seizure of Chinese territory by the foreign powers. To the diplomatic representatives, whose nations took no part in these acts of aggrandizement, it was sad to see crumbling before their eyes the edifice of the coöperative policy which had existed since 1863. It was sad to see violence take the place of persuasion, partition the place of autonomy, and a disgraceful strife

between the powers as to which should get the most benefit from the weakness of a prostrate nation.

As a matter of policy the system of spoliation was all wrong. It has accomplished and will accomplish no benefit to China or her oppressors. The interest of the world was to make her rich and prosperous. She was to be a large consumer of foreign goods and a great exporter of her own. To cut her up into hostile camps was the suicide of commerce. China, like Japan, prior to 1897, was working out her own salvation. The telegraph was in every province. Foreign ships were allowed to navigate all the rivers. The tariff was nominal. Railroads were being introduced. Mines were being opened. What I contended for while I was Minister to China, and what I contend for still, is that she should remain the mistress of her own destiny, that mechanical progress should come, but under her own auspices, and that her autonomy should in the common interest of all nations be preserved.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FIRST PHILIPPINE COMMISSION

IN the month of January, 1899, President McKinley appointed the Hon. Jacob Gould Schurman, Major-General Elwell S. Otis, Rear-Admiral George Dewey, Professor Dean C. Worcester, and the writer, to constitute a commission to accomplish certain purposes relating to the affairs of the Philippine Islands. This commission was generally called a "Peace" Commission, which expression was technically a misnomer, but was practically descriptive of its main purpose. In the instructions given to the commissioners by the President, they were ordered to "facilitate the most humane, pacific, and effective extension of the authority of our government, and to secure, with the least possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the inhabitants of the

islands." To this end they were diligently to study all the conditions existing in the islands, and to report on all subjects which might be of use in treating questions affecting their interest. The commission was not entrusted with the government of the islands. The absolute and undisputed power of control remained with the military authorities. General Otis was the supreme power when the civilian members of this commission reached Manila, and so remained during all their stay.

The situation was anomalous. General Otis was a member of the commission, and, occasionally, was present at its deliberations, but he was in no wise bound by them, and he did not pretend that he would be. Indeed it was impossible that he should be. Necessarily, the commander-in-chief who is waging a great war must be supreme. This position was recognized by the commission as correct, and no steps were taken which infringed on his authority, but this position rendered the work exceedingly difficult. There was some friction until the general and the commissioners got to know each other well, but toward the end there was perfect harmony. The main desire

of the civilian members was to pacify the Filipinos. It looks like a contradiction in fact, that, while the army was engaged in active hostile operations, a respectable body of gentlemen accredited by the President was endeavouring to induce the enemy to quit fighting, but that was the actual situation.

Shortly after its arrival at Manila the commission issued a proclamation wherein every right that men desire, except independence, was offered to the Filipinos, and this paper was signed by all five members. As a plan of government for a free people this paper embodies all the principles of human freedom, except national independence, which are to be found in *Magna Charta*, the Bill of Rights, and our own Constitution. It was printed in English, Spanish, and the Tagalog language, and circulated in enormous quantities. Copies of it, wherever posted, were destroyed, and the natives were forbidden to read it by their chiefs, and all possible means were used to suppress it. Nevertheless, it was largely read, and served as a basis for further action by the commission. One result was that Aguinaldo sent one of his chief officers, Colonel Arguelles,

to meet the commission, and to ask that an armistice be declared while the terms of the proclamation were being considered. General Otis refused to declare an armistice, but actually during the stay of Arguelles at Manila there was no fighting. Long conferences were had with Colonel Arguelles, and he was urged to induce the insurgents to lay down their arms and join with the commission in framing an organic law. Arguelles was favourably impressed, and soon returned with a companion, Captain Zialcita, when further conferences were held. Again during his stay fighting was suspended by both sides, though no formal agreement to do so was made. Long interviews were held with these two envoys. The whole situation was discussed frankly and amicably. It was reiterated again and again that the freest government in local matters that was possible would be given to the islands, but that the question of independence could not be discussed because that lay with Congress, and not with the executive. Colonel Arguelles expressed himself as greatly satisfied with the views of the commission, but he desired a fixed and definite plan of govern-

ment to be stated in order that he might transmit it to Aguinaldo.

After communicating with the President, a telegram was received from the Secretary of State, in which a plan of government was outlined. Briefly stated, it provided for a governor appointed by the President, with a Cabinet selected by the governor, a general Advisory Council elected by the people, an independent judiciary with the principal judges appointed by the President, the governor to have the veto power.

When Colonel Arguelles returned to his people he was arrested and tried for being pro-American, and was sentenced to be degraded from his military rank and imprisoned twelve years. In spite, however, of this cruel treatment of an envoy, on the 19th of May, 1899, four other distinguished gentlemen came from Aguinaldo to treat with the commission. They were Señor Gracio Gonzaga, Señor Barreto, General Gregorio del Pilar, and Captain Ziaicita. The first was a distinguished statesman, the second a leading lawyer, and the remaining two soldiers of great reputation. These gentlemen during two whole days dis-

cussed with the commission every question of law and policy that could be thought of. The proclamation, the various plans of government, and, particularly, the one above outlined, were gone over with great minuteness. It was conceded by these envoys that no valid objection could be made to the propositions announced by the commission, but the dream of independence still floated in their minds. They went away promising to return in three weeks with an answer from the insurgent leader, but they never came back.

During all the time that these envoys were in our lines, there was no fighting. While General Otis refused to recognize the status of the insurgents so far as to grant them a formal armistice, still, there was a practical truce during the time that the envoys were in consultation with the commission. In the discussion mentioned, a question was raised as to what disposition should be made of the Filipino soldiers. The envoys thought that they ought to be taken into the service of the United States, but plainly this was inadmissible except as to a few regiments. It was finally suggested, with general approval, that work

might be found for the soldiers in building roads, or other public works, which would afford them means of support.

The members of the commission met every day in rooms in the Audiencia, and remained for several hours engaged in examining the leading merchants, bankers, lawyers, editors, and officials, resident not only in Manila, but all over the islands. The statements of these gentlemen covered all subjects touching the islands, such as government; political, social, and racial questions; law, currency, public property, and institutions; the Chinese question; church property; agriculture; meteorology; railroads; commerce, etc. The report of the commission embodying these statements will be found very valuable.

At the residence of the commission in Malate, during all the afternoons and evenings, visitors were freely received, and every effort was made to gain the good-will of the natives. It was greatly desired by the commission to have an interview with Aguinaldo. Word was sent to him that we would meet him at any place that he should designate, and that we would freely and frankly discuss all points of

difference with him. A safe-conduct was assured to him if he would come into our lines, and we expressed ourselves as willing to go into his on a like understanding. Our propositions were never accepted.

After remaining several months at Manila, the two members who were still there were suddenly ordered to Washington for the purpose of consultation with the President. Thus terminated an honest, straightforward effort to avoid further shedding of blood. As the insurgent leader would listen to no proposals which did not embody independence, the war had to be prosecuted until our authority should be acknowledged. After studying the conditions in the islands with care and impartiality, the commission made its preliminary report to the President, containing its views of the situation. That report set out a brief history of the events which led up to the rebellion of 1896 against Spain, and of those which transpired after Dewey's victory. It set forth a gradual favourable change of public sentiment toward the United States, and it recounted in detail the measures adopted by the military authorities to organize municipal gov-

ernments, a native police force, and a system of public schools. In all these matters, as well as in preparing a constitution for the island of Negros, and in suggesting a convention with the Sulus, the members of the commission were actively engaged — but simply in an advisory capacity.

Subsequently to the appearance of the preliminary report a full report has been made, published, and circulated. It comprises four volumes and an atlas, and contains a great deal of information concerning the islands and their population.

The commission did not express any definite opinion as to what should ultimately be done with the Philippines. Its opinion, as far as it was expressed, will be found at page 183 of the first volume of the report, and reads as follows:

“Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission believes that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occu-

pation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable, and the indispensable need, from the Filipino point of view, of maintaining American sovereignty over the archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, would take the revenues, and leave us the responsibilities. Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable fact that the Filipinos cannot stand alone. Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national honour in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of government which our sovereignty entails; and the commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands."

What we should do with the Philippines scarcely comes within the province of this book. The result of the Presidential election of 1900 seemed to indicate that a great majority of the people was in accord on the prop-

osition that the flag, that went up in honour, should not come down in dishonour. As the insurgents first made war on us, and not we on them, there could be no result consistent with our sovereignty as a nation except their submission.

Peace has now been secured, and the Filipino is fairly entering upon his tutelage of American citizenship. Whether there shall hereafter rise on the equator another Canada, or Australia, or a free and independent republic, will depend on the progress made by this people in the art of government. It is not too much to say that the present administration has managed all matters touching the Philippines with conspicuous prudence and ability, and that it may be expected that it and its successors will solve all questions that may hereafter arise happily and successfully.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE BOXER UPRISING

THE domestic insurrection known as the “Boxer Rising,” directed against foreigners and finally aided and abetted by the empress dowager and some of her Manchu advisers, was a most conspicuous event of Chinese history. A description of this rising, its causes, and its far-reaching effects, would constitute a history of the Empire for the decade.

From the inglorious termination of the war between China and Japan in 1895, and the exposure of the fatal weakness of the Chinese Empire, on to the culmination of the government's folly in 1900, in the infamous attack on the legations in Peking, it was evident to all well-informed observers that the country was in a precarious condition which, unless promptly dealt with, meant disaster. Peking

was in a deplorable state of administrative rottenness. All honesty and integrity and all patriotism seemed to have left the councils of the state. A tempting chance was offered for the ambitions of foreign powers as well as for designs of private schemers. Some of the foreign representatives at Peking adopted an aggressive and peremptory attitude toward China, which the ministers of state were quite unable to resist and which aroused the suspicion and alarm of other powers. It was at that period that the seeds were sown which in 1900 developed into the great insurrectionary movement that so startled the world.

The years '98 and '99 might be characterized as the "period of concessions." It was then that the Chinese government, under the vain idea that it was developing its resources or perhaps influenced by more sordid motives, began giving away concessions for railways, mines, and other purposes. In the process of these negotiations for concessions an intense international rivalry was manifested, and there resulted at Peking a scramble among agents of foreign capitalists, to some extent participated in by the representatives of foreign pow-

ers, which furnished an edifying spectacle of foreign rapacity and unscrupulousness to the Chinese officials. There is no doubt that the prestige of foreigners was seriously impaired during these times, and the ground was thus prepared for the contempt for them which was afterwards felt. The Chinese ruling classes saw, in the intense rivalry of foreigners to obtain a foothold in their country, a menace to the very existence of the government. It required, indeed, very little foresight to realize that great foreign capitalistic combinations which had secured exclusive rights to carry on large enterprises in the interior were bound, in time, to entail a shock with the native customs and native industries. Such a shock could be seen to be particularly inevitable when it is remembered that all foreigners and all foreign corporations in China enjoy the privileges of extraterritoriality, often mentioned here, which secure to them a status as defendants in all legal actions, criminal as well as civil, entirely exempt from the jurisdiction of the authorities of China. To Chinese well enough informed to think of such matters it became evident that China had parted with

a large portion of her autonomy in granting comprehensive foreign concessions; while even to the unthinking it was evident that foreigners were gaining an enormous influence in the development of their railway, mining, and other projects.

The native miner, for example, felt the competition of his foreign rival, and easily realized that the foreigner worked under a freedom from official extortion and oppression which placed the Chinese competitor at a disadvantage. Moreover, much popular ill-will was caused by the granting by China of rights which were really the vested interests of private owners. For instance, in some cases mining rights were granted in territories where Chinese were already at work and where they had been at work for centuries. Under some of these concessions, the foreign grantee was authorized to either dispossess Chinese, or was enabled to acquire his rights from the Chinese on terms which left the native owner no option but to sell. In the same way railways met with popular opposition. The boatmen on the rivers and canals, and the carters, coolies, and others, who had gained their live-

lihood by transportation of the products of certain areas, saw those areas invaded by the iron horse, drawing in a single load goods enough to have kept them busy many weeks. Cities which owed their importance—as Tungchow, near Peking, for example—to facilities afforded for shipment by canal or river, were reduced to insignificance and decay by an adjacent railway, that diverted a traffic which, for centuries, had been the main-stay of their prosperity. The lower classes of Chinese were unable to realize that industrial improvements are eventually the means of raising up the people and contributing to the prosperity of wider areas than had enjoyed the advantage of more primitive methods. In all ages it has been the same, and those immediately affected by new methods and inventions have been blinded to the ultimate advantages which these bring.

As the Chinese common people saw themselves menaced in their industries and daily occupation by the increasing activity of the foreigner, so, also, the Chinese educated or literary classes looked with undisguised alarm at the advance of foreign religious ideas.

The doctrines of Confucius constitute for the Chinese *literati* more than a religion, they are in fact the ethical system for all time and for all conditions; they are the basis of the state, the foundation of government and society. The descendants of Confucius, who live to this day on the estates of the family near the tomb of the great sage in Shantung, receive the veneration, almost the adoration, of the Empire. They trace back their lineage by an unbroken chain through more centuries than any monarch in the world. The Duke of Confucius, as the head of the family is called, holds his rank and his prerogatives by a title more indisputable than does the emperor himself. Through rebellions, revolutions, changes of emperors and dynasties, the Dukes of Confucius continue venerated by the people, honoured by the Throne, the foremost subjects of the Empire. Any encroachment upon their rights would be a sacrilege, any failure of imperial respect to their illustrious progenitor would be an insult to the educated classes of the Empire. To a lesser extent, the two other predominant cults of China — Buddhism and Taoism — have a strong hold on the popular

imagination. Debased into almost formless superstitions as they are, they yet enter into the daily life of millions of the people. The common Chinese may not be able to give a very clear account of his intellectual processes when he visits a Buddhist temple or when he employs Taoist priests to recite incantations in his house, but it is certainly true that both these so-called religions appeal to his emotional nature, and in the crises of his family life he falls back on their ministrations; for funerals and marriages the priests are indispensable, and even in the lesser affairs of life, the building of a house, the inauguration of commercial ventures, etc., they are often called upon.

For these reasons the introduction of Christianity into China and the aggressive pushing of the missionary teaching have always been unacceptable to the learned classes as well as to the uneducated. The classes see in it a menace to their revered system, the masses a conflict with their unreasoned practices. As long as Christianity seemed to make small progress, it was only in occasional instances and purely locally that anti-Christian out-

breaks occurred. When, however, the Christian missionary movement seemed to the people and to the government to take on an increased aggressiveness and activity, as it certainly has in the last ten years, it became identified in the popular and official mind with the general foreign aggression, and was looked upon as an attack upon Chinese institutions in a most vital quarter.

The attitude of the Chinese toward the missionary class, particularly as an element among the causes responsible for the Boxer uprising, is deserving of more detailed attention here. It has been widely declared amongst those not in sympathy with the missionary movement that the main basis of the antiforeign uprising of 1900 was to be found therein. This view can hardly be maintained. The missionaries were a factor, and a large factor, in the antiforeign feelings of 1900, but at the same time the commercial enterprises and, in particular, the policies of certain foreign governments were to a larger degree responsible for the uprising which was so disastrous to the missionaries themselves.

On an analysis of the bitter anti-Christian

movement, we find that it is largely to be explained as primarily antiforeign, that is, largely directed against missionaries solely as foreigners, not solely as teachers of a foreign religion. We find that some of the specific charges made against the missionaries have no reference to their teachings. For instance, a common charge against missionaries which has been the pretext of several outrages, is the charge that hospitals gouge out the eyes of young children for the manufacture of chemicals. This charge was invented to incite the populace against the foreigner in general, not particularly the missionary. Few, if any, accusations of aggressiveness and personal violence on the part of missionaries against Chinese can be substantiated, while there are authentic cases of bad conduct against Chinese by foreigners of other classes. The missionaries, in the vast majority of cases, are loved by those Chinese with whom they succeed in establishing intimate relations, and they are almost universally respected by all classes in the communities in which they are well known. Perhaps the only one of the numerous accusations that are made against

them that has a substantial basis of truth is that they interfere on behalf of their adherents in lawsuits. That there have been many well-substantiated cases of this kind is undeniable. It is only necessary to inquire of Protestant missionaries to learn that the charge is true of Catholics, while the Catholics can recite many instances of the culpability of the Protestants in this regard. There have been authentic cases of quarrels between Catholic and Protestant converts, in which each side relied on the support of its missionary protectors and in which it was impossible to ascertain the truth, as the Chinese principals on each side, whose testimony was diametrically opposite, were supported by their respective missionary teachers as worthy of full credence. It is natural that Chinese, finding, in their legal controversies, their antagonists prevail by means of foreign missionary support, should feel a bitter rankling against the Christian Church and its converts. It is natural, also, that Chinese officials charged with the hearing of cases should resent foreign interference with legal processes, even where they inwardly realized that such interference

conduced to a just decision. It is noticeable that allegations of missionary bad practices in this respect received credence from the Throne itself. In an imperial edict published in the *Peking Gazette* early in June, 1900, the troubles then rife in North China were ascribed to the favour shown to converts in law-suits and to the admission of bad characters to convert ranks.

On careful examination, it cannot be denied that the missionaries erred in this respect, and that they must accept a share of the responsibility for the Boxer outrages, of which they were the foremost victims.

Looked at comprehensively, therefore, the causes of the Boxer insurrection may be grouped under three heads:

i. The aggressive and high-handed action of several foreign powers — chiefly Russia and Germany — in securing territorial concessions from China, and France in actively supporting certain railway concessions. Though China nominally acquiesced by convention in the Russian usurpation of Manchuria under the guise of a railway contract, and in the autocratic German seizure of Kiao-

chow as a compensation for the murder of two missionaries, it was universally recognized in official circles that the government's acquiescence was compelled by foreign threats, however covered under diplomatic procedure, and that the further advance of the foreigner would ultimately lead to the subjection of the Chinese race. This feeling on the part of the governing classes made them connive at the Boxer rising, and encourage the lawless mobs of different localities of origin to combine in a comprehensive effort to exterminate the foreigner and his hated religion.

2. The causes under the second head are somewhat allied to the first and have been somewhat dwelt upon above; that is, the friction with the people and the feeling of unrest caused by the operations of foreign syndicates, grantees of concessions of various kinds from the Chinese government.

3. The antimissionary feeling, chiefly due to ignorance, but somewhat explicable upon the grounds above outlined.

Another great circumstance was very powerful in urging on the uprising. In 1898, the Emperor Kwang-sü became a great reformer,

and issued edict after edict ordering changes in the fundamental institutions of the Empire. In the edict of January 29th, he provided for holding of special examinations in scientific and technical studies, and abolished the essay system, which was the main element of the competitive examinations. He ordered the establishment of schools on Western models in the district and prefectural cities, and universities in the provincial capitals. All old things were done away with, and the new systems, for which the people were not prepared, were ordered to be put into immediate execution. The building of the railways, a bureau of mines, an intelligence department, a department of patents, extensive army reforms, reform newspapers, were parts of this scheme of improvement, and sinecures were abolished.

It was a sweeping revolution, and China was aghast at its conception. The empress dowager and the people were opposed to it, and the empress very quietly, but firmly, seized the helm of state. It was rumoured that she had assassinated the emperor, but it is not likely that she ever contemplated such a step. She set the emperor aside and became regent again,



HU YU-FEN, DIRECTOR OF RAILWAYS

as she had been twice before. Some of the reforms were retained, such as those relating to railroads and mining, but the mass of them was ruthlessly dispensed with. The emperor unresistingly acquiesced in his deposition, and suffered her to work her will. He, himself, lacked the personal strength to carry out the proposed reforms. While his intentions were good, he went too fast. He was too weak mentally and physically to confront with any hope of success the conservative tendencies which had controlled China for centuries, and he undertook to do too much.

During the winter of 1899 and 1900, the ground in North China was found prepared for trouble, and the trouble came. The people in some villages in Shantung, noticeable as the scene of the German government's aggression, began organizing themselves, ostensibly as societies for mutual protection, under the name of *I Ho Chuan*, the Chinese character for *I* meaning patriotic, *Ho*, harmonious, and *Chuan*, a fist, the latter having reference to the gymnastic practices of the society, the society being called by foreigners "Boxers," from the last character of their

name. The members of this society underwent an initiation which was supposed to render them invulnerable, and they were supposed to be under the express protection of the spirits. They sang incantations as they made their attacks, and indulged in dances and prostrations, which were supposed to effectually protect them. They performed their experiments, demonstrating their claims, before admiring crowds, and when an occasional member was blown to pieces by an error in the arrangements of their leaders, he was looked upon as one who had not perfected himself in the art, or who had failed to confide sufficiently in the protecting deity. When the Boxers later in the year found themselves attacking foreign positions, as the legations at Peking or the concessions at Tientsin, many striking incidents occurred, in which foreign guns failed to "bring down" uniformed Boxers at short range, who apparently made their prostrations successfully and escaped. A few such instances counterbalanced in the minds of ignorant followers the many cases in which their comrades were slain — through want of faith, as their leaders said. Of course, this faith could not

continue to be unshaken; the Boxers were put to severe tests and, where deception was not possible, ignominiously failed. On one attack at the Tientsin railway station, the regular Chinese troops attacking with great bravery were repulsed with severe loss.

Going back to their lines, they taunted their Boxer allies with their claims to invulnerability and demanded that they should take their turn at assaulting the foreign position. The Boxers, under the compulsion of the regulars, reluctantly advanced, and on their ignominious retreat were shot down in large numbers by the imperial troops, indignant at the complete failure of Boxer pretensions.

An interesting story is told in Chinese official circles in Tientsin in this connection about the Viceroy Yuan Shih Kai, now Governor-General of the province Chihli. When Boxer outrages in Shantung had aroused the diplomatic body at Peking to a feeling of alarm, they demanded that the Governor of Shantung be recalled. This demand was acceded to by the Chinese government, and Yuan, then general of Chinese foreign drilled troops near Tientsin, was sent down to replace him. Yuan

had been Chinese resident in Korea, he had had some experience in the China-Japan war of 1894-95, he had associated with foreigners, he put little faith in Boxer pretensions, and he was, as well, a determined man. On assuming his post in Shantung, he took a large number of his troops with him. Upon arrival there he was called upon by a committee of the most prominent Boxer leaders, who proceeded to explain their doctrines and to impress upon the new governor their claims to invulnerability. Yuan listened to them with apparent respect, congratulated them upon their supernatural powers, and ended by inviting them to dine with him and meet some of the notables of the province. The Boxers, delighted with the impression they had made, promptly accepted. At the dinner Yuan introduced the Boxers to the other guests, and toward the close of the feast brought the conversation around to a discussion of their mysterious powers. Finally he stated that an exhibition of their invulnerability would not only be of interest to himself and the other guests, but that he felt sure the Boxers would be glad of an opportunity to give a conclusive proof



YUAN SHIH KAI

of their claims and secure the confidence of those who might be skeptical on the subject. He then invited the reluctant committee to step out on to the parade-ground, where the demonstration would take place. Protestations were of no avail, and the unfortunate committee were lined up against a wall, where they found themselves confronted by a squad of the governor's foreign-drilled riflemen. The word to fire was given, and every member of the committee fell dead, furnishing a demonstration of the Boxer claims which greatly assisted in keeping the province of Shantung in order during the remaining period of the uprising. It was the frequent boast of Yuan, before he was made Governor-General of Chihli, that if the power were given him he could control the Empire, and he often pointed to his administration of Shantung in proof of his ability. In one respect he was a faithful follower of his illustrious predecessor, Li Hung Chang, namely, in his unhesitating appeal to force. When Li came through Tientsin from Canton, on his way to Peking to arrange terms with the foreign powers, after a long, confidential talk on the conditions prevailing

in the province of Chihli, he said, "If I had been here the rising would never have grown to such serious proportions; I should have checked it." To the inquiry, "How would your Excellency have done it?" "Sha, sha, sha (kill, kill, kill)," was the answer, and there is little doubt that the old warrior, had he been viceroy at Tientsin, would have used relentlessly the means he indicated and that he would have strangled the movement.

The organization of these societies and their antiforeign and anti-Christian purpose did not long escape the notice of the missionaries scattered throughout the interior of Shantung and Chihli. The most alarming reports were sent to Peking, Shanghai, and Tientsin, where they were received with a considerable degree of incredulity. Active movements against the foreigners began by the murder of Mr. Brooks, of the Church of England Mission, on December 30, 1899, in the Fei Cheng district of Shantung. This caused alarm for the safety of other missionaries in the affected district, and representations were made by the foreign ministers to the Chinese authorities for their protection.

The punishment inflicted for Mr. Brooks's murder seemed to exercise no deterrent influence on the Boxer movement. It rapidly spread over the borders from Shantung into Chihli, and raged with great violence chiefly against native converts. There seems no doubt that the greater part of the non-Chinese—that is the Manchu and Mongol—advisers of the Throne were in sympathy with it. The empress dowager alarmed, not only by the aggressiveness of foreign powers, but by the advance made by pro-foreign ideas in the mind of the emperor himself, scarcely concealed her Boxer leanings.

It was on the 24th of January that the emperor issued a startling decree, in all probability dictated by the dowager empress, in which he declared in effect that he was unequal to the duties of government, that he was not only childless, but that through an incurable ailment he could never beget a successor to the throne, that he had therefore asked the empress to nominate an heir apparent, and that she had selected Pu Chun, son of Prince Tuan, as prince imperial, to carry out the dynastic succession. This decree reduced

his power to a nonentity, and placed the Boxer party, with Prince Tuan as its substantive head, in a position of almost supreme influence. From that time on the movement spread with great rapidity and publicity. Boxer drilling was publicly conducted, not only throughout the villages and towns of Chihli, but even in the streets of Peking and Tientsin. Attacks upon converts, upon foreign railway employés in the country, and upon missionaries became frequent. Frequent demands were made upon the Chinese Foreign Office for some energetic efforts to suppress the secret societies, but the representations of the foreign ministers were coldly received. On the 5th of June, the British Minister appealed to the ministers of the Chinese government to take some serious action, pointing out to them that further inactivity would lead inevitably to foreign intervention. No attempt was made by the ministers to defend their government; no assurances were given as to the safety of Peking, and it was freely admitted that the government was reluctant to deal harshly with the movement, "which, being antiforeign, was popular."

TYPICAL CHINESE VILLAGE



On the 19th of May, 1900, Bishop Favier, of the Apostolic Mission of Peking, wrote to the French Minister at Peking: "I beg you to be assured, M. le Ministre, that I am well informed and am making no statement at random. The religious persecution is only a blind, the main object is to exterminate the Europeans, and this object is clearly indicated and written on the 'Boxers' standards." (British Blue Book 3, 1900, p. 108.)

Earlier in the spring there had been no unanimity among the foreign representatives at Peking nor among the foreign journals as to the serious character of the threatened trouble. On the 20th of March the *Post*, London, published a translation of a protest made by the *Ost Asiatische Lloyd* against the attitude of certain newspapers in England and China in publishing incredible rumours about events in China, of a nature to make people in Europe believe that China was on the verge of a revolution. The German paper stated that "one could laugh heartily over the whole affair were it not that the question has unfortunately a serious side to it. The reports, which even the most respectable papers have

published during the last few weeks, have made a deep impression, which will not easily be removed, upon the Chinese population, and more especially among traders, who naturally know little about the dynastic and political conditions of their country, but who place implicit confidence in the statements of Europeans. The wild tales that are telegraphed to Europe and America must influence the value of Chinese stock, but more especially the confidence of the home market in Chinese affairs."

It is noticeable that up to the very beginning of June there was a distinct aversion on the part of the representatives of the powers to make naval demonstrations against China, or to bring foreign guards to Peking. This was particularly conspicuous on the part of Russia. It has been charged by some critics that Russia was playing a deep game of diplomacy, and her aptitude for such games lends some appearance of truth to the charge. There seems much reason to believe that Russia would have been glad to keep off all co-operation by foreign powers in an effort to keep order in China until the necessity for

armed interference became imperative, and then to come forward herself as the sole rescuer of the legations and restorer of order in China. This would have given her not only valid pretexts for increase of her military forces in Manchuria, but it would also have placed in her hands an excellent opportunity for further aggression on China. Never were Russian agents in North China more active than just before, during, and immediately after the Boxer troubles. They were accused by other foreigners of having secret knowledge of the Chinese government's plans and of encouraging them. It is pretty well known that they eagerly wished to secure the persons of the emperor and empress dowager and to hold them as a political lever, and were much chagrined at their Majesties' escape. After the capture of Peking, when Li Hung Chang came up from Canton to negotiate terms with the allies, he was placed under a sort of involuntary surveillance of Russian officers and troops. The Russian general placed quarters at Li's disposal, gave him escorts by river and on land, furnished him foreign interpreters, and took every possible measure not only to

give him and the Chinese authorities in general the impression that he was particularly the object of Russia's regard, but also to influence as far as possible the peace negotiations favourably to Russia. There does not seem to have been a result sufficiently compensatory for all Russia's efforts. She secured a handsome war indemnity, it is true, as well as certain small concessions.

Returning to the Boxer troubles. During the whole spring the conduct of the empress contributed to the general unrest. She had replaced in office all the men who were suspected of favouring foreigners by reckless, greedy, antiprogressive tools of her own. The reformer Kang Yu-wei, and the emperor's own tutor Weng, who were respected by the people, were condemned to death. Outrages became frequent in the country around Peking and Tientsin. May 27, 1900, all the houses and railway stations at Paotingfu were destroyed by a mob. At Feng-tai, the junction of the Peking and Paotingfu railway lines,—four miles from Peking,—the roundhouse and all the buildings were destroyed, the railroad employés escaping to Tientsin. Application



STREET SCENE, PAOTINGFU

was then made by the foreign representatives to bring marines to Peking, and, when the government interposed an objection, it was informed that the marines would be brought up at all hazards. Admiral Kempf had arrived at Taku, sixty miles from Tientsin by river, thirty miles by rail, and he landed one hundred men, two machine guns, and a field-piece. These Americans were the first troops to arrive at Tientsin, except a small Japanese force. The day after, guards from ships of five nations reached Tientsin, and permission was asked to send them to Peking. The Chinese, finding that resistance would be useless, consented that thirty men of each nationality should go to Peking. There went in fact seventy-five British, seventy-five Russians, seventy-five French, fifty-two Americans, thirty Italians, and thirty Japanese, while guards of like strength were left in Tientsin. Outrages in the country continued. Messrs. Norman and Robinson, English missionaries, were slaughtered. Refugees were pouring into Tientsin. The railway line to Peking was being interrupted every day, bridges and culverts were destroyed. Twenty foreign men-

of-war were by this time collected off Taku. The government at Peking was in a desperate condition. The empress had favoured the "Boxers," but now that she saw foreign troops invade China she trembled lest the dynasty should be overthrown. She, therefore, sent General Nieh with an army to confront the "Boxers." Reports vary as to whether he made a forcible attack or not. It is claimed that he ordered the soldiers to fire over the enemy's heads. At all events the outrages continued to be perpetrated, and railway stations were burned every day.


From May 30 to June 6, 1900, there were landed at Tientsin the following number of soldiers: British, 206; American, 175; Russian, 150; French, 140; German, 412; Japanese, 100; Austrian, 31; Cossacks, 60. Four hundred of them went to Peking and eight hundred remained at Tientsin. Twenty-eight men-of-war lay at the mouth of the river. June 7, 1900, twenty-five American marines from the U. S. S. *Monocacy* landed at Tientsin. Two men-of-war arrived. The railway tracks were all torn up, and the employés deserted. Saturday, June 6, 1900, it was

learned that orders had been received at Lutai to send to Taku seven thousand foreign-drilled troops with about sixty field-guns. This force actually started from Lutai for Taku, marching overland. The foreign commanders of the ships had a consultation, and sent notes to the commander of the forts at the mouth of the Peiho that these troops would not be permitted to enter the forts.

The troops which had been diverted from Taku were joined by the troops which escaped from the forts, and marched on Tientsin, making common cause with the "Boxers." This resulted in concentrating at Tientsin about ten thousand troops and sixty field-pieces. Finding that thousands of Chinese troops had entered the forts, and mines were being laid across the channel, the foreign commanders called on the general of the forts, and informed him that unless they were surrendered by twelve o'clock that night, Saturday, June 15th, they would bombard the forts at two A. M. the following day. At one o'clock A. M., the forts opened fire on the foreign ships. From this time until 6.30 P. M. there was an unceasing bombardment by the ships, and shortly after-

ward the forts surrendered. In this fight the British lost one officer and a sailor; the Germans, one officer killed, and some men wounded and some killed by a boiler explosion; the Russians, three officers badly wounded, sixteen men killed, twenty-two wounded, and seventy burned in an explosion of powder; the French, one officer killed, and one man wounded. Thursday, July 5, 1900, was a comparatively quiet day at Tientsin, though there was some cannonading. On the 8th, 9th, and 10th, the Chinese sharply shelled the foreign position. The 10th, the Chinese attempted with a large force to cut the foreign communications. They were discovered working around the west arsenal and got as far as the race-course. The Japanese, British, and Germans were soon in the open attacking them. The Chinese lost four hundred killed, and six guns. The Tientsin native city and most of the surrounding forts were taken on the night of the 13th and early in the morning of the 14th. The soldiers of all the nations behaved nobly. In proportion to numbers the Americans suffered most. Out of nine hundred men engaged they lost one hundred, including among the killed

TIENTSIN AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT



the gallant Colonel Liscomb, who had arrived only the day before from Manila in command of the Ninth Regiment.

Thenceforth, peace reigned at Tientsin, but, until the Provisional Government was established there was much plundering and disorder.¹ The story of the siege of Peking has been so often told that I will treat it briefly. May 31, 1900, 459 foreign soldiers or marines arrived at the capital to act as legation guards. By the 8th of June, the foreign residents had become greatly alarmed. The failure of the relieving force of marines under Admiral Seymour to reach Peking increased their fears for safety. It was not known until August 2d that this force had turned back. The American missionaries agreed to concentrate at the Methodist Mission, which is not far from the end of Legation Street, and a guard of twenty marines was sent to protect them. The Catholics were mostly gathered at the Peitang. June 11, 1900, a secretary of the Japanese Legation was murdered and mutilated, near the railway station. June 13th, 14th, and 15th the

¹ For fuller particulars of the siege and government of Tientsin, see following chapter.

"Boxers" destroyed all abandoned property, as many as thirteen churches, seven hospitals, seven schools, and thirty-three houses being burnt.

The 16th of June a great conflagration occurred, which destroyed three thousand shops and houses and twenty-six banks. June 19th, the Tsung-li-Yamen handed passports to the foreign ministers, and ordered them to leave Peking in a day, and the next day China declared war against all the world — not even excepting the United States, which had taken no part in bombarding the Taku forts.

June 20th, Baron Ketteler, German Minister, was shot down on the Hattamen Street as he was proceeding to the foreign office with his secretary, who also was wounded. The foreigners were then directed to proceed to the British Legation as a general rendezvous. The converts were assigned the palace of Prince Su opposite the British Legation across the moat. June 20th, Rev. Francis Hubert James was killed as he was passing along the north side of this palace toward the British Legation. At this legation the chapel was assigned to the Americans, who had no food or beds.

LEGATION STREET, PEKING, AFTER THE SIEGE



At the British Legation there were over four hundred foreigners exclusive of marines, and 350 Chinese men, women, and children, while 2,300 Chinese were at the palace of Prince Su.

The line of defence adopted covered the legation quarter, extending from the Russian and American Legations at the west to the Italian at the east, and running back from the wall about six hundred yards north. The Americans occupied the city wall near their legation, and the Germans a point on the wall toward the Hattamen. The Americans had a Colt's automatic gun, the British a Nordenfeld, the Austrians a Maxim, and the Italians a one-pounder. An old English gun of 1860 was found and repaired, and did good service. The Rev. F. D. Gamewell, a Methodist missionary, was assigned to be chief of fortifications, and appropriate committees to have charge of the food supply and all other matters were appointed by Sir Claude Macdonald, who was in command. Mr. Squires, Secretary of the American Legation, was his efficient adjutant. I shall not follow day by day the incidents of this siege. Rev. Gilbert Reed has written a full and admirable account of it. The Chi-

nese attempted in various ways to smoke the foreigners out. They set fire to the great Hanlin Library which adjoined the legation buildings, but the wind changed and the smoke did no harm. Rifle-firing continued nearly all the time. Heavy guns were fired from several positions. All the writers who describe the siege of the legation report that the "Boxers" were honoured and favoured by the empress. June 24th, Prince Chang, one of the hereditary princes, was appointed supreme commander of the "Boxers"; Kang Yi was made grand secretary and Minister of the Cabinet; other nobles were appointed under Prince Chang. June 25th, the empress gave the "Boxers" one hundred thousand taels, and all the time any man who was inclined to show any favour to the foreigners was denounced and insulted. Still some sensible Chinese survived. The young Marquis Tseng advised against war. The Assistant Secretary Hwai said that in any event under international law the foreign ministers must be respected. Wang Wen Shao and Vice-President Sung said: "It is indispensable to protect the foreign legations." Nevertheless,



WANG WEN SHAO

the war party carried the day. There were conflicts on the wall, in one of which the Germans were worsted, and in another the Americans drove the Chinese from the wall.

The battle went on in a desultory manner from day to day, and it was wondered why the Chinese did not make a rush and capture the legation, but no general attack was made.

There were many casualties. Of regulars there were killed, and died, fifty-four, and of civilians eleven. One hundred and thirteen regulars were wounded, and twenty civilians. The converts lost nine killed, and twelve wounded.

The afternoon of the 14th, a regiment of Sikhs arrived at the legation, and the siege was over.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE CAPTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF TIEN- TSIN¹

IN justice to the Russians, it must be noted that it was very largely due to them that the Tientsin community was able to survive the siege, and it is certain that, had Tientsin been taken by the "Boxers," the legations at Peking would have been easy victims. On the 14th of June, some seventeen hundred Cossacks arrived at Tientsin, subject to the orders of Colonel Wogack, Russian military agent stationed there. It was supposed that these troops were to be sent on to Peking, but Colonel Wogack, with a striking military insight which was more than justified by sub-

¹The following chapter was written by Hon. Charles Denby, son of the author of this book, whose presence in Tientsin during the siege and his part in the Provisional government of the city gave him a most excellent opportunity to know and to write of these exciting and important events.

sequent events, realized that these troops were needed for the successful defence of Tientsin, and that if Tientsin fell the relief of Peking would be too late. He accordingly detained the Cossacks at Tientsin, and in all probability it was this addition of seventeen hundred men to the small foreign garrison which enabled the Tientsin settlements not only to resist all assaults upon the settlements themselves, but to hold the railroad station against terrific odds.

On the 16th of June, the allied naval commanders at Taku demanded that the forts there be surrendered before two o'clock in the morning of June 17th, and it was decided to attack the forts at that hour if the demand of surrender were not complied with. This action was taken because the relief of Peking would present most serious difficulties if a large force should enter China leaving fortresses in Chinese possession between the invaders and the sea. Already Admiral Seymour, in command of a force of British, American, German, Italian, Russian, Austrian, French, and Japanese troops had advanced from Tientsin toward Peking and met such

opposition that an expedition for his relief seemed urgently necessary.

Instead of acceding to the demand to surrender, the Chinese decided to take the offensive, and at one A. M., on the 17th of June, they opened fire from the forts on the allied fleets. The fleets replied, and after six hours' engagement the forts were silenced and occupied. It is worthy of note that though the only American vessel present, the *Monocacy*, was struck by a Chinese shell, the United States took no part in the engagement.

The immediate effect of this conflict at Taku was to remove all pretence from the attitude of the Chinese government. Peking had hitherto tried to represent that the "Boxer" movement was simply the outbreak of mobs beyond its power to control. It now became evident that the movement was a national one, not only connived at, but openly abetted by the imperial government. At Tientsin this transition from a state of resistance by foreigners against an attack by undisciplined local rabble to a state of warfare with the Chinese government itself was very marked and ominous. The writer of this chapter remem-


bers with vivid distinctness how the transition occurred. He, with his wife and young child, had several days previously taken refuge with a friend who lived in a house more centrally situated and more susceptible of defence against mob attack than their own residence. It had become known in Tientsin, on the 16th of June, that the Taku forts were to be taken, with a view toward opening the Peiho to foreign navigation, thus to enable relief to be brought to Admiral Seymour's force and to Peking. This was generally regarded as a wise and timely movement, the success of which seemed certain, and it was believed that the capture of the forts would intimidate the Chinese government and lead to the immediate suppression of the "Boxers."

On Sunday, the 17th of June, 1900, it was reported at Tientsin that the forts had been brilliantly captured and occupied by the allied forces. A feeling of relief spread over the town. At the hospitable house where the writer and family then sojourned, the event was celebrated by a luncheon which was enjoyed with a lightheartedness long absent from that circle. The "Boxer" troubles were be-

lieved to be over, and the party gave themselves up to pleasant anticipations of returning to their various homes and engaging again in the usual pursuits of Tientsin life. The luncheon was just over and the guests were about to rise from the table when a terrific explosion shook the house. A tense silence fell on the company. In a few seconds another and a third explosion followed in the immediate vicinity. At the third explosion one of the ladies present rushed to the window and exclaimed, "The Chinese are shelling us." It was only too true, and all men present realized in a moment that they were under shell-fire from the government forts, equipped with modern foreign guns, which lay about three miles north of the foreign settlement.

The siege of Tientsin has often been described. The heroism of its defenders, the gallant ride of Jim Watts to carry to Taku the tale of the danger of the community, the arrival of foreign relief detachments which forced their way across the plains from Taku to Tientsin against a fierce resistance, followed later on by the assembling of an army, the assault of Tientsin City and its capture,

U. S. CAVALRY ENTERING TIENTSIN



the march on Peking, the relief of the legations, all these incidents have been the theme of story and song in the foreign communities of North China and have found their chroniclers in the languages of the world. To those who lived through those trying days when, for one month, men faced with such equanimity as they could the constant fear of violent death for themselves, and sometimes, with a sickening dread, foresaw the more than possible fate of their wives and children hidden away in the cellars of Tientsin,— to those be much pardoned if they view with less lenient hearts the race upon whose soil they had peaceably resided, and if they allow the suppressed passions of the days of June and July, 1900, to influence somewhat their judgment on a people and a government which committed the dastardly folly of a general attack upon the foreigners within their gates.

On the 14th of July, Tientsin fell, and was occupied by the allies, the city being divided into four equal areas, of which one was assigned to be governed by the American, one each to the British, French, and Japanese detachments. This impromptu arrangement


was soon changed by the establishment of a centralized government, created by the commanding officers of the allied forces at Taku, which was endowed with absolute power over the Chinese city of Tientsin. The conduct of this government, called, "Le Gouvernement Provisoire de la Cité Chinoise de Tientsin," was first entrusted by the allies to a Conseil d'Administration, consisting of a Russian, a British, and a Japanese officer. These officers proceeded to engage civil employés from the civilian population of Tientsin, and officers and men from the various detachments were freely placed under their orders. The first civilian engaged was Charles Denby, Jr., as *Secrétaire Général du Gouvernement*, and the other newly created positions of Chinese secretary, judge, chief of police, chief of public works department, treasurer, etc., were gradually filled as suitable men could be secured. In fact, there sprang into existence in a few weeks' time a completely organized, efficient, honest, and enlightened administration, which ruled over Tientsin, restored order, administered justice, collected just taxes, carried out public works of long-felt

necessity, and performed all the functions of enlightened rulers. Its acts are beyond all praise. From a scene of physical and of moral chaos there sprang into existence a community, Chinese still, but enjoying a beneficent and honest government; under an iron military rule, it is true, but a rule so tempered by justice and of so lofty purpose that it commended itself to the enlightened element of the Chinese society itself as well as to all intelligent observers. After the government had been about a year in operation its membership was increased by the admission to the Council of Administration of an American, a French, a German, and an Italian officer. The area placed under the Council's jurisdiction was also largely extended so as to include a strip of territory about forty miles wide, covering both banks of the Peiho River from above Tientsin to the sea. This government continued in existence from July 18, 1900, to August 15, 1902. Not only was it one of the most interesting and successful efforts at international coöperative government ever essayed, but it furnished to the world a conspicuous and effective refutation of

the oft-repeated dictum that foreigners could not govern China. The full effect of this momentous demonstration of the readiness of the Chinese to accept foreign rule, when accompanied by manifest power and administered with justice, has been, however, offset by the victories of Japan in her war with Russia. The Island Champion has risen up to warn Europe that China shall not be in future a helpless victim of spoliation.

The city of Tientsin had been for nearly a month under foreign military rule before the allies penetrated the Water Gate at Peking and ended the "Boxer" uprising throughout the North. The sequel is a well-known story. China agreed to pay an indemnity measured rather by the greed of the victors than by the actual losses inflicted on their nationals, plus the expense to which they had been themselves subjected. China acted with dignity during the negotiation of the peace protocol and afterward. She has accepted without unseemly protest the burden imposed upon her, a burden which, up to the present, only America seems disposed to lighten.

It is a remarkable fact, perhaps not unusual



MAIN GATE OF TIENSIN AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT

in the history of the world, that the nation's misfortunes have brought blessings upon her. China has gained from her defeat some of the advantages which publicity brings. Her doors have been more widely opened, and civilization has entered more freely in. The realization of her weakness has aroused her to reform. Railways are more and more traversing her territory, developing her markets, and enlightening her people. Her mines are beginning to disclose their treasures to the world. The progressive paths into which she has now entered must lead to reform of the civil administration, to sounder methods of education, to a grand betterment of the life of her people.

During the past two years the unfortunate country has heard again the clash of arms, this time, though within her borders, happily not against herself. The wisdom of her rulers and the friendly advice of neutral nations have enabled the Peking government to look on a spectator of the Titanic struggle which now shakes the East. Whether the victory fall eventually to Japan or to the Muscovite, China will do well to conserve her strength,

to look to her own welfare, to preserve the good-will of all her foreign friends, to enlighten and build up her own people. A great rôle is reserved for the Chinese in the future drama of the world. Every well-wisher of the human race must hope that, as they master that phase of civilization which finds its most perfect development in the use of armed force, the worthier and the nobler arts of peace may to an equal degree exercise a softening influence upon them. In some quarters, not free from the taint of selfish motives, the cry of the "Yellow Peril" has been raised. The fair-minded foreigner in the East, whether he be soldier, merchant, missionary, or diplomat, foresees some competition, some friction, it is true, but only such a peril as enterprise, justice, and integrity will be able to meet. The only foreign interference he can wish for is the introduction of nobler ideals made illustrious by nobler examples. May the West, which forced her intercourse upon the East, now show to China that not only does our civilization teach the arts of war which her neighbour has so conspicuously mastered, but that in our hearts we are ashamed that so apt a pupil has learned

so one-sided a lesson, and that we ourselves aspire to higher ideals, toward which East and West, with earnest hope and sincere efforts, may together strive.


CHAPTER XV.

THE UNITED STATES CONSULAR SERVICE

A N American consul in China occupies a very important position. He is not only charged with the ordinary duties of a consulship in all countries, but he is also a judge in all civil and criminal matters pertaining to the rights, obligations, and business of his fellow citizens. He may be called on to try equity or admiralty suits, or murder cases, or important actions at common law. In all local matters he represents his government, and is in continual correspondence with the Chinese officials, it may be on questions of tariff, or of protection to his nationals, or transit passes, or something else. In Shanghai the consul-general holds court almost every day.

It is a new life on which the consul enters when he goes to one of the little concessions in China. He finds himself immediately an

MARKET - PLACE, SHANGHAI




important factor in a refined society composed of his colleagues of every nation and rich and cultured merchants. A round of dinners welcomes his arrival, and he is entertained with lavish hospitality. Sometimes the evening suit in which he must appear is entirely new to him, and the dinner courses and wines are revelations of an untried life. He may be awkward at first, but very soon he becomes familiarized with the social elegancies which surround him, and in a short time he returns these civilities at his own handsome table. It sometimes happens that a man is hopeless, that he will still chew tobacco in the salon, and expectorate in the fireplace, that he will be uncouth in his manners, and will drink too much of the beverage which is new to him, but common to the country, "whiskey and polly."

The Department soon finds him out. Every man in either the diplomatic or consular service makes a reputation which is as well known at the State Department as a man's reputation is in the village where he resides. The Department knows, and gauges at his true value, every man under its control. All of its employés pass for exactly what they are worth.

There are no jealousies or ill feelings to pull one down. The fairest treatment is accorded to all. Every employé bears with him a part of the reputation of the Department, and without the slightest envy praise is awarded wherever it is due. After nearly fifteen years' service under the Department — partly as minister to China, and partly as commissioner to the Philippines — I would like to make here suitable mention of the esteem and affection which its subordinates feel for it. During two Democratic and two Republican administrations the writer did not realize the slightest difference in the treatment accorded to him. His political opponents were just as kind, just as considerate, and just as liberal to him as were his political friends. Secretaries Bayard, Gresham, and Olney were no kinder than Secretaries Blaine, Sherman, Foster, and Hay. We were component parts of a great and admirable machine. Every employé felt the *esprit de corps* that such an institution develops. Every one knew that justice would in every matter be done him. We knew that political feeling was non-existent in the work of this great international bureau, and that

GENERAL VIEW OF THE LEGATIONS, PEKING



fairness, justice, and honour were the governing rules of its action.

Of course, from his official despatches the Department knows the efficiency, or the want of it, of every minister or consul, but it knows more than that. It knows them personally in their daily conduct and habits — and this in the natural sequence of events, and without the slightest espionage. Sometimes the minister is surprised to receive a notification to examine into the habits of a consul, and report the result. If the consul is making money outside of his salary, the fact is immediately reported to the Department. If he contracts debts that he does not pay, the Department is promptly advised of it, and applies the remedy. In a small Chinese concession the consul lives in a fiercer light than that which beats about a throne. A consul in the Orient must practically keep open house. He must entertain largely. He must put up distinguished Americans and the navy officers who visit his post. It is difficult to do all this on the small compensation allowed, but somehow the offices never go a-begging.

One thing which would tend greatly to im-

prove the corps would be to retain in office all valuable men. I do not mean that Congress should pass a law making the tenure of office by consuls permanent. I doubt the wisdom of such a plan. In our form of government we should have as few life offices as possible. An American rebels against the idea that any set of officials should be placed in positions from which they cannot be removed during their lives. It is, he thinks, the creation of a privileged class, as no doubt it is. While in the army and navy for technical reasons, and in the judiciary, for very weighty considerations, some of which involve its independence, we must have a life tenure of office, there is no overwhelming necessity for such tenure either in diplomatic or consular office. If there were no remedy whereby an efficient service could be procured outside of life tenure, the argument in its favour would be strong, but there is a very simple and efficacious plan whereby every evil can be driven away. It is within the power of the Department of State, with the concurrence of the President, to keep any person in office as long as it pleases. The ruthless manner in which able and experienced

officials have been removed, simply because a new administration has come into power, cannot be approved of by any reasoning man. I could name of my own knowledge consuls in the Far East who made splendid reputations, whose retention was desired by every American, and by all the foreigners and natives, but who, when a change of administration came, were superseded.

These changes are not always made for political causes. It happens that a new President wants to reward his own special friends, and so, having regard to no other consideration, new men are appointed to office who take the places of the most efficient officials. It is recorded that one Secretary of State in a few days revolutionized the service by innumerable changes.

The rule suggested is the best for both the diplomatic and consular service. Whenever the Department finds that a man in office has made a fine reputation for efficiency, let it keep him at his post. Whenever it finds that the public good for any reason requires a change, let it make it, — but let it not remove an able and efficient officer simply because he would

have, if he had been at home, voted a ticket different from the one which prevailed at the election. It would seem from recent appointments in the diplomatic service, that the Department has got on this platform. It is noticeable that promotions, here and there, follow vacancies, and recourse is not had to the appointment of new civilians. There can be no objection to this policy. Certainly it will encourage the ambassadors, ministers, and consuls to renewed efforts to discharge their duties with increased effectiveness.

Another thing has been recently done which is in the right direction. Several students have been designated to go to Peking to prepare themselves by studying the Chinese language, and in other ways, for positions as clerks in the consular offices. This policy was adopted by Great Britain at the very beginning of its diplomatic intercourse with China. It has always had a corps of students who remain at Peking three years, and during that time are regularly instructed by competent teachers. When the course is completed, the most distinguished student is paid five hundred dollars as a prize. These young

gentlemen are then sent to the consulates to act as clerks. They serve nowhere but in China. They are stationed during their service in all parts of the Empire. They speak the language perfectly, and they know the people and officials better than any other class does, except, perhaps the missionaries. They are promoted, when they have proved their efficiency, to the position of consuls. The reports of these officials on Chinese trade are of inestimable value. As the result of their labours, in part, the foreign population of China is three-fifths British, and the trade of England is nearly eighty per cent. of the entire foreign trade.

Under our present system, except so far as the appointment of students has modified or may modify it, it is almost impossible that a consul can acquire the Chinese language. One of our consuls goes to his post with the reasonable certainty that he will not retain it more than four years. There is little inducement for him to learn the language, for the mastering of which all his time would be insufficient, because it is a very difficult language to learn. He has not much time to spare from the per-

formance of his official duties. He must take everything at second-hand. He is in the power of his interpreter, who, in most cases, is a Chinese, and sometimes not the most honest person in the world. If this class is not slandered, its members, sometimes at least, take bribes, utter false permits, and enter into fraudulent combinations to influence the unsuspecting consul.

The consular system is complicated. We have consul-generals, consuls, consular agents, and commercial agents, and to each of these officers there may be subordinate officers, such as vice-consuls, etc. We have also thirteen consular clerks who receive twelve hundred dollars per annum. The design in appointing these clerks was to prepare them to become consuls, and originally it was intended to give them consulships as fast as vacancies occurred, but the scheme utterly fell through. The consular clerk knew that if he were appointed a consul he would in all probability hold the office only three or four years, and he preferred a life job, at twelve hundred dollars, to a slightly higher salary for a year or two. He therefore positively refuses to give up his

clerkship. As clerk he has grown gray, and he prevents the appointment of a new clerk as long as he lives. Some of these clerks act as prosecutors in the consular courts, and get the usual fees. Some practise law on their own account in the consular courts. Some make a little money by doing odd jobs for the consul, and occasionally they are detailed to act as consuls during an interim, and are allowed the fees for unofficial work. Altogether the system should be amended. The consular clerk should be compelled to accept a consulship if one is offered to him, so as to make way for a new recruit who, in his turn, should learn the business. If this is not done the class should be abolished and its place supplied by the students to whom I have alluded. Consular agents are an anomaly. The President appoints as many of them as he pleases. They are not salaried officials. The act of Congress provides "that the only allowance to any vice-consulate or consular agency for expenses should be an amount sufficient to pay for stationery and postage on official letters." The consular agent, however, is allowed to do business, often over the protest of the mer-

chants who are engaged in importing or exporting. All the invoices of the exports pass through the agent's hands, and he is enabled to ascertain the values put on their goods by the merchants, and may thus gain valuable hints as to their business. Protest against such a system came to me while I was Minister to China.

Commercial agents somewhat resemble consular agents. They are unlimited in number. They have no salaries, but have fees. It is plain to be seen that the whole system is cumbersome and expensive. It would be better for the government to appoint a consul wherever one is necessary. Of course there may be exceptions to the rule, where the number of consuls to a country is limited.

It must not be imagined that anything hereinbefore written will be new to the State Department. I am not writing to instruct its employees. Indeed I have derived some of this matter from its own records. The Department is perfectly cognizant of all the evils existing in the consular service, and so far as executive action can remove them they will all be remedied. Under John Hay, its distin-

guished and experienced head, it has done much to improve and remodel the service, and it will continue this work until the Executive has exhausted its power — but without legislative action no radical remedy can be applied. A fundamental idea now existing must be done away with, and that is that the consular service should be made self-supporting. If the service accomplishes valuable results for our foreign trade, as it undoubtedly does, there is no reason why it should be compelled to collect sufficient funds for its maintenance any more than the army and navy should. In no case would the deficit ever be considerable, as the service will always almost, if not quite, pay its way.

A great and unpaid part of the services rendered by both ministers and consuls consists in the efforts made to promote our trade. Reports after reports are made by them on all commercial questions. They write innumerable letters to the merchants at home, and send all the information that is asked for. They have accomplished a good deal, but not nearly as much as their interlocutors expected. Why their efforts have

fallen short in producing great results belongs rather to a chapter on the trade of China (*q. v.*), than to one on the consular service.



ADMIRAL DEWEY

CHAPTER XVI.

PROGRESS ON THE PACIFIC SHORES

THE year 1898 will be considered an epoch in our history. After thirty-five years of peace this country with fiery eagerness plunged into a war. There were veterans of the Civil War surviving, who heard the signal as the war-horse hears the trumpet-call. Dewey, Sampson, Schley, Fitzhugh Lee, Wheeler, Wilson, and others still lived, and many a private who had gone to war in his teens snuffed with joy the approaching conflict. If the war had accomplished only one of its results it would have been well to have fought it. It reunited this country. It brought the South back to its standard. It put her on her feet again. It made patriotism respectable, honoured, and glorious. It made heroes of Southern birth, and all the world

loves a hero. The year 1898 accomplished other and far-reaching results.

The fever of annexation came upon us. We took to ourselves Hawaii, Tutuila, Guam, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. Who started the crusade nobody knows, and, now that McKinley is dead, nobody ever will know. It seemed that in the vast boldness of his schemes, the arch-magician simply followed the popular will, for the people reëlected him. Certainly no greater innovation was ever inaugurated than the annexation of countries not contiguous to this continent. Certainly it involves problems which will test the strength of the Constitution — but, fortunately, this old document is elastic and expands and contracts at the will of the great lawyers who interpret it.

The beacons of progress on the borders of the Pacific were luring us on. From the shores of this once pathless ocean, and from the myriads of people who dwell on them, the siren song of progress was swelling in our ears, and we did not close them to the entrancing melody as Ulysses did.

Not very long ago one galleon a year left

Manila for Mexico, now she has lines of her own to the Southern islands, to Hongkong, and the Straits Settlements, and the ships of several lines make her a regular port of call.

Look at Japan. She was ruled by the daimios in 1854, and she was closed to all the world. Perry struck her with the wand of progress. Her foreign trade to-day amounts to more than two hundred million dollars a year. She is gridironed with railroads. The daimios, like the ancient feudal lords in Europe, have retired for ever. An emperor holds peaceful sway. The two-sworded samurai are gone, and in their place are found the great merchant and the enterprising manufacturer. Osaka is rivalling Birmingham. Wonder of wonders, Japan has a parliament. Constitutional government has taken the place of feudal rule. There are political parties. Japan loves the United States. The Fourth of July is a day to celebrate. Her legislators understand the Monroe Doctrine, and their loudest cry is, "Asia for the Asiatics." This will be the shibboleth of the war, of Cossack against Jap. Japan has become a great maritime nation. Her government pays

enormous subsidies to ships, so that, with low passage-money and freight, her steamers can profitably navigate every sea. The Nippon Yushan Kaisha is the second great steamship line in the world—the Peninsular and Oriental being the largest. Japanese lines run to London, the Straits Settlements, Australia, China, Hongkong, Korea, Vladivostok, and the United States. There are eighty-three steamers run by this one company, and there are hundreds of sailing vessels.

There is progress in mental, moral, and religious matters also. Recently the news came from Japan that fifteen hundred students had become Christians. The Greek Church has twenty-five thousand converts in Japan. Our own missionaries are reaping a harvest. There is an Episcopal bishop at Tokyo, and another at Kyoto. The heathen world is moving. It is fashionable to belong to the Young Men's Christian Association, whose admirable agents teach mental and physical culture, as well as religion.

It will not be long before China will be covered with railroads. It is a mistake to imagine that the "Boxer" movement im-

peded or interfered, except temporarily, with the prosecution of business enterprises. The foreigners have a greater foothold in China than they ever had. Foreign municipalities are extending their limits. Associations of all kinds have been set on foot.

If it be necessary local governments are organized by the foreigner, and sometimes even in Chinese cities. With phenomenal boldness he takes possession of a locality, and, as if by magic, a city springs up, and trade and commerce go forward by leaps and bounds. Usually, of course, he assumes jurisdiction only over his own race, but sometimes when imperious necessity requires it he does not hesitate to control the native as well as the foreigner. A fine example of the administrative power of the foreigner has been recently furnished at Tientsin, China.¹

It was a *de facto* government sprung from the necessity of preserving order, and it had absolute sway over natives as well as foreigners, all of whom rendered to it unquestioning obedience. It embodied the military power of the civilized world, a title which no

¹ More fully described in Chapter XIV.

one could dispute. It actually accomplished for Tientsin things that no other government would have dared to inaugurate. It was sublimely autocratic and irresistible, but it undertook nothing that was not beneficial to its subjects, and what it determined to do it did.

It gave the Chinese impartial and honest courts. It gave them more freedom than they ever had before. No limits were assigned to its power. It tore down and removed the ancient ramparts which surrounded the city, and made the site of the wall into boulevards and quays. It founded a water-works company to furnish pure water. A tramway was started, a steel bridge built over the Peiho. More than fifty Chinese forts were destroyed. Asylums and hospitals were established. The board spent more than two hundred thousand dollars in improving the Peiho.

Outside of the material reforms, which will be of lasting benefit to Tientsin, the board went along its gentle but strenuous way in giving to the Chinese an object-lesson in government, which they greatly appreciated. The common people saw with regret the termination of this benign influence in 1902, but the

authorities, of course, were clamorous to be returned to power, and there was no legal reason to prevent the restoration of Chinese control, so the provisional government came to an end.

Concessions have been granted to foreigners to build railroads all over China, and they are being built. The reader need but examine the most recent volume of the Statistical Trade of China to see how American, German, French, British, and other companies are building railroads in that country. Their argument and influence is greatest of all forces in opening and liberalizing China. In this Americans should lead.

A great trade will spring up between our Pacific slope and the Orient. I have not space to dwell long on the other countries bordering on the Pacific. There is Korea, the Hermit Nation, emerging from the slumber of her vassalage to China. She, too, is building railroads and opening gold mines. She has sent a legation to Peking, to which formerly, by special grace, a deputation of vassals once a year took ginseng without paying any duty. Her minister stands before

the emperor the equal of the British and Russian representatives. She was one of the subject nations, the Burmese, the Tonquinese, the Nepaulese, but the "Middle Kingdom" has shrunk until this definition well befits it.

Siam, too, has entered the race of progress. Her enlightened king has turned his attention to railroad building, and is educating his sons in Europe. The Malay States, under a British protectorate, have given up piracy, and are becoming orderly, rich, and prosperous. The telegraph will belt all the railroads that I have mentioned. There are two hundred thousand miles of ocean cables. News used to come in a roundabout way, but will do it no longer. In China the Eastern Extension goes around by the canal and thence to Europe. The Great Northern goes via Japan and Vladivostok, across the continent. The Chinese land line connects with the Russian going from Peking to St. Petersburg. What we in this country wanted, and wanted imperatively, was a line from San Francisco connecting us with Japan, China, Hawaii, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. For commercial purposes we needed this line before we

owned the Philippines. It is a governmental necessity now. That such a cable will vastly facilitate the handling of important political questions by our government goes without saying. A message sent to Manila formerly travelled about fourteen thousand miles. It went across the Atlantic, through Europe and the Mediterranean, along the Suez Canal, through the Red Sea, on by Aden, Colombo, Singapore, up to Hongkong, and over to Manila.

Such a message now goes to Honolulu, thence to Midway Island, thence to Guam, and thence to Manila, traversing little more than half that distance. It was necessary to make at least ten retransmissions, now it requires but three. The cable will be a financial success. It is supposed that much of the traffic of Western Europe will go over such a line, following the example of the mails, which from that part of Europe go to Asia across our continent. There may be serious questions arising between our government and England as to our right to land a cable in China, but unless China refuses to stand by her promises, she will allow an American

cable to be landed on her soil. From time to time this question has arisen in China. It arose while Mr. Chester Holcombe was chargé d'affaires in 1881, and called forth from Prince Kung, the head of the Yamen, the following declaration:

"If hereafter the United States desires to lay a telegraph cable from Japan to China, a satisfactory and suitable arrangement will be made, and one which shall not disappoint the hopes of the American company in the least degree."

During my time the question did not arise between the Chinese government and myself, but the laying of a cable was much talked of in commercial circles, owing to the fact that Russia in 1890 endeavoured to secure what was called a Chinese-Russian telegraphic monopoly. The scheme failed then, but was afterward put through. In reporting on this matter to my government in 1890, I gave it as my opinion: "That, under the treaties, an American company has the right to land a cable in China, is not and cannot be disputed."

It appears, however, that England has been recently setting up some sort of a claim in the

port of the Eastern Extension that no other party can, under certain agreements made with China, lay a cable to her shores. It is to be hoped in the general interest of the commercial public that no such claim will receive recognition by China. Competition in telegraphing is ardently desired by the business men of China, and a universal sentiment, during my day, existed among them in favour of a trans-Pacific cable.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE FAR EAST

THE observer who undertakes to picture the future of the Far East is compelled to reconstruct his horoscope from day to day. The view changes as that of a kaleidoscope. When I went to China in 1885 the coöperation policy prevailed. The ministers met from time to time, and took up and considered all questions concerning foreign interests, determined what action to pursue, and left it to their distinguished and very able dean, Herr von Brandt, the German Minister, to present the question to the consideration of the Yamen. It was a simple and effective plan. It secured unanimity and the great influence of united action. Thus, when a riot occurred, the ministers determined the gist of the despatch to be sent to the Yamen, and left it to the dean

to prepare it. He sent a copy to each minister for further consideration and approval, and, when it was approved by all, it was forwarded to the Foreign Office. In the same manner all questions touching passports, the tariff, the right to manufacture in China, and many other subjects were handled. It was the world against China. When, on Herr von Brandt's retirement from China, I became the dean, the same system prevailed for several years. The ambitions of the various powers shattered and destroyed the coöperative policy, and in later years scarcely a vestige of it remains. Herr von Brandt had been twenty-two years in the Far East as secretary and minister. He knew the Asiatics perfectly. He stood high in the graces of the Chinese authorities. He treated them with kindness, and ruled them by persuasion. He continued the coöperative policy, which had been adopted in the time of Bruce and Burlingame. China had in 1861 entered upon a new and untried system. The first decade of the operation of the treaties had passed when Von Brandt arrived as minister, but even then the Chinese statesmen did not thoroughly com-

prehend the scope of the treaties. It may be safely said that if they had understood them before they were signed they never would have ratified them. With wonderful patience, and gentleness, and force, Von Brandt argued day after day questions involving foreign interests, and invariably with success. Do I violate the proprieties by mentioning the reason why my dear friend abandoned the post which he had honoured by many years of prudent, careful, and brilliant service?

He was engaged to be married to a beautiful American girl. At last, when the appointed day for his auspicious wedding drew near, he wired Bismarck for permission to marry her, and, being refused permission because she was an alien, he did what this *preux chevalier* could not have failed to do — he surrendered the first diplomatic position in the Far East, married his sweetheart, and retired to lead a scholarly life at Wiesbaden.

Here is a lover's romance, crowned with magnificent renunciation of place and power, found in the musty records of diplomacy. Should these lines ever meet the eyes of the great diplomatist, I hope he will pardon me

for illuminating the pages of this book with this splendid instance of manly faith and honour.

Naturally, after 1897, when the seizures of Chinese territory began, the coöperation policy waned and withered. It was every man for himself. The greed of territory, and of concessions of coal, iron, and railroad privileges, transformed the members of the diplomatic corps into commercial drummers.

It is almost useless to express regret that the attitude of the world has changed toward China. Instead of the pupil, willing and friendly, looking with childlike eyes into the face of her tutor, she has become the common prey of every nation. Instead of studying the peaceful arts, and working out by slow progression a civilization, which, blending the Western with the Eastern phases, should give assurance of a splendid career, she must ply her energies now to the one proposition — the saving of her territory from partition.

Since 1898 everything has changed in the Far East. Spain has lost the grasp which she feebly held for three centuries on the Philippine Archipelago. Ten millions of

people have passed under American sway. The United States has become an Asiatic power. This is the salient point of the new situation. I remember well how, when I undertook to arrange the preliminaries of peace between China and Japan, my European colleagues did not fail to express their surprise and very great regret that America should in any wise enter into the arena of Asiatic affairs. It was unusual and impolitic, they thought and said, and would produce complications. We had no interest in Asiatic questions, we were violating the Monroe Doctrine, etc. Three years afterward, when Dewey's guns boomed over Manila Bay, the attitude of the United States was all changed, altered, brightened, and elevated. We held our heads high at Peking, and hailed the echoes of American artillery as the signals of a new career, and a power hitherto undreamt of.

And so we must count hereafter on a new element in the East, which will have its weight in the determination of political questions. The riots of 1900, too, have contributed to change the situation. Things are not as they

were before. An immense power has been developed to do harm and injury. Whatever China may be, she is not what she was generally called,—a “sleepy Colossus.” She has shown that she can be very wide awake indeed, and her strength, controlled and directed by some more advanced power, may serve to check the designs of any single power on the globe. It is convenient and easy to say she will go to pieces, be partitioned among the European nations, and cease to be an integral power. When these prophecies were made, the new element that was hinted at above had not appeared on the scene of action. As long as we hold the Philippines there will be no partition of China proper, that is to say, the eighteen provinces. I advise all persons who are interested in China to dismiss from their minds the hope or the dread, as the case may be, of partition. I use the word “hope,” because there are many Americans in China, particularly merchants, who pray every day that partition may come, because they believe that peace and tranquillity would thus pervade the country, and mercantile pursuits would be safe and successful.

Those who dread it are far more numerous. This class comprises, in America, the missionaries, the manufacturers, the carriers, and the public men, and the politicians of all parties. It is safe to say that partition will not be attempted so long as we have a foothold in the East, which is only six hundred miles away from the Chinese coast. I do not predict war. I believe, on the contrary, that moral influence will be sufficient to deter any nation from such a flagrant act of injustice as the seizure of any one of the eighteen provinces absolutely as its own. Included, however, in moral influence may be reckoned the fear of war. Undoubtedly this consideration had weight with the men who came forcibly forward to defend the administration when the Philippines were annexed. Without including myself among the prominent persons who entertained this view, I may, nevertheless, say that I advocated the acquisition of these islands chiefly on the ground that their possession would enable us to prevent the partition of China. Holding enormous territories in the Far East, we have the right to intervene in any matter which points to the destruction

of our interests, and there is little doubt that such intervention would be heeded — not, probably, from fear, but from a customary and decent compliance with international courtesy.

Having thus settled that China proper will not be partitioned, let us briefly consider what the future of England, Germany, Russia, France, and Japan may be in the Far East. To England is chiefly due the credit of opening up China to foreign trade. She has spread broadcast in the Far East her free trade principles, to which she owes her greatness as a nation at home. She secures the opening of ports to her own commerce, but she knows that under the treaties they will be open to all the world. In her great emporium, Hongkong, no trade statistics are kept — it is a port as open as the air. Along with her baled goods go the English club, and the Church of England. When I visited Twatatia in Formosa, I found a club with seven resident members. They gave me a reception at the club-house on the bank of the Tamsui River. Eatables and drinkables were abundant, only ice was absent; the water was

cooled in jars suspended in the wind. This distinguished body, small as it was, was then negotiating with the governor of Formosa for permission to build a fine club-house on a beautiful spot on the river. I venture to say that wherever three Englishmen are gathered together, there is a club. It entertains all reputable strangers. They recall now at Hong-kong the adroitness with which Prince Henry, whose grandmother was an English lady, won the hearts of the club members by telling the dilatory waiter, who was slowly pouring Scotch whiskey into his glass, to keep on until he said "when."

With the club, too, goes the English Church. In the nicest spot in the concession, cool, enticing, reverential in appearance, divine service becomes attractive — though, to tell the truth, as I must, the homily, "where two or three are gathered together," is often realistic.

England, left to herself, has no ulterior designs on the territory of China. She took Wei-hai-wei, she claims, as a safeguard against the advance of Russia, and the territory around Hongkong for self-protection.



GENERAL VIEW OF HONGKONG

What she wants is trade. She may be relied on not to initiate the partition of China. Altogether we Americans can find no fault with her in the Far East. Possibly she patronizes us a little too much, and demands a fealty which is not always gracefully extended, — but, though we grumble sometimes at her, we really do love her very much.

In incidental conflicts which came on at Peking — once, for instance, when the French and Russians resigned from the club for a fancied slight — the English and Americans stood by the club, and pulled it through, and had the races as usual, and the British Minister proposed at the race dinner the health of an American lady because she had as he said, “when friends were needed befriended the club.”

All this is very nice indeed, and very gratifying, because of reasons that we cannot coldly explain — the occult working of racial causes, a kind of family relation, the cousinship which begets affection and sometimes leads to feuds.

I cannot see that there is any real gain to be expected for England in seizing other parts

of China as she seized Burma. When the English writer talks of the spread of liberal principles under her sway, and pictures the benefactions she bestows on the conquered nations, he overdraws the picture, possibly because these peoples are not able to enjoy the privileges so portrayed. The benefactions of England are more material than ethical. It is the vivifying influence of her vast trade which benefits the natives. To-day this trade is open to her, and nearly eighty per cent. of it is hers. As intercommunication increases it will grow. Let the imperialist coquet, if he will, with the colonies, and tinker at the free trade legislation, which has made England the greatest commercial nation in the world, but let him not kill the goose that lays the golden egg. I am persuaded that the British statesmen understand and will hold to this policy.

Russia to-day occupies the foremost place in the Far East. Her position has been somewhat discussed already in these pages. Her position in Manchuria was gained to enable her great trans-Siberian road to be operated. Unless Japan stirs up trouble against Russia there will be no war. If such a war inter-

venes its conclusion will be marked by the making of a new map of the world.¹

Germany in 1897 made her first effort to plant a colony in China. Her action has not been attended with success. To take Kiaochau, as was done, by force and violence, was a sad commencement of colonization. If ever a favourable time for partition comes Germany will seize the opportunity to acquire the great province of Shantung. Meantime her subjects are wisely and successfully engaging in an active competition for trade. Her goods are cheaper than the English or American goods. Her steamboats navigate all the coasts, and her mechanics are of the best. She has great and princely houses in China, who do business on a magnificent scale, who control large fleets of steamboats, and have branch houses in every important port in China, and in all the great cities of the world.

My opinion is that Germany will not inaugurate a system of partition, but if any other nation begins it, she will cheerfully join in the confiscation.

¹ Apparently prophetic words. See chapter on the Russo-Japanese war.—THE EDITOR.

France has more territory and more native population in the Orient than any other European country. She has as a colony, Cochin-China, and as protected states, Tonquin, Annam, and Cambodia. She has also a strip of territory at Chow-man Bay opposite the island of Hainan, and she practically claims all the concessions in China as French soil. The population she controls may be estimated at twenty-four or twenty-five millions, and the area of the countries named is enormous. So far it must be truly said that the Frenchman has proved a poor colonizer. His very virtues are against him. He is gallant, brave, and polite, but he is not serious enough. He loves pleasure too much. He is not domestic enough. He takes no family with him to the colonies, but finds a temporary one wherever he is. He loves office too well. In his book on the East, Henry Norman tells us that in Tonquin the population is 1,800,000 souls, while the French number 1,600, and 1,200 of these are functionaries.

As an example of French management I mention that the government paid to an operatic company thirty thousand dollars annually

to sing during the winter months at Saigon. I once had the good fortune to travel with that company from Saigon to Marseilles. We had opera and vaudeville all the trip.

France is continually seeking to extend her sphere of influence. After the Japanese-Chinese war in 1894, she compelled Siam to cede to her a large strip of territory on the left bank of the Mekong, which was the identical part of the Shan State of Kiang-hung which England had ceded to China the year before, with the express understanding that it should not be transferred to any other power without her consent. It will always be a question whether France derives any real benefit from her Eastern possessions. Year by year she appropriates enormous sums of money to defray the expense of the functionaries, and always there is a lively discussion in the Chamber of Deputies on the reasonableness of this policy.

France will probably wait to see what effect the construction of the railways will have on her colonies before giving them up, but when it is definitely known that they will always be a burden, she will give them up. Possibly

England may then step in to show her how to build up empires.

It is certain that the white man cannot labour in the fields in the tropics. Of all the nations Russia seems to understand this fact best. She goes toward the rising sun, but she keeps in the white man's country, and leaves the tropics to the "get-rich-quick" people. Her colonization is agricultural, which is the one certain method of creating prosperous communities in new countries.

The Frenchman will never leave home until he is driven to do so by want. As estates are equally divided he always inherits something, and on that he tries to live. France is declining in population, and cannot spare emigrants as Russia, England, and Germany can. The tariff policies of France in her Eastern possessions are the opposite of those of England. Duties are enormous, and they drive off trade. Even in French colonial ports England holds her own, and French trade with China is insignificant. It must be said also that her alliance with Russia hampers her. She must go wherever the Czar points the way. She would like to seize the two southern prov-

inces of China, Kwangsu and Kwangsi, but if she ever does she must look for war with England, because on this question England will fight — as she should do.

What shall I say of beautiful, delightful Japan — one of our children, of our creations? We struck her with the wand of progress, endowed her with ambition, and made her the wonderland of the world. She is the tourist's ideal, the cynosure of the artist, a grand play-house for geisha girls, kings, and statesmen, but alive with the burning breath of railroads, steamships, and manufactories. It is the land of the chrysanthemum and the cherry blossom, of delicious valleys, and snow-capped Fujiama. There are festivals all the year around. These things must be left for other writers. I am dealing with political questions.

Since the Chinese war Japan thinks she can whip all the world, and she particularly desires to whip Russia. She greatly deprecates the partition of China, and that is an indication that she will not seize any of its territory for herself. When she made war on China she intended to play toward her the same part that we did toward herself. She was going

to create a new China, which would adopt all the modern improvements, and become her fast ally, and help her to enforce the slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics." There cannot be much doubt that Japan intended, also, to seize and hold Korea. These schemes all dropped when Russia cleared her ships for action. Out of the useless and pitiful war, Japan only got Formosa, and some other islands, and a war indemnity. But as I write she is preparing to realize the ambition she has had so long and to gain the prizes of which she was cheated. What the future holds in store for her constitutes that eternal puzzle which is ever deeply fascinating to all who are concerned with the philosophy and progress of mankind and of civilization.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE RUSSO - JAPANESE WAR

[By the Editor]

THE reader of the preceding chapter has gained from Colonel Denby's admirable exposition of the ambitions of the various great powers in the East a foundation for an understanding of the causes of the war between Russia and Japan. It is the purpose of this chapter to give very briefly the steps leading up to the beginning of hostilities and the progress of the war up to the signing of the treaty of peace at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

This has been from the start an irrepressible conflict. As Colonel Denby has said, Russia needed the control of Manchuria in order to make safe her trans-Siberian railway and with it her new channel of traffic and communi-

cation between St. Petersburg and the Pacific. Japan, on the other hand, could not tolerate the dominance of Russia in Manchuria because that meant the probable absorption in time of Korea; and Korea, Japan must have as an outlet for her too great population and as her granary. The greatest reason Japan had for wanting Korea was to prevent Russia from getting it, for with Russia in the control of Korea she would hold a vise-like grip on practically all of Japan's communications. Between these two ambitions there could be no compromise. War or a backdown has been sure from the start.

It will be remembered that at the close of the Chino-Japanese war, in 1895, China ceded the Liaotung peninsula to Japan. But when Japan stepped forward to claim this cession, Russia, France, and Germany brutally informed her that they would not allow this portion of the treaty of peace to be carried out, that it threatened the integrity of China and introduced an element there inimical to their interests and to the peace of the Far East. This was undoubtedly the most impertinent and barefaced action ever taken by civilized

nations. Little Japan, bewildered by this show of force, looked appealingly to Great Britain, which, the reader will observe, was not included in the interfering nations. Just there Great Britain turned tail, as she has done so many times before. The lion was glad to roar and growl, but it would not leap. It was a terrible blunder for Albion. It cost her vastly in prestige and it made possible this war, just as Gladstone's indecision and temporizing and compromising and leaving great issues unsettled made possible England's war with the Boers. If the British had dared back Japan in her rights, the malicious trio of highwaymen would have dissolved in a night. So Japan had to give up that for which she had laboured and fought so hard. Meantime she bided her time.

More impertinent yet, Russia, not long after Japan had got out of Manchuria and given up Port Arthur, moved in and fortified that place! Then she demanded of China a right of way for a railroad across Manchuria as a reward for having saved that province for China! That was too much for Japan, little as she was, and she asked from China

a guarantee that neither Port Arthur nor any other portion of Manchuria should ever be leased to or fortified by any foreign power. That was a square proposition, but at once arose the Cossack's two Dromios, France and Germany, and informed Japan that perseverance in that demand would be regarded by them as an unfriendly act. Again England looked the other way, and again Japan had to swallow her discomfiture and bide her time. But she did more. She got ready for war. She saw it must come, and she became forearmed with a vengeance. While Russia at St. Petersburg dreamed of conquest of the Far East by her diplomacy, in which bluff was the main factor, Japan at Tokyo was enlarging her army and navy, building forts and arsenals, and accumulating great stores of ammunition. Even more important, she kept on instilling into her citizens a sense of the wrongs she had suffered and the great peril to her national existence if they were not righted. Thus the Japanese were ready and eager for war, while the Russians knew nothing of the issues and planned in no way to circumvent the plain purposes of the Japs. Meanwhile, as Colonel

Denby has so well told the story, grabbing went on by the European nations. Great Britain, having lost the magnificent opportunity to save China and help Japan, went into grabbing with the others, demanding Wei-hai-wei, just across from Port Arthur, while Germany and France demanded and got Kiao-chau and the bay of Kwang-Chau-Wan. To add to Japan's miseries, it became known that in 1896 China had concluded a secret treaty with Russia by which the latter was given express permission to occupy Manchuria with railways troops and fortifications. This was accomplished probably by bribery. As Colonel Denby has said, this grabbing was one of the first causes of the "Boxer" outbreak. It's a long lane that has no turning, however, and China, after the "Boxer" outburst, saw the enormous force Russia was pouring into Manchuria, the great works at Port Arthur and the building of Dalny, called the "Fiat City," on the sea to become the end of the trans-Siberian railroad. Then she awoke from her sleep and cried to be released from her bonds. In this protest she was supported by Great Britain and the United States

in 1901. The Japs went a step farther, and the next year, emboldened by their growing strength, they drew Great Britain into the treaty of alliance, a very brief document indeed, merely stipulating that in case any two powers attacked either Japan or Great Britain the other would join her. In the present war, of course, no fulfilment of that treaty has taken place because only one power, Russia, has engaged Japan, but it has had a wonderful potency, nevertheless, keeping off the Kaiser and the French, both anxious and eager to snuff out the Japs' life. When the news of that treaty's negotiation came out, all nations paused for a long time. It revealed Japan as a real world power. That she could induce conservative Great Britain into forming an alliance with her showed two things, one, the strength of Japan, the other, the alertness of Great Britain. Now backed by British arms and John Hay's influence, Japan began an adroit diplomatic pounding upon Russia's position in Manchuria. Then at last the Bear faltered. Things were massing too rapidly for his slow brain. Russia then made her fatal mistake. She signed an agreement to

withdraw from Manchuria by October 1, 1903. Therein she abandoned her bluff policy and took a backward step. No sooner had she done it than she realized her mistake. Whether she ever meant it or not no one knows. Her ambassadors, however, repeatedly assured our and the British and Japanese diplomatic officers of the honesty of Russia's intentions. But when the time came she did not budge. It was plain that to hold her power in China she must not withdraw. But in formally agreeing to withdraw and then flatly going back on her word, she lost the respect of the people of the whole world. Shrewd and diplomatic lying is pardoned and even applauded, but a bungling, barefaced lie forfeits the respect of gods and men. And without the world's respect Russia cannot win in Manchuria or anywhere else in this twentieth century.

When October 1, 1903, arrived, the three powers made protests against Russia's failure to act. Nothing was done. Then Japan, having taken stock, began to move. With the approval of Great Britain and the United States she submitted to Russia certain proposals, viz.:

To respect the integrity of Korea and China, Russia agreeing not to obstruct the commercial development of the Japanese in Korea, and Japan agreeing to take the same attitude toward Russia in Manchuria. Russia to have a right to send troops into Manchuria, and Japan into Korea, to suppress disorder, but neither to attempt permanent military occupation there. The recognition of Japan's right to give advice to Korea to be conceded. After two months' delay Russia submitted counter proposals, providing that Japan should formally relinquish all interests in Manchuria and agree not to interfere with Russian designs there. Russia at the same time agreed to allow Japan to advise Korea, but suggested a neutral zone in the north of Korea. Naturally, Japan at once rejected this proposition, but she submitted another one, modifying her first one in the interest of peace. This second proposition was for a joint agreement of the two powers to respect the integrity of China and Korea, and for a Russian protectorate over Manchuria, and a Japanese protectorate over Korea. It took forty-one days for Russia to answer that, and in her note she agreed to

the Korean part of the Japanese proposition, but made no reference to Manchuria. This meant plainly that Manchurian affairs were not Japan's business. Japan thought differently, and so expressed herself in a note which reached Russia January 13, 1904. No answer was ever received. Again and again Japan pressed for a reply, and the only response was that the date of a reply could not be stated. On February 5th, Baron de Rosen, Russia's Minister at Tokyo, was notified that diplomatic negotiations were to be broken off, and the next day he was ordered to quit Tokyo, on that day the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg demanding his passports. Two days later, February 8th, the Japanese fleet attacked the Russian fleet outside Port Arthur, and the war was on.

The story of the war is so fresh in the mind of the reader that no attempt will be made to give it here except in the barest outline. At the opening of hostilities Russia held two important stations on the Pacific coast, Port Arthur and Vladivostok. The Russian army was scattered in various parts of Manchuria, with the centre of operations at Mukden,

and what might be called general headquarters at Harbin, both, of course, in Manchuria. The design of the Japanese was, on the one hand, to capture the two Russian seaports as soon as possible by combined army and naval movements, and, on the other hand, to drive the Russian armies out of Manchuria. The first attack was made by Togo on the Russian warships, anchored, by some outrageous blunder, in the outer harbour of Port Arthur. This was effected with almost complete success on February 8th. The Russian squadron there was taken by surprise and badly beaten, two warships being sunk and seven disabled. Almost at the same time Kuroki landed troops in Korea, two days later occupied Seoul, the capital, and then pressed on through Korea into Manchuria. From April 29th to May 1st, were fought the first hard battles of the war, when Kuroki crossed the Yalu from Korea into Manchuria, driving the Russians before him. Russia was taken completely by surprise, not dreaming apparently that the Japanese would go to war. This lack of preparation explains the slight resistance Russia's armies were able to make at first to the



ADMIRAL TOGO

terrible and rapid movements of the Japanese under Count Oyama, commander-in-chief. Meanwhile, in order to capture Port Arthur it was necessary to isolate it. To accomplish this the Japanese second army under Oku landed at Pitsewo, on the Liao-Tung peninsula, May 5th. Three days later Oku cut the railroad at Pulantien, and Port Arthur was isolated. Oku then proceeded north toward the Russian main position. A third army under Nodzu landed at Takushan, above Pitsewo, and also started north. Neither of these armies took up the task of the siege of Port Arthur. That was left to the fourth army under Nogi, which in June landed at Kerr Bay south of Pitsewo and at once undertook that stupendous task. Meanwhile, the Russians had burnt and abandoned Dalny, the "Fiat City" they had spent millions to build, and on May 30th Japanese troops entered it. Its importance to them was as a base for attack on Port Arthur.

The Russian armies by this time lay north of the Japanese, stretched over a front of 150 miles. They were commanded by Kuropatkin, Russia's greatest military leader. Against

these armies the three armies of the Japanese advanced. And the story of the campaign there is simply the story of the advance, sometimes rapid and sometimes slow, but always sure, of these terrible Japanese troops. A bloody and important fight was at Nanshan on May 26th. The first general engagement of the two forces occurred at Liao Yang from August 26th to September 4th. Four hundred and twenty thousand men were engaged, and the result was a signal Japanese victory. Kuropatkin executed a masterly retreat. On October 9th Kuropatkin assumed the aggressive, and the battle of the Shakhe followed, a disastrous one to the Russians. Meanwhile Nogi was advancing doggedly south toward Port Arthur, fighting most desperate and bloody battles. The most horrible and fiercely contested of these battles was on November 30th, and resulted in the capture of 203-Metre Hill, which commanded the interior works of Port Arthur and made its surrender a matter of days only. The capitulation occurred on January 2d, after a siege of 232 days. This capture cost Japan scores of thousands of



FIELD - MARSHAL OYAMA

men and one hundred million dollars. It was an awful price.

The general Manchurian campaign had not been progressing during the last weeks of the Port Arthur campaign because of the winter. But soon after the capitulation, Oyama pressed forward toward Mukden, where Kuropatkin had established his headquarters, and there, from February 24th to March 12th, occurred probably the most desperate battles in modern history, if not in all history. About eight hundred thousand men were engaged. Again Oyama won and again Kuropatkin retreated in fairly good order. The Russians were driven about a hundred miles north of Mukden. Since that great battle practically no movements have occurred in Manchuria. The scene shifted to the sea again.

After the defeat of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur early in the war, the Russians began equipping the Baltic fleet under Rojestvensky, that they might retrieve their naval eminence in Chinese seas. That squadron could not be started from Libau until October 15th, and five days afterward the world was startled by the news that this squadron had

fired on some English fishing-boats in the North Sea, thinking they were Japanese torpedo-boats. Two fishermen were killed and one boat sunk. This act came near involving Great Britain and Russia in war, but diplomacy smoothed over the affair. An Inquiry Court was constituted, and after several months rendered a Scotch verdict. The general opinion is that it was a case of nerves and hysterics on the part of the Russians. Meanwhile, Rojestvensky proceeded on his way to certain doom. He had taken the route around the Cape of Good Hope, and he arrived at Madagascar on January 3d, the day after the surrender of Port Arthur. There he waited for his fate to be decided. At length he was ordered to go on. In May he entered the Sea of Japan, and on the 27th occurred the great naval battle in which the Russian fleet was annihilated by the Japs under Togo. That was a crushing blow to Russia's hopes. It made her ready to listen to reason at last, and to welcome President Roosevelt's offer to take steps for peace negotiations. The conference of these peace envoys, Sergius de Witte, Russian Prime Minister, and Baron de Rosen,



SERGIUS DE WITTE

Russia's Ambassador to the United States, and Baron Komura, Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, and M. Takahira, Japan's Minister to the United States, began at Portsmouth, N. H., on August 9th. The peace treaty was signed there on September 5th, and an armistice was soon afterward ordered. It is unnecessary here to recapitulate the provisions of the treaty, for they are commonly known. Officially the exact form of the treaty is not yet published, but we know that Japan has got practically all she went to war for, viz., the expulsion of Russia from Manchuria and the right to control Korea. The future is bright for her, and her prestige is higher than any other country in the Eastern Hemisphere.

For the reader's convenience there is appended a chronology of the war as follows:

1904

- Feb. 5. Diplomatic relations broken off.
- Feb. 8. Togo attacks the Port Arthur fleet.
- Feb. 9 *Variag* and *Korietz* sunk. Japanese troops land at Chemulpo.
- Feb. 10. The Czar declares war. Japanese occupy Seoul.
- Feb. 11. The Mikado declares war. United States

- announces neutrality. A Japanese merchantman sunk by Vladivostok fleet.
- Feb. 28. Skirmish at Ping-Yang; first land action of the war.
- March 6. Kamimura bombards Vladivostok.
- March 8. Makaroff takes command at Port Arthur.
- March 27. Kuropatkin reaches Mukden.
- April 4. Kuroki occupies Wiju, on the Yalu.
- April 13. Makaroff goes down with the *Petropavlovsk*, during a sortie from Port Arthur.
- May 1. Battle of the Yalu.
- May 5. Oku lands at Pitsewo.
- May 11. Russians destroy and evacuate Dalny.
- May 14. Port Arthur isolated.
- May 15. Japanese battle-ships *Hatsuse* and *Yashima* sunk by mines, and the cruiser *Yoshino* in collision.
- May 22-26. Taking of Nan-Shan Hill, the first of Port Arthur's defences.
- May 30. Japanese occupy Dalny.
- June 15. Vladivostok squadron bombards Wonsan, Korea, and sinks the transports *Sado* and *Hitachi*.
- June 27-29. Kuroki and Nodzu capture the Fen-Shui, Ta, and Mao-Tien passes.
- July 13-17. Russian volunteer cruisers *St. Petersburg* and *Smolensk* seize the British steamer *Malacca* and the German steamer *Prinz Heinrich* in the Red Sea.
- July 23. Torpedo-boat attack on Port Arthur fleet.
- July 26-30. Capture of Wolf Hills, Port Arthur.
- July 30. Japanese begin advance on Liao-Yang.
- July 30-31. Battle of Hai-Cheng.

- Aug. 8. Oku occupies New-Chwang.
- Aug. 10. Wittsoeft killed in sortie from Port Arthur; the fleet dispersed and damaged.
- Aug. 14. Kamimura defeats Vladivostok squadron; *Rurik* sunk.
- Aug. 19-24. First general assault upon Port Arthur.
- Aug. 26-Sept. 4. Battle of Liao-Yang.
- Sept. 19-21. Fort Kuropatkin taken; commanding Port Arthur's outer defences.
- Oct. 11-21. Battle of Sha River.
- Oct. 15. Rojestvensky sails from Libau with Baltic squadron.
- Oct. 20. Armies go into winter quarters before Mukden
- Oct. 22. The North Sea trawlers fired on by Rojestvensky's fleet.
- Oct. 25. Kuropatkin replaces Alexieff in supreme command.
- Oct. 26. Japanese attack East Kikwan forts and occupy Rihlung-Shan.
- Nov. 16. Russian destroyer *Rostrofny* escapes to Che-Foo with despatches, and is blown up to avoid capture.
- Nov. 30. Storming of 203-Metre Hill.
- Dec. 6-10. Japanese fire destroys Port Arthur fleet.
- Dec. 18. First permanent breach made in Port Arthur main defences.
- Dec. 28-31. Nogi takes all Kikwan positions.

1905

- Jan. 1. Stoessel offers to surrender.
- Jan. 2. Surrender of Port Arthur.

- Jan. 3. Rojestvensky arrives off Madagascar.
- Jan. 10-11. Cossack raid in Japanese rear penetrates nearly to New-Chwang.
- Jan. 25-29. Battle of the Hun River. (Sandepas.)
- Feb. 15. Third Pacific squadron sails from Libau under Nebogatoff.
- Feb. 24-March 12. Battle of Mukden.
- March 16. Rojestvensky sails east from Madagascar.
- April 8. Rojestvensky arrives off Singapore.
- May 2-5. Vladivostok torpedo-boats raid Japan's north coast.
- May 8. Nebogatoff's squadron joins Rojestvensky.
- May 27-28. Battle of the Sea of Japan.
- June 3. Enquist with three cruisers reaches Manila; vessels interned.
- June 9. President Roosevelt opens diplomatic correspondence with the fighting powers, looking to peace.
- June 11. Russia and Japan pledge themselves to a peace parley.
- July 8. Japanese land on Sakhalin Island.
- Aug. 9. Peace Conference opens at Portsmouth, N. H.
- Sept. 5. Peace Treaty signed.

THE END.

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